The Inherent Right of the Haudenosaunee to Criminal Justice Jurisdiction in Canada: A Preliminary Inquiry by Cousins, Michael
THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE HAUDENOSAUNEE TO 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE JURISDICTION IN CANADA: 
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 
Michael R Cousins 
Bachelor of Arts, Wilfred Laurier University 1995 
Bachelor of Laws, University of Saskatchewan 2000 
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 





O Michael R Cousins 2004 
IMON FRASER UNIVERSITY 
Fail 2004 
All rights reserved. This work may not be 
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy 
or other means, without permission of the author. 
Name: Michael R Cousins 
Degree: Master of Arts 
Title of Thesis: The Inherent Right of the Haudenosaunee to 
Criminal Justice Jurisdiction in Canada: A 
Preliminary Inquiry 
Examining Committee: 
Chair: Dr. Brian Burtch 
Professor of Criminology 
Dr. Ted Palys 
Senior Supervisor 
Professor of Criminology 
Prof. Michael Jackson 
Supervisor 
Professor of Law 
University of British Columbia 
Dr. Eldon Yellowhorn 
External Examiner 
Professor of Archaeology 
Date DefendedIApproved: I , V  n\#m I ?Gq 
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY 
PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENCE 
The author, whose copyright is declared on the title page of this work, has 
granted to Simon Fraser University the right to lend this thesis, project or 
extended essay to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make 
partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the 
library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or 
for one of its users. 
The author has further granted permission to Simon Fraser University to keep or 
make a digital copy for use in its circulating collection. 
The author has further agreed that permission for multiple copying of this work 
for scholarly purposes may be granted by either the author or the Dean of 
Graduate Studies. 
It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not 
be allowed without the author's written permission. 
Permission for public performance, or limited permission for private scholarly 
use, of any multimedia materials forming part of this work, may have been 
granted by the author. This information may be found on the separately 
catalogued multimedia material and in the signed Partial Copyright Licence. 
The original Partial Copyright Licence attesting to these terms, and signed by this 
author, may be found in the original bound copy of this work, retained in the 
Simon Fraser University Archive. 
W. A. C. Bennett Library 
Simon Fraser University 
Burnaby, BC, Canada 
The Haudenosaunee, or Six Nations of the Grand River, are the largest First 
Nations community in Canada and are located near the city of Brantford, Ontario. 
Currently, the Six Nations Band Council is examining the prospect of implementing a 
"parallel" criminal justice system. 
In support of this initiative, this thesis analyzes the viability of implementing a 
parallel criminal justice system pursuant to the inherent right of self-government within 
the meaning of s. 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Supreme Court of Canada 
has established a four-step legal framework that all courts must utilize when assessing 
an Aboriginal rights claim. In conformity with existing judicial directives, anthropological, 
historical, and oral tradition evidence is applied to each of the four areas of inquiry to 
support the legal assertion that the Haudenosaunee have a constitutionally protected 
inherent right to develop and administer a system of criminal justice within their territorial 
boundaries. 
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Table 1: Overview of an Aboriginal Rights Analysis 
The ~audenosaunee,' or Six Nations of the Grand River,' are the largest First 
Nations community in Canada and are located near the city of BrantFord, Ontario. They 
have an approximate membership of 21, 6003 and their territory encompasses 20,000 
 hectare^.^ They are one of the most progressive First Nations communities in the 
country, with ample community, legal, and educational support  structure^.^ Their elected 
Band Council consists of twelve Councilors and one Chief Councilor. The traditional 
hereditary government still maintains a deep-seated position of leadership and is 
appointed by the women who hold the hereditary Chieftainships.' 
Since the point of first contact with Europeans, the Haudenosaunee have 
consistently maintained a position of sovereign nationhood, and have resisted any 
1 Haudenosaunee is the correct lroquoian expression the Six Nations use to refer to themselves. 
In English it translates into 'People of the Longhouse'. Other expressions used to identify the 
Haudenosaunee include, Five Nations, Six Nations, Iroquois, the League, and the Confederacy. 
2 The Six Nations are a political Confederacy comprised of the Mohawk, Cayuga, Oneida, 
Onondaga, Seneca and Tuscarora Nations. 
3 Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Registered Indian Population by Sex and 
Residence (December 31, 2002) [http:llwww.ainc-inac.gc.calpr/stslriplripO2e.pd. As of 
December 31, 2002 the Six Nations of the Grand River had a Band membership list totaling 
21,618 individuals (February 14, 2003). 
4 Six Nations Reserve Grand River Country, A Brief History [http:lltuscaroras.comljtlc IProposal 
lsix - nations-reserve.htm] (February 10, 2003). 
5 Ibid. Primary community support structures include employment services; a medical services 
facility; a day care centre; a senior citizens residence; a crisis intervention centre; drug and 
alcohol abuse services; welfare services; and a recreation centre. Legally oriented services 
include First Nations constables; child protection; correctional services counselling; and family 
violence counselling. Educational services include five elementary schools that integrate 
Aboriginal languages and First Nations' culture in their curricula; one post-secondary institution 
that emphasizes the development, promotion and retention of Haudenosaunee culture and 
languages; and a post secondary centre that manages and distributes funding for post secondary 
students attending institutions off territory. 
6 Six Nations of the Grand River, Six Nations Council [http:llwww.woodland-centre. on.calS - 
Nations.html] (February 10,2004). 
attempts by foreign nations to supplant or encroach their internal affairs.' Their position 
of self-governing autonomy also extends into the sphere of criminal justice jurisdiction. 
Currently, the Six Nations elected Band Council, in consultation with the Hereditary 
Council and other First Nations, is examining the prospect of implementing a "parallel" or 
"alternative" criminal justice system.' In support of this initiative, this thesis will make a 
preliminary assessment of the viability of implementing a parallel criminal justice system 
pursuant to the inherent right of self-government within the meaning of s. 35 (1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.' Thus, the scope of this inquiry will be focused primarily on the 
examination and evaluation of the existing legal requirements necessary for the 
Haudenosaunee to assert such a right. 
Chapter 1 will examine the political history of the Haudenosaunee from the point 
of first contact with Europeans to their most current expressions of sovereign 
nationhood. The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, it will provide the context 
necessary to fully understand and evaluate the Haudenosaunee and their position on 
7 See, A.C. Parker, Parker on the Iroquois vol. 3 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968); 
P.A. Wallace, W.B. Newell, Crime and Justice Amoung the lroquois Nations (Montreal: 
Caughnawaga Historical Society, 1965); L.H. Morgan, League of the lroquois (New York: Burt 
Franklin, 1901 ); H.C. Colden, The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada, 1727, vol. 1 (New 
York: Allerton Book Co., 1922); E. Kenton, The Indians of North America (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & Co., n.d.); Deskaheh and Six Nations Council, The Redman's Appeal for Justice 
(Brantford: Wilson Moore, 1924); P. Williams & C. Nelson, "Kaswentha" in Canada, Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, For Seven Generations: An Information Legacy of the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (CD ROM) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 
1 997). 
8 Six Nations of the Grand River, Six Nations Council, Justice and Law Portfolio [http://www. 
Sixnations.calJusticeandLaw.htm] (February 10, 2004). 
9 For the purposes of this thesis the type of "parallel" justice system expressed is that advocated 
for by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which is characterized as, the power to 
create criminal law within Aboriginal territories; jurisdiction to deal with a wide range of matters in 
the area of criminal law and procedure operative within Aboriginal territories; unimpeded authority 
over aspects of criminal law and procedure that fall into the core of Aboriginal jurisdiction; and, 
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal power over criminal law and procedure generally. This type 
of parallel system is much more comprehensive than existing Aboriginal justice initiatives that 
tend to be typified as small-scale; developed on an ad hoc basis; operating on limited budgets; 
and, under the shadow of a pilot project mentality. Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in 
Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 177-247. 
sovereignty. Second, it will demonstrate continuity of criminal justice practices.1•‹ The 
rationale used in this section assumes that Haudenosaunee complacency towards 
British interference into their sovereign affairs gives a reasonable indication of the 
probability of the Iroquois abandoning their internal social regulation practices. 
Conversely, the more resistance to British intrusion exhibited by the Haudenosaunee, 
the stronger the evidence of their desire to retain their traditional methods of criminal 
justice. It is important to note that although this evidence may not be sufficient to meet 
the specific legal standard required to demonstrate continuity, it certainly allows one to 
draw rational, sound conclusions on the matter, which is a primary function of this 
preliminary inquiry. 
Chapter 2 will investigate traditional Haudenosaunee methods of social 
regulation and how their worldview, in conjunction with The Great Law of Peace, 
maintained an extremely cohesive society in which anti-social or criminal behaviour was 
a very rare occurrence. In order for a court to accurately assess the assertion of a 
Haudenosaunee inherent right to criminal justice jurisdiction, the appropriate historical 
and cultural context must be presented and this Chapter is designed to provide this 
information. 
Chapter 3 will review existing Aboriginal rights case law relevant to the assertion 
of Aboriginal criminal justice jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Canada has established 
a four-step legal framework that all courts must utilize when assessing an Aboriginal 
rights claim, and this section will closely examine that framework and its related 
principles. 
Chapter 4 applies the framework and principles established by case law to the 
specific issue of Haudenosaunee criminal justice jurisdiction. The anthropological, 
historical, and oral tradition evidence outlined in Chapters 1 and 2 will be utilized to 
10 In order to be considered an existing Aboriginal right, Canadian law requires an Aboriginal 
claimant to demonstrate continuity of a practice, custom, or tradition integral to the distinctive 
Aboriginal society. What this means is that there must be some continuous application and 
connection of the right that is being asserted, with a practice, custom, or tradition that was integral 
to that society before contact with Europeans. Essentially, if that practice, custom, or tradition was 
abandoned or altered to the extent that it can't be considered integral to the society, it is not 
considered an existing Aboriginal right. However, the courts have also distinguished between the 
abandonment and the suppression of Aboriginal rights, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
support the legal assertion that the Haudenosaunee have an existing right to develop 
and administer a system of criminal justice within their territorial boundaries. 
The final conclusion will reflect on some of the legally oriented issues discussed 
in the thesis, although it will also comment on one of the most important questions 
related to this subject matter, i.e., "Why are the courts being left to adjudicate the matter 
of Aboriginal criminal justice jurisdiction, when there is longstanding governmental 
recognition of the existing Aboriginal right to self-government"? 
CHAPTER 1: 
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE HAUDENOSAUNEE 
Since Time Immemorial 
Originally the Five ~ations," or Haudenosaunee, occupied the area in what is 
now Montreal, and were subject to the domination of the Adirondacks, who were a very 
powerful warrior-oriented nation. The Haudenosaunee revolted against the Adirondacks, 
but were driven from their homes, and migrated to the lower shores of the Great Lakes, 
from the Hudson River on the east to the Niagara River on the west, and from the Great 
Lakes on the North to the Potomac River on the south.I2 From east to west, the 
Haudenosaunee territorial boundaries were home to the People of the Flint (Mohawks), 
the People of the Stone (Oneidas), the People on the Mountain (Onondagas), the 
People at the Landing (Cayugas), and the Great Hill People (seneca).I3 
Initially, these nations were similar to other Aboriginal nations. Each was an 
independent body with similar dialects and similar customs, but there was no political 
alliance. The standard norm was each man and each nation to itself and they often 
warred amongst each other, as well as with surrounding First Nations. These practices 
only served to devastate any existing internal cohesion and create vulnerability to 
surrounding hostile nations, such as the Huron and ~lgonquin. '~ All this changed when 
the Peacemaker planted The Great Tree of Peace and provided the Haudenosaunee 
11 The original Five Nations Confederacy became the Six Nations Confederacy with the 
admission of the Tuscarora in 1724. 
12 L.H. Morgan, League of the Iroquois (New York: Burt Franklin, 1901) at 36-37. 
l3 W. N. Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1998) at 51. 
14 Ibid. at 17. 
with The Great ~ a w . ' ~  The result was the creation of the most powerful and influential 
First Nation Confederacy in North America.16 
16th and 17th Century 
First contact occurred in the fall of 1534 when Jacques Cartier sailed up the St 
Lawrence and came upon the Haudenosaunee settlement of Hochelaga, which was 
inhabited by several thousand ~ohawks."  The Mohawks peacefully greeted Cartier and 
prepared a feast for the 'strange' guests, who, fearing poison, declined the hospitality 
and returned to their fort near Stadacona. Cartier and company remained at the fort over 
the winter and the following spring returned to Britanny, not returning for six years." 
In 1609, the Dutch, having established New Amsterdam at the mouth of the 
Hudson River, encountered the Haudenosaunee as they pushed northward.lg In the 
same year, Champlain with a party of Algonquian allies encountered an army of 
Mohawks near Crown Point. The Haudenosaunee and the Algonquian had long been 
enemies and a battle ensued. This was the focal point for a long-standing hostility 
between the lroquois and the French that would last until 1763.~' In 1645, the lroquois 
and Dutch entered into an alliance of peace and friendship with the Two Row Wampum 
~rea t y .~ '  The concept of this Treaty was developed by the Haudenosaunee so they 
could peacefully co-exist, conduct trade and share resources with the Dutch, and later, 
other European Nations such as the British. The Two Row Wampum embodies the 
principles of sharing, mutual recognition, respect and partnership and is based on a 
15 Appendix 1. The Great Law of Peace of the Longhouse People (Akwesasne: White Roots of 
Peace, 1973). 
l6 For a complete version of the Legend of the Peacemaker see, A.C. Parker, The Constitution of 
the Five Nations (Ohsweken: lrocrafts Ltd., 1984). 
17 R. Wright, Stolen Continents: The New World Through Indian Eyes (Toronto: Penguin Books, 
1993) at 1 22. 
18 B.G. Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic (Montreal: McGilllQueen's University Press, 1987) at 
177-208. 
19 J.A. Noon, Law and Government of the Grand River lroquois (New York: Johnson Reprint 
Corporation, 1949) at 12. 
20 D. R. Snow, The Peoples of America: The Iroquois (Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996) at 
78-79. 
For a more detailed examination of this Treaty please see the section on Surrender. 
nation-to-nation relationship, which respects the autonomy, authority and jurisdiction of 
each nation.22 Both parties adhered to these principles until 1664 when the British 
defeated the Dutch and overtook New ~ m s t e r d a m . ~ ~  
The English were able to preserve the same friendly relations with the lroquois 
that had been maintained by the Clut~h.'~ On September 24, 1664, representatives of 
the Five Nations and Britain's Colonel George Camright entered into a formal alliance 
similar to that between the lroquois and the Clut~h.'~ This alliance was further solidified 
in the 1679 Albany Conference that ensured Haudenosaunee hunting and travel through 
Manahoac territory and the 1684 Albany Treaty that blocked English settlement in 
Iroquois-controlled ~iedmont.'~ These agreements also provided for British protection 
from the French within lroquois territ~ries.'~ 
In 1692 the original treaty relationship that had been forged with the Dutch in the 
Two Row Wampum was formally extended to the British, but thereafter, became known 
as the Silver Covenant chain." The Treaty was so named as a metaphor for the 
relationship, which was considered a silver chain that tied the British ship and the 
lroquois canoe to the Tree of Peace. An actual silver chain was made to symbolize their 
agreement and the three links of that chain were said to represent peace, friendship, and 
forever, which was the basic theme of all Haudenosaunee treaties. The parties also 
agreed to meet regularly to polish the chain to restore their original friendship and to 
pass the treaty down from generation to generation, so that its intent would never be 
f~rgotten.~' It is important to note that treaty protocol during this period was always 
- - - 
22 Two Row Wampum Treaty [http:llwww.kahnawake.comlckrltwo_row.htm] (October 18, 2003). 
23 B. Graymont, The lroquois in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1972) at 26. 
24 Ibid. 
25 H. Broshar, The First Push Westward of the Albany Traders [http:lldinsdoc.com/broshar-I .htm] 
(October 18, 2003). 
26 Treaties Defining the Boundaries Separating English and Native American Territories 
[http:llwww. virginiaplaces.org/settlelandltreaties.html] (October 19, 2003). 
27 Graymont, supra note 23 at 27. 
28 The Covenant Chain [http:llwww.iroquoisdemocracy.pdx.edulhtmllcovenantchain.htm] (October 
19, 2003). 
29 What is important about the treaties? [http:llsixnations.buffnet.netlLessons~from~History/] 
(October 18, 2003). 
conducted according to Haudenosaunee custom, and the British knowingly adopted and 
adapted each element of Haudenosaunee Council and treaty pr~cedure.~' 
18th Century 
After 1697, with the end of King William's War, the Haudenosaunee could no 
longer depend upon British support against the French. The abandonment by their 
British allies forced the lroquois to seek further treaties of peace and friendship with 
both, which the Haudenosaunee were able to achieve.31 On August 4, 1701, the lroquois 
became signatories to "Le Grande Paix," or "The Great Peace," a treaty meant to end 
the decades of bloody conflict between the French, their Indigenous allies, and the 
lroquois confederacy. The terms of the Treaty required the French to recognize the 
independent sovereignty of each signatory First Nation and in return, those nations 
pledged peace and goodwill. The treaty was signed by the French governor, de Calliere, 
and was marked by the leaders of 39 First Nations. Essentially, this compact required 
the lroquois to remain neutral in any future wars between England and France, and in 
return, the French would initiate a procedure of trade with the Five Nations, recognize 
the lroquois right to the beaver-hunting territory and refrain from invading 
Haudenosaunee territories. Importantly, this treaty virtually ended the Amerindian- 
French wars and set a precedent of negotiation, which lasted well into the 1800's.~~ 
Shortly before the Haudenosaunee became signatories to The Great Peace 
Treaty, they had sent a delegation to Albany to conduct negotiations with the British. The 
result of those negotiations was the Nanfan Treaty of 1 7 0 1 ~ ~  or 'A DEED FROM THE 
FIVE NATIONS TO THE KING, OF THEIR BEAVER HUNTING GROUND'. In this 
accord, the lroquois surrendered land to the north and northwest of Lake Erie, which 
they had conquered some eighty years previously. In return, the English were to protect 
and guarantee hunting within the boundaries stipulated, to the Haudenosaunee, their 
30 P. Williams & C. Nelson, "Kaswentha" in Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
For Seven Generations: An Information Legacy of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
(CD ROM) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1997). 
31 Graymont, supra note 23 at 27 
32 The Great Peace of 1701 [http:llwww.turtletrack.orgllssues01ICo081120011 C0-08112001 
- Great-Peace.htm] (October 18, 2003). 
heirs and descendants, forever. Apparently the French had allied themselves with the 
former Indigenous inhabitants of the area and were planning on building a fort in the 
territory. However, the lroquois cleverly prevented French expansionism and ensured 
their own continued use of the area.34 
During the next three inter-colonial wars of the eighteenth century35 the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy generally preserved a position of neutrality, although 
individual nations strengthened their alliances with both European powers for the benefit 
of their societies. For instance, some Mohawks fought alongside the British, and some 
Seneca alongside the French, during both Queen Anne's and King George's 
However, during the French and lndian War, the lroquois were reluctant to support either 
side. A longstanding association with the British still existed, although the French defeat 
of General Braddock in July of 1755 was especially impressive to the Haudenosaunee, 
who were content to delay any active participation in the war until a clear victor began to 
emerge.37 By 1759, it became apparent to the majority of lroquois that the English would 
prevail, and all but the Seneca joined the British in the expedition against Niagara. 
With the defeat of France and their subsequent withdrawal from Canada, the 
Confederacy was left with little choice but to ally themselves with the English. In April of 
1762 Sir William Johnson, the British superintendent of lndian affairs, held a congress 
with the Six Nations at Johnson Hall. Here, he presented the Haudenosaunee with a 
large belt of wampum that was meant to reaffirm "the Antient (sic) Covenant Chain" and 
promised that the English would keep it "entire and unbroken" so long as the lroquois 
remained faithful allies of the ~ i n g . ~ '  In response, the Seneca asked forgiveness for 
their previous attachment to the French and swore future loyalty to the British. 
33 Nanfan Treaty, 1701. 
34 Graymont, supra note 23 at 27 
35 Queen Anne's War, 1701-1 71 3; King George's War, 1744-1 748; French and lndian War, 1754- 
1 763. 
36 Graymont, supra note 23 at 29. 
37 Ibid. at 30. 
38 S. W. Johnson, Sir William Johnson Papers, vol. Ill at 670-717 
In 1763 England's King George Ill issued a Royal p roc lama ti on^^ that set aside 
huge tracts of land, reserving them as Aboriginal hunting grounds, and prohibited grants 
or purchases of this land, or settlement on it, without a licence. The document reflected 
the existing nation-to-nation relationship between the British Crown and First Nations 
and defined the issue of criminal justice jurisdi~tion.~~ The primary intent of the 
Proclamation was clearly directed at protecting Indian possession or use of land 
reserved to them, however, the Seneca who harbored some historical hostility towards 
the English were not appeased. Some of them would soon join Chief Pontiac in the 
failed 1763-64 war against the English, after which, they were required to once again 
take hold of the Covenant Chain at the congress of Niagara in 1764.~' 
By 1768 the land policies enunciated by the Royal Proclamation had consistently 
been disregarded by settlers and land speculators, so British officials met with Iroquois 
leaders at Fort Stanwix in order to ratify a new arrangement. In return for a guarantee of 
their traditional homelands in western New York, the Iroquois surrendered their claims 
south of the Susquehanna and Ohio rivers, which were not occupied by the Six Nations, 
but home to the Delaware, Mingo and  hawn nee.^' 
For the next several years the Haudenosaunee enjoyed a period of relative calm 
and autonomy, with little interference from the British apart from a more concerted effort 
to convert them to the Christian faith.43 By 1775 they were once again placed in the 
difficult position of choosing a side with which to ally. The American colonies and the 
British Crown were preparing for conflict, and both were representing themselves as the 
legitimate heirs of the traditional Iroquois-English alliance. During the early stages of this 
confusion the Confederacy arrived at a temporary solution by declaring neutra~ity.~~ 
39 Royal Proclamation, 1763. 
40 For a more detailed account of the Royal Proclamation please see the section on legislative 
extinguishment. 
4 1 Johnson, supra note 38 vol. XI at 141. 
42 Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1 768) [http:/lwww.u-s-history.comlpageslh1214.html] (October 19, 
2003). 
43 Graymont, supra note 23 at 33-47. 
44 Ibid. at 48. 
However, they were eventually drawn into the Revolutionary War, with some of the Six 
Nations allying themselves with the British and others with the ~ m e r i c a n s . ~ ~  
The Mohawks, having long been staunch allies of the British, first gained 
guarantees from Sir Guy Carlton, Commander of the British forces, that any losses, 
including land, would be ~ompensated.~~ On November 30, I782 the Preliminary Articles 
of Peace between Great Britain and the United States were concluded. The Articles did 
not include any protection of lroquois land, but in fact transferred ownership of those 
lands to the United States as far west as the Mississippi ~ i v e r . ~ '  
The Haudenosaunee were incensed with Britain's casual disposition of their land 
without a word of consultation. Speaking through Captain Aaron Hill, they boldly told 
General Maclean, commander at Niagara, that they: 
... were a free People subject to no Power upon Earth and that they were 
the faithful allies of the King of England, but not his subjects. Accordingly 
the King had no right whatever to grant away to the States of America, 
their rights or properties without a manifest breach of all justice and 
Equity, and they would not submit to it.48 
On October 22,1784 some delegates of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy met 
with representatives of the United States and concluded the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. The 
agreement contained provisions regarding the return of prisoners of war, land cessions, 
and the delivery of 'goods' for the 'comfort' of the Six ~at ions.~ '  Shortly thereafter, the 
lroquois held a Confederacy Council at Buffalo Creek and promptly refused to ratify the 
Treaty. They denied that the delegates were authorized to cede such large tracts of land, 
and therefore, decided to request the return of the deeds given to the Americans. The 
Americans refused.50 
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Several months before the conclusion of the Fort Stanwix Treaty, the 
Haudenosaunee members who remained loyal allies to the British Crown sought to 
ensure that the land compensation guarantees given by Sir Guy Carlton were upheld. 
Led by Chief Joseph Brant, they entered into negotiations with British General Frederick 
Haldimand for territories that were reasonably close to their traditional homelands, but 
outside the jurisdiction of the United States. By this point, the Confederacy had little trust 
in either the British or Americans, and wanted to ensure their Iroquois brethren in the 
United States were close by in times of emergen~y.~' The negotiations resulted in 
General Haldimand purchasing a substantial tract of land along the shores of the Grand 
River from the Mississauga Peoples. Subsequently, the lroquois were granted this land 
"Six Miles deep from each Side of the River beginning at Lake Erie, and extending in 
that Proportion to the Head of the said River, which them & their Posterity are to enjoy 
forever."52 
By 1785, over 1,800 Iroquois from all of the Six Nations, as well as numerous 
Delawares, Nanticokes, Tuteloes, Creeks and Cherokees had settled in their new 
te r r i t~ r ies .~~  Although the Confederacy was now separated by a border imposed by 
foreign powers, the Council Fire still burned and The Great Law still remained the 
foundation on which their societies would continue to function.% 
51 Graymont, supra note 23 at 284. 
52 Canada, Public Archives of Canada, Haldimand Grant, R.G. 10, Ser. 2, XV, at 132-33. 
53 Canada, Public Archives of Canada, Census of the Six Nations, B103, at 457. 
54 Traditional oral teachings with S. Sandy, Clanmother, Mohawk Nation; J. Thomas, Traditional 
Chief, Cayuga Nation; R. Maracle, Traditional Chief, Mohawk Nation; G. Hill, Pipekeeper, 
Mohawk Nation; L. Hill, Traditional Healer, Mohawk Nation; R. Hill, Pipekeeper, Onondaga 
Nation; S. Porter, Sweatlodge conductor, Mohawk Nation; R. Longboat, Elder, Mohawk Nation 
(1 994-2003) Six Nations of the Grand River. 
19th Century 
Once the Grand River Haudenosaunee had settled in their new territory the 
ancient Confederacy began to replicate itself in conformity with the mandates of The 
Great Law. Fifty condoled chiefs were appointed by ~ lanmothe rs ,~~  Pine Tree Chiefs 
were selected, and a new Council Fire was established and tended by the local 
Onondagas. Life had become somewhat peaceful and the people focused their energies 
on building and maintaining their c ~ m m u n i t y . ~ ~  
By 181 2 the lroquois were once again courted by the British and Americans as 
allies for yet another war. In reply to these overtures the Haudenosaunee stated, "We do 
not seek war, and we may not fight against our brethren, but if our homes are attacked 
we will defend them." Many contemplated siding with the Americans because of the 
prevailing belief that Upper Canada would ultimately fall to the United States. In the end, 
most declared their neutrality57 although they did act in defence of their new territory 
once the Americans had invaded. In particular, the lroquois are noted for their actions in 
the battle of Queenston, in which they were recognized for the "great measure due to 
them" and fully shared in "the honours of the brilliant affair."58 
After the British defeated the Americans in the Battle of Stoney Creek the 
Haudenosaunee returned to their homes to get on with the demands of daily life. Shortly 
55 A Condolence Council is a Haudenosaunee mourning ritual and would always occur when an 
existing Confederacy Chief died. The ritual would begin with the arrival of a messenger from a 
condoling, or "Clear-Minded" community, who would make their presence and peaceful intentions 
known. Members of the mourning community would welcome the messenger and they would then 
perform the requickening ritual together. This would be followed by an exchange of stories and 
wampum, as well as other ceremonial practices that were meant to show sorrow for the deceased 
Chief; wipe away bad blood; reestablish bonds; and restore the mourning community to good 
spirits. After the condoling ceremonies were concluded, the new Chief, who had been selected by 
the women of the Clan who own the name and title of the Chieftainship, would be installed. The 
lroquois also used the Condolence Ceremony to mourn non-Iroquois allies and conducted their 
treaty negotiations according to ritual structures adapted from the Condolence Council. R. A. 
Williams, Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and Peace, 1600-1800 
(New York: Routledge, 1999) at 55. 
56 Wright, supra note 1 7 at 31 5. 
57 Snow, supra note 20 at 163. 
58 E.M. Chadwick, The People of the Longhouse (Toronto: The Church of England Publishing 
Company Ltd., 1897) at 21. 
before the War of 1812, Chief Joseph Brant had recognized the need for the lroquois to 
adapt to the rapidly changing world. The Grand River territory was not sufficiently large 
to provide sustenance from game alone, so more reliance would have to be placed on 
agriculture. Brant surmised that bringing non-Indian farmers into proximity with Iroquois 
farmers would provide the latter with the skills and values they would need for the 1 gth 
century. Therefore, Brant began the practice of selling and leasing Grand River territory 
to Europeans, which ultimately resulted in the loss of 350,000 acres. Now that farming 
was an integral part of their lives, the Haudenosaunee returned to their livelihood with 
little interference for the next several years.59 
In 1841 the Grand River Chiefs recognized that the late Chief Brant's land 
policies were leading to the gradual alienation of virtually all of their territory. In response 
to the crisis, they agreed to surrender most of their remaining land to be held in trust by 
the Dominion government, who then evicted all non-Indians from the territory and 
secured its boundaries for the future.60 
The mid 1800s also saw the Confederacy struggle with some difficulties in the 
appointment of hereditary Chiefs. The Seneca and Oneida populations were somewhat 
sparse and therefore unable to provide the required number of hereditary leaders 
mandated by The Great Law. However, the Confederacy overcame this difficulty, and 
filled all 49 positions, by assigning Chieftainship names to lineages that had not 
traditionally held them. 
The necessity of filling the Chieftainships at this point was extremely crucial to 
the lroquois in two important aspects. First, the continued formation of the League 
ensured that their traditional internal practices would be respected and upheld. 
Secondly, the League would continue to have a nation-to-nation relationship with the 
Dominion government, which recognized the Confederacy at the Grand River as the 
appropriate group to speak for all ~roquois.~~ 
59 Snow, supra note 20 at 164. 
60 Ibid. at 165. 
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With the traditional governance structure firmly entrenched in the new territory, 
the function of the Confederacy Chiefs now required some reorientation. In the pre- 
contact era, the Council's authority was focused principally on external affairs and 
matters of war and peace, but the existing reality now required them to take the 
additional role of a local government and regulate the internal affairs of the community. 
However, the added responsibilities did not affect the Council's mandate to continue to 
act as the delegated authority of a sovereign people. They still continued to emphasize 
the importance of their 'international' role in any relations with the Dominion and, later, 
Canadian  government^.^^ 
After the implementation of the 1876 lndian A C ~ , ~ ~  conflicts within the 
Confederacy arose over the type of government that would be most beneficial to the 
community. The Act endorsed the abolishment of traditional forms of governance in 
favour of an elected system. A majority of Onondaga Chiefs wanted to reassert the 
traditional League structure in the face of Canadian domination, while the Mohawks 
believed that adopting some provisions within the lndian Act might work to their 
advantage.64 The Onondagas held strong to tradition and "adamantly opposed federal 
legi~lation"~~ that would impede their autonomy. In contrast, the Mohawks were willing to 
adopt new procedures and policies in Council "as long as their control over local affairs 
was not endangered".66 The Mohawks had increasingly assumed the role of middlemen 
between the Onondagas and the Superintendent of lndian Affairs, holding a somewhat 
more moderate position on government regulations. 
Traditionally-based Council deliberations often took inordinate periods of time 
and often prompted the Superintendent to threaten the Chiefs with the prospect of an 
elected system if they did not proceed in a more efficient manner. In response, the 
Mohawks, who wanted to ensure the Council remained an autonomous form of local 
government, would then attempt to expedite the process through the self-appointed role 
62 Noon, supra note 19 at 18. 
63 lndian Act, S.C. 1876, c. 34. 
64 Snow, supra note 20 at 182. 
65 S. M. Weaver, "Seth Newhouse and the Grand River Confederacy" in M. K. Foster, J. Campisi, 
& M. Mithun, eds., Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to lroquoian Studies 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984) at 171. 
66 Ibid. 
of faci~itator.~' However, the Mohawks' moderate position on procedural matters did not 
equate to a concession on their attitude towards Haudenosaunee sovereignty. In fact, 
when any Dominion legislation threatened to diminish their power or jurisdiction, "the 
Mohawks were even more vociferous than the Onondagas in asserting their 
 objection^''.^' 
By 1899 the Confederacy set about to further emphasize the legitimacy of their 
traditional political processes and sovereignty with the creation of a written version of the 
original Five Nations' Constitution or Great Law. The document was drafted under the 
direction of Chiefs John Gibson, Jacob Johnson, John Elliott and Hilton Hill with an 
assessment review carried out by Albert Cusick. The manuscript received final approval 
from the Chiefs in 1900, and although its construction may not have repaired the existing 
divisions in regard to Council procedure, it was certainly a powerful symbol regarding the 
Leagues' unwavering consensus on matters of internal sovereignty, and the enduring 
applicability and authority of The Great ~ a w . ~ '  
20th Century 
In the late 19th and early 20th Century the Dominion government, through 
provisions of the Indian Act, began a concerted effort to compel elected forms of 
government in the majority of First Nations communities situated in Canada. The 
traditional Iroquois Councils at Tyendinaga, Kahnawake, and Akwesasne had all been 
overthrown by 1900, but those at Grand River still appointed their Council leaders in the 
traditional manner and continued to assert their sovereign authority within their 
b~undaries.~' In 1909, their status as a self-governing people was reaffirmed by the 
Minister of the Interior, Frank Oliver, who maintained: 
It is the policy of the Canadian Government, as I understand it, to 
recognize its relations with the Six Nations lndians of the Grand River as 
being on a different footing from those with any of the other Indians of 
Canada. The Six Nations lndians of the Grand River came to Canada 
67 Ibid. at 176. 
68 Ibid. at 171. 
69 Snow, supra note 20 at 184. 
70 Wright, supra note 17 at 320. 
under special treaty as allies of Britain, and the policy of the Canadian 
government is to deal with them having that fact always in view. 
The system of tribal government which prevailed among the Six Nations 
on their coming to Canada was satisfactory to the Government at that 
time, and so long as it is satisfactory to the Six Nations themselves so 
long it will remain satisfactory to the Government of ~anada .~ '  
However, the legitimacy of the Confederacy Council would soon be challenged 
by a minority of Christian Haudenosaunee who advocated a change to an elected 
system of governance. Apparently the Dominion lndian Department was also working in 
concert with the 'Christian democrat' faction in order to dissolve the Council in the name 
of electoral reform.72 The League observed these actions as a serious threat to their 
existence and once again set about to renew their claims of sovereignty. In 1919 the 
Council appointed a Status Committee headed by Cayuga Chief Deskaheh to defend 
against the aggressive Dominion threat.73 In the autumn of 1920 the Council hired 
London Ontario lawyer AG Chisholm to draft a petition asking for a reference to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. The claim was based on the contention that actions taken by 
Dominion government under the lndian Act were a violation of the Six Nations right to 
internal self-government and ultra vires Canada. However, under the existing Supreme 
Court Act the case could not be heard without leave from the Governor in Council, who 
was deemed to act on the advice of the Canadian Prime Minister. In practice, however, 
the Prime Minister relied on recommendations from the lndian Department, which was 
effectively a party in this case.74 Based on a judiciously worded memo from Duncan 
Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent of lndian Affairs, which advised that the 
reference would be of 'no advantage' to the lndian administration, the petition was 
rejected by an Order in Council and the Six Nations were declared British subjects.75 
71 Canada, F. Oliver, Minister of the Interior to Chief J.S. Johnston, Deputy Speaker, Six Nations 
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Subsequent to the dismissal of their petition, the Council replaced Chisholm with 
George Decker, a lawyer from Rochester, New York. They drafted a second petition 
asking for the protection of the British Crown from Dominion laws 'manifestly designed to 
destroy our ~ o v e r n m e n t ' . ~ ~  
The League also made an appeal for simple justice, stating: 
The Six Nations of the Grand River, with sorrow in their hearts, come to 
complain of wrongs done us in the name of the Dominion Government. 
We complain because the Ministry of the Interior has ceased to recognize 
our rights in the Grand River Retreat. The Ministry has devised and 
prevailed on the Dominion Government to enforce on our people, one by 
one, [Canadian] citizenship ... and thus to open our domain, without our 
consent, to piecemeal purchase by outsiders ... We have no shield of our 
own with which to oppose the Power of Canada coming against us in our 
own homes. To prevent so great a wrong we offer the simple justice of 
our 
Receiving no adequate resolution from the Governor General, Deskaheh then 
departed to England in order to secure British protections from Dominion aggression, 
which, had been guaranteed in the many treaties concluded with their historic allies. 
Winston Churchill, colonial secretary of the time, dismissed the Iroquois delegation7' 
stating, "The matters submitted lie within the exclusive competency of the Canadian 
~overnment " .~~  
On 4 December 1922, Charles Stewart, the new Superintendent of Indian Affairs 
accompanied by Duncan Campbell Scott, traveled to Ohsweken to negotiate the 
appointment of a tribunal to resolve the ongoing discord. The result of the meeting 
included an acceptance by the Confederacy in regard to tribunal member selection and 
the appointment of seven constables to collaborate with the Ontario police on the 
question of liquor contro~.'~ However, before the Council could formally confirm their 
acceptance of the negotiations, the Grand River territory was subjected to a three-day 
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raid by the newly created Royal Canadian Mounted Police, accompanied by Inland 
Revenue Officers, who claimed to be looking for illicit alcohol.81 At some point during the 
raid shots were fired, which halted any further negotiations and resulted in the 
construction and staffing of an RCMP detachment within yards of the Council House at 
~hsweken. '~ 
Subsequent to the RCMP raid and the imposition of Dominion criminal justice 
enforcement into Haudenosaunee territory, the Confederacy resolved to present their 
case to the newly formed League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. Deskaheh and 
Council lawyer George Decker, prepared a brief entitled: The Redman's Appeal for 
Justice: The Position of the Six Nations That they Constitute an Independent State. The 
document itself asserts a clear statement of internal sovereignty, overviews the historical 
nation-to-nation relationship with the British Crown and lists several ongoing grievances 
including: 
The Dominion Government is now engaged in enforcing upon the people 
of the Six Nations certain penal laws of Canada, and, under cover 
thereof, the Dominion Government is violating the Six Nation domain and 
has wrongfully seized therein many nationals of the Six Nations and cast 
them into Canadian prisons, where many of them are still held.83 
and, 
All the measures aforesaid have been taken without the consent of the 
Six Nations, and under protest and continued protest of the duly 
constituted Council thereof.. . 84 
In addition, the document also described the RCMP invasion of Haudenosaunee 
territory in the following manner: 
To the manifest end of destroying the Six Nations Government, the 
Dominion Government did, without just or lawful cause, in or about 
December of the year 1922, commit an act of war upon the Six Nations 
by making an hostile invasion of the Six Nations domain, wherein the 
Dominion Government then established an armed force which it has since 
maintained therein, and the presence thereof has impeded and impedes 
81 Woo, supra note 74 at 7. 
82 Wright, supra note 17 at 322. 
83 Redman's Appeal for Justice, supra note 79 at para. 1 1. 
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the Six Nations Council in the carrying on of the duly constituted 
government of the Six Nations people, and is a menace to international 
~eace. '~  
As a remedy for the alleged injustices, the Confederacy appealed to the League 
of Nations to protect and secure their independent right of home rule; appropriate 
indemnity for the said aggressions; a just accounting of Six Nations trust funds; provision 
to cover the right of recovery of trust funds; freedom of transit across Canadian territory; 
protection for the Six Nations under the League of Nations in the event that Britain will 
not extend such protection; and suspension of all aggressive practices by the Dominion 
of Canada upon the Six Nations peop~es.'~ 
In preparation for their trip to Europe, the Confederacy demonstrated their 
autonomy by creating Six Nations passports that were subsequently accepted and 
authenticated by Switzerland as legally valid international doc~ments.'~ According to the 
tenets of the League of Nations, any nonmember required a member nation to sponsor 
their affairs. Deskaheh first approached the Netherlands, with whom the 
Haudenosaunee had first established diplomatic relations in the early 1600s. However, 
with Canada still a part of the British Empire, the Foreign Office in London prevented the 
Netherlands from presenting the Six Nation's petition through a process of 'diplomatic 
embarrassment'.'' 
In response to this setback, Deskaheh and Decker distributed copies of the 
petition to all remaining member nations. On September 27, 1923 delegates of Estonia, 
Ireland, Panama and Persia all signed a letter requesting a communique of the Six 
Nations' petition to the League of Nations' ~ssembly.'~ After being informed that the 
matter could not be addressed because the Assembly's session was almost concluded, 
the Persian delegate forwarded a telegram asking for consideration by the League's 
Council. However, the request was rejected on the grounds that no Canadian delegate 
was present and the matter was put over for another year. Britain then utilized the 
85 Ibid. at para 15. 
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interruption to exert diplomatic pressure on the countries that had supported the 
Haudenosaunee. Over the following months the previously sympathetic governments 
withdrew their support, suggesting that their representatives at the League had acted 
without proper  instruction^.^^ 
While Deskaheh was in Geneva advocating for the Haudenosaunee, the 
Dominion government was conspiring to overthrow the Confederacy Council and replace 
it with an elected lndian Act government. A Royal Commission, headed by Colonel 
Thompson, was appointed to investigate Six Nations' affairs. However, the Confederacy 
refused to acknowledge the powers of the Commission and the Chiefs refused to give 
testimony. In his final report, Thompson accused the Council of mismanaging public 
affairs, and also reported the existence of 'flagrant immoralities' throughout the 
territo~-y.g' This purportedly gave the Dominion government grounds to depose the 
Council and on September 17, 1924 Prime Minister MacKenzie King and Governor- 
General Lord Byng of Vimy signed an Order-in-Council mandating the replacement of 
the Haudenosaunee Council with a Band Council elected under Canada's lndian Act. On 
October 7, 1924 the RCMP forced their way into the Ohsweken Council House and read 
a decree dissolving the traditional Confederacy government. They then seized historic 
documents relevant to Iroquois sovereignty, raided the homes of wampum keepers and 
confiscated the sacred belts.92 
Indian Act elections were held on October 21, 1924, and of the total Six Nations 
population of 4,500, only 26 ballots were cast. Apparently, all of those elected to Band 
Council belonged to the 'Christian Democrat' minority, who had effectively voted 
themselves into power.93 With their legitimacy now undermined, the Confederacy 
Council still continued to hold regular meetings at the Grand River Onondaga 
Longhouse, but they were no longer able to conduct business as usual. The Dominion 
government had control of their trust funds, which they dispensed to the Band Council. 
Woo, supra note 74 at 9. 
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With no access to the resources needed to effectively address community needs, the 
League could no longer function as an effective form of local g~vernment.'~ 
Although the League was now relegated to a form of symbolic traditional 
leadership not recognized by the Dominion, they still continued to advocate for 
Haudenosaunee sovereignty. The literature regarding the Six Nations during the mid- 
1900s is quite sparse; however, there are important recorded instances of the people's 
support of the Traditional Council and their resistance to the imposition of Dominion 
jurisdiction. For instance, during the census of 1941, the Dominion government was 
attempting to enroll members of the Six Nations as loyal subjects of His Majesty's 
government. Supporters of the Confederacy refused to participate in the census on the 
grounds that that they were not subjects of His Majesty but citizens of the Six Nations of 
the Grand River. Consequently, four individuals were charged with violations of the 
Census Act and subsequently tried and found guilty by a Magistrate's Court in Brantford. 
When the accused refused to pay the fines imposed, all were sentenced to jail.'= 
The number of votes cast in Band Council elections during this period give a 
good indication of the populations' rejection of the elective system. By the late 1940s, the 
vote represented "somewhat less than ten percent of the voting population of the 
re~ervation".~~ 
In 1959, the Confederacy staged a countercoup in an attempt to restore their 
legitimate government. They were successful in gaining control of the Ohsweken Council 
House, but the RCMP soon ousted them, utilizing clubs to expedite their ~bjective.'~ 
In the same year the Confederacy sought a legal injunction to restrain Clifford E. 
Styres, Chief Councilor of the elected Band Council and R. J. Stallwood, Superintendent 
of the Six Nations Indian Agency, from surrendering 3.05 acres of Grand River territory. 
They challenged the validity of the Orders-in-Council that approved the surrender and 
further argued that: 
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... the Six Nations Indians, not being subjects of the Crown, it was ultra 
vires the powers of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to enact section 
91(24) of the B.N.A. Act, whereby the legislative authority of the 
Parliament of Canada is made to extend to all matters coming within the 
classification "lndians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" insofar as the 
said Six Nations lndians are concerned. If this be so the plaintiff then 
states that it is ultra vires the powers of the Parliament of Canada to 
enact the lndian Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 149 insofar as the said Six Nations 
lndians are concerned and that likewise the Orders in Council already 
referred to and made pursuant to the lndian Act are likewise ultra vires 
insofar as the Six Nations lndians are concerned." 
In his somewhat brief decision, Justice King concluded: 
In my opinion, those of the Six Nations lndians so settling on such lands, 
together with their posterity, by accepting the protection of the Crown then 
owed allegiance to the Crown and thus became subjects of the Crown. 
Thus, the said Six Nations lndians from having been the faithful allies of 
the Crown became, instead, loyal subjects of the Crown. 
and, 
I am of the opinion that the Six Nations lndians are entitled to the 
protection of the laws of the land duly made by competent authority and 
at the same time are subject to such laws. While it might be unjust or 
unfair under the circumstances for the Parliament of Canada to interfere 
with their system of internal Government by hereditary Chiefs, I am of the 
opinion that Parliament has the authority to provide for the surrender of 
Reserve land, as has been done herein, and that Privy Council Order 
P.C. 6015 is not ultra vires." 
Although the ruling in this decision does conclude that the Haudenosaunee 
became subjects of the Crown with their acceptance of Crown protection, the ruling 
basically reflects the prejudicial judicial reasoning of the courts during this time period.loO 
Under the existing principles of law in relation to First Nations' legal rights, this ruling 
would undoubtedly be considered a mistake of law. As previously discussed, under 
current jurisprudence any treaty or other document which purportedly extinguishes an 
Aboriginal right requires a clear and plain intention to do so and any ambiguities must be 
Logan v. Styres (1959), 20 D.L.R. 2d 416 (Ont. High Crt.). 
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peacemaking under public international and Canadian constitutional law (Saskatoon: Native Law 
Center, University of Saskatchewan, 1998) at 181. 
resolved in favour of the First  ati ion."' A plain reading of the Haldimand Grant certainly 
does not exhibit any such clear and plain intention to extinguish any Haudenosaunee 
right. The relevant clause states: 
Whereas His Majesty having been pleased to direct that in consideration 
of the early attachment to his cause manifested by the Mohawk Indians, 
and of the loss of their settlement which they thereby sustained - that a 
convenient tract of land under his protection should be chosen as a safe 
and comfortable retreat for them and others of the Six Nations. 
For comparative purposes, similar provisions in the Royal Proclamation, 1763, 
which also applied to the lroquois read, "the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with 
whom We are connected, and who live under our Protection". 
When evaluating these two clauses it is quite apparent that they have very 
similar aims and purposes. Both set aside land for First Nations connected in some way 
to the British Crown, who, because of that connection are under the protection of the 
Crown. The Royal Proclamation is considered an affirmation of existing Aboriginal rights 
and not to have extinguished any such rights.'02 The Haldimand Grant, with similar 
wording and intent, cannot be considered an agreement with the clear and plain intent to 
extinguish Haudenosaunee sovereignty or internal self-governing practices. The Iroquois 
certainly didn't understand that to be the case, and if there is any intent to extinguish 
rights, that intent is certainly not 'clear and plain'. 
In September 1977 the Haudenosaunee once again returned to Geneva, 
Switzerland. Several non-governmental organizations of the United Nations had called 
for papers that described the conditions of oppression suffered by Native peoples, with 
supportive oral statements to be given to the U.N. Commissions. The traditional Six 
Nations Council prepared and sent a delegation with three papers that offered an 
abbreviated analysis of Western history, and called for a consciousness of the Sacred 
Web of Life in the universe.lo3 The three documents were entitled, "Introduction and 
Spiritualism: The Highest Form of Political Consciousness"; "The Obvious Fact of Our 
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Switzerland, Autumn 1977, Awkwesasne Notes [http://www.ratical.com/many~worlds/6Nations 
/BasicCtC.html] (October 22, 2003). 
Continuing Existence: Legal History of the Haudenosaunee"; and, "Policies of 
Oppression in the Name of Democracy: Economic History of the Haudenosaunee". Each 
of the papers hold important and profound messages regarding lroquoian and European 
histories and ideologies, however, the second and third essays convey strong ideas 
concerning Haudenosaunee sovereignty and how the Haudenosaunee understand the 
expression of that concept. The following excerpts are primary examples of those 
expressions: 
The Haudenosaunee are a distinct people, with our own laws and 
customs, territories, political organization and economy. In short, the 
Haudenosaunee, or Six Nations, fits in every way every definition of 
nationhood. 
We have always conducted our own affairs from our territories, under our 
own laws and customs. We have never, under those laws and customs, 
willingly or fairly surrendered either our territories or our freedoms. Never, 
in the history of the Haudenosaunee, have the People or the government 
sworn allegiance to a European sovereign. In that simple fact lies the 
roots of our oppression as a people, and the purpose of our journey here, 
before the world community. 
Now we find ourselves in Geneva, Switzerland, once again. For those of 
us present, and the many at home, we have assumed the duty of carrying 
on our peoples' struggle. Invested in the names we carry today are the 
lives of thousands of generations of both the past and the future. On their 
behalf, also, we ask that the Non-Governmental Organizations join us in 
our struggle to obtain our full rights and protection under the rules of 
international law and the World ~ommun i t y . ' ~~  
and, 
The citizens of the Haudenosaunee are a separate people, distinct from 
either Canada or the United States. Because of this, the Haudenosaunee 
refuses to recognize a border drawn by a foreign people through our 
lands. 
The Haudenosaunee vigorously objected to the Citizenship Act and 
maintains to this day that the People of the Longhouse are not citizens of 
Canada or the United States, but are citizens of their own nations of the 
League. 
104 The Obvious Fact of Our Continuing Existence: Legal History of the Haudenosaunee, 
Akwesasne Notes, [http://www.ratical.~om/many~worlds/6~ations/6nations2.html#pa2] (October 
22,2003). 
We, the Haudenosaunee, have clear choices about the future. One of the 
choices which we have faced is whether to become Westernized, or to 
remain true to the Way of Life our forefathers developed for us. We have 
stated our understanding of the history of the changes that have created 
the present conditions. We have chosen to remain Haudenosaunee, and 
within the context of our Way of Life, to set a course of liberation for 
ourselves and the future generations.Io5 
In 1982 the Haudenosaunee became active participants at the Working Group on 
lndigenous Populations and in 1984 participated in an international congregation of 
lndigenous Peoples in Panama, where they assisted in the development of the 
Declaration of Principles of lndigenous ~ igh ts , "~  which is a comprehensive doctrine on 
lndigenous Peoples' rights to self-determination. Haudenosaunee delegates were also 
present at the 1989 General Conference of the International Labour Organization of the 
United Nations where they lobbied to the U.N. to protect lndigenous peoples and their 
lands from colonial exploitation, as well as the 1992 Earth Environmental Summit where 
they petitioned the U.N. to declare 1993 as the 'International Year for the lndigenous 
~eoples'. '~' 
In 1999 the federal government, the Ontario provincial government, and the Six 
Nations-elected Council co-sponsored an initiative to establish a "Tribal court" on Six 
Nations' territory. Court operations would be managed and administered principally by 
qualified Haudenosaunee individuals, although there would not be any significant 
change in traditional Canadian criminal justice system practices and procedures. The 
community was engaged through information meetings and regular updates through 
local media, and approval or rejection of the project would be determined by way of 
community referendum. Throughout the community consultation process the elected 
Council remained neutral on the issue, preferring to let the community base its decision 
on the information disseminated to them. However, the hereditary Council lobbied 
extensively against the scheme as they considered it an unwelcome intrusion of foreign 
105 Policies of Oppression in the Name of Democracy: Economic History of the Haudenosaunee, 
Akwesasne Notes, [http:/lwww.ratical.comlmany~worldsl6Nationsl6nations3.html#pa3] (October 
22,2003). 
l o6  Declaration of Principles of lndigenous Rights, Fourth Assembly World Council of lndigenous 
Peoples (September, 1984) Panama. 
107 D. George-Kanentiio, Iroquois at the U.N., Akwesasne Notes, [http:llwww.ratical.org lmany 
worldsl6NationsllroquoisAtUN.html] (November 5, 2003). 
- 
jurisdiction on sovereign territory. In the end, the Haudenosaunee people 
overwhelmingly rejected the endeavor for many of the reasons the Confederacy had 
articulated: A provincial court would continue the imposition of foreign values, practices, 
and jurisdiction that had routinely been utilized to oppress and dispossess the 
Haudenosaunee for centuries.lo8 
To this day, the Haudenosaunee continue to assert their unwavering position as 
independent sovereign peoples. The Longhouses remain the time-honored location for 
hereditary Council meetings and members of that Council are still appointed according 
to the mandates of The Great Law. Although not recognized by the Canadian state as 
the formal political leadership of the community, the hereditary Chiefs, Clanmothers, 
Pipe Carriers and Faithkeepers still retain positions of leadership and are highly 
influential in community affairs.log The existing elected Council also maintains a firm 
stance on Haudenosaunee sovereignty and rights. For example, in response to the 
proposed First Nations Governance ~ct,"O elected Chief Roberta Jamieson 
unreservedly declared: 
Because of certain events of the 1920s, our community has both a 
traditional government with long historic ties to the British Crown, and an 
elected council recognized pursuant to the Indian Act. Over the years, 
differing perspectives have caused contention, and it is our challenge and 
opportunity to reconcile issues and concerns amongst ourselves. Our 
children are taught both systems of governance in our schools. How do 
we explain to them that the Parliament of Canada is planning to pass 
legislation that will not recognize the existence of traditional governance 
and which makes repugnant impositions on the elective system? 
It is with sadness and firm resolve that our peoples are forced to return to 
this table, once again, now in the 21st Century, to repeat what has 
already been stated over and over again - the federal government has no 
right to intervene in the affairs of the Six Nations of the Grand River. 
The peoples of Six Nations have a long historical relationship with the 
Crown based on peace and friendship. It is a special relationship of trust 
as defined in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Haldimand 
Proclamation of 1784, through Orders in Council (June 24, 1803) & 
legislation (Feb. 17, 1830), by our Two Row Wampum, and our Silver 
108 Traditional Oral Teachings, supra note 54. 
log Ibid. 
"O Canada, Bill C-7, First Nations Governance Act. 
Covenant Chain. Six Nations traditional people continue today as the 
guardians of this heritage. 
We, as sovereign peoples, defended the Crown two centuries ago even 
when we knew it would cost us the lives of our people. We kept our word 
and history records that our people died fulfilling our promises to the 
Crown. We stood as allies with the Crown. And we did so under our own 
flag from Six Nations as allies. Our people were instrumental in securing 
the integrity of the boundaries of this country on more than one occasion. 
History and law sustain us in our position that we are allies of the Crown. 
We are not subjects of the Crown. We are a sovereign self-determining 
people. To those who will say we cannot be sovereign in Canada, the fact 
is, we are - and as such, we continue to be interlinked inextricably with 
Canada's future."' 
The above history of Haudenosaunee political relations confirms three important 
factors. First, it is clear that the Confederacy entered into treaty relationships of peace 
and alliance with the Dutch, English, and French. Secondly, after the English defeat of 
the French, the Haudenosaunee continued to preserve their relationship as sovereign 
allies with the British, with little interference into one another's internal practices until the 
late 1800's. Lastly, the Six Nations have always maintained a position of national 
sovereignty and have consistently resisted any attempts by the Crown to intrude into 
their internal sphere of jurisdiction. 
With the political history of the Haudenosaunee and their positions on 
sovereignty now established, Chapter 2 will provide a more detailed examination of their 
internal affairs with an explanation of the Haudenosaunee worldview, The Great Law of 
Peace, and traditional social regulation practices, all of which are the foundations of a 
society that remained essentially free of 'criminal' behaviour for centuries. 
"' R. Jamieson, "HEARINGS ON CANADA'S BILL C-7 FIRST NATIONS GOVERNANCE ACT" 
Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs (21 March 2003) 
Northern Development and Natural Resources [http://www. robertajamieson.com/ speeches 
lmarch21-03a.htmll (November 5,2003). 
In order to gain a true evidentiary understanding of why and how the 
Haudenosaunee used certain methods for controlling anti-social or criminal behavior, 
one must have the appropriate context of that society's world-view and culturallspiritual 
practices. Without this context one will undoubtedly perceive social control methods 
through one's own cultural lenses. In order to avoid such misrepresentations or false 
conclusions, I will begin with a very basic1'* illustration of traditional Haudenosaunee 
perspectives of material and spiritual reality, with a focus on matters that help to explain 
Haudenosaunee social control practices in relation to anti-social or criminal behavior. 
Please keep in mind that this evidence is based upon my traditional 
Haudenosaunee (Six Nations of the Grand ~ i v e r ) " ~  oral teachings in conjunction with 
the publications of early European explorers, historians and anthropologists. Therefore it 
may not be in complete accordance with other Haudenosaunee Nation or traditionalist 
understandings, as cultural variations do exist. I make no claim to be speaking for all 
Haudenosaunee peoples, or for an Aboriginal perspective in general. 
A Haudenosaunee World View 
When comparing and contrasting a Haudenosaunee worldview with a Euro- 
Canadian outlook or perspective, the fundamental difference is a holisticlcontextual or 
cyclicallcircular understanding, versus linearltime-bound understanding. In a 
Haudenosaunee world all things have been placed here through the will or direction of 
112 An in-depth explanation of the Haudenosaunee spirituallmaterial perspective would require 
several volumes. For further information see, J. Thomas, Teachings from the Longhouse (Don 
Mills: Stoddart, 1994); A. Mogelon, The people of many faces: masks, myths and ceremonies 
(Lakefield: Waapoone Publishing & Promotion, 1994); E. Johnson, Legends, Traditions and Laws 
of the Iroquois, or Six Nations, and History of the Tuscarora Indians (New York: AMS Press, 
1978); The Great Peace: the gathering of good minds CD ROM (Brantford: GoodMinds, 1998). 
113 Traditional oral teachings, supra note 54. 
the Creator or The Master of ~ i f e , " ~  and therefore, all things have a distinct purpose and 
are of equal value, although they may have different forms and functions. Every material 
object (such as rocks, trees, or water) and nonmaterial energy (such as wind) has a 
spirit or life-force that allows it to exist. It is through this spirit or life force that all things 
are integrally connected. Those things that take a similar form (such as humans and 
other mammals) have a somewhat deeper existence connection because they share 
similar experiences and understandings. No one thing or force has a greater inherent 
value or any more beneficial purpose to serve, as all things exist in order for all other 
things to exist. 
Human beings have been gifted with life to ultimately evolve spiritually through 
the material experience. The experiences one will encounter in life are either of one's 
own creation (the law of free will), another person's creation (that person's free will), 
through the will of the Creator (spiritual law), or different combinations of the three. 
Experiences do not happen by coincidence. All occurrences have purpose and meaning. 
When one creates one's own experiences, one is responsible and accountable for the 
ultimate outcome of that experience, as everyone is responsible for his or her own will 
and actions. When the Creator wills certain events in a person's life in order to forward 
their personal growth or provide them with assistance in something, that person is 
responsible for how they respond to the event, but they are also given additional 
assistance from their Spirit Guides, who are with the individual constantly. If one is to be 
subjected to an experience through the will of another person, the impact of that event 
will be taken into account through spiritual law,lI5 and if the outcome of the experience is 
not within the divine plan of that individual, Spirit Guide intervention will occur to change 
the outcome to be in accordance with the divine plan.'16 An individual's divine plan is full 
114 The Haudenosaunee Creation Story gives a full account of how the Earth and all things on it 
came in to being through the actions of Sky Woman and the left and right-handed twins. The 
Master of Life is responsible for all things on Earth because it is ultimately through the life-giving 
force of the Master of Life that things may exist. For one account of the Creation Story see H. 
Hertzberg, The Great Tree and the Longhouse (New York: Macmillan & Company, 1996) at 16. 
Spiritual law is contextual and takes all matters and outcomes into account. 
116 Spirit Guide help and intervention is a somewhat complex matter, which I will attempt to clarify. 
If an individual is independently acting with free will, Spirit Guides are not allowed to intervene in 
that individual's choices without the individual's consent or request. Spirit Guides cannot 
independently break the law of free will. In this instance all that is required for assistance is a 
request and permission to intervene. If an individual is subjected to an experience based upon 
external factors not of their free will, and the outcome is not within the individual's divine plan, 
of many different experiences, some of which may be extremely difficult to endure, but 
are definitely in the interest of their personal growth and evolution. When a person views 
their experiences through this spiritual framework, life takes on a completely different 
meaning and is appreciated through a very different perspective. 
While viewing life through a spiritual framework, one must also interact and exist 
in the material world. The physical realities of the world are observed as operating in a 
cyclical manner. The days, the seasons, life and death all run in a cycle or repeat 
themselves. The concept of time is also included in this context. Each day or each 
moment is not viewed as a linear concept with an end, but only the continuation of the 
cycle. A new day could be said to be the same day repeating itself, but with changing 
physical realities occurring throughout that cycle of day and night. The changing physical 
realities are also acting within their own cycle, which is integrally linked to the daylnight 
cycle. In order for this cyclical reality to continue, there must be a diametric opposite to 
what is occurring at any given moment. Daylnight, lifeldeath, warmlcold are all examples 
of this concept; neither can exist without the other. The opposite is not conceived as 
negative in a Haudenosaunee understanding. These realities just are. They exist as 
necessities of creation and for the continuation of material existence. 
The concept also applies to human beings. Awakelasleep, hungrylfull, 
happylsad, are suitable examples, but there is a factor that allows humans a measure of 
control over their experience. That factor is free will. Free will allows humans to make 
choices that release them from acting in a purely instinctual or impulsive manner. Being 
gifted with free will conveys a responsibility to use it in a commendable manner. Doing 
so involves treating all things with honor and respect. Other people's well-being is as 
important, if not more so, than one's own. Personal desires and gratification are not 
paramount objectives. In meeting one's material needs there is some act of gratitude 
towards the material object (i.e. food, medicinal plants) and the Creator for those needs 
being met. Duties and responsibilities to others (human and non-human), as opposed to 
personal needs and rights, are the foremost factors to be considered. 
Spirit Guides will intervene to modify the outcome to ultimately correspond with the divine plan. 
To add further to this, Spirit Guides will not always intervene, even if asked, as the outcome may 
be in accordance with the divine plan. One is never really sure when intervention will occur, if at 
all, and on occasion severe consequences from an act of free will or external forces will still 
ensue. This is one of the reasons why life is called The Great Mystery. 
If one does not use free will in an honourable manner, they are significantly out of 
balance with one or more of the four  aspect^"^ that constitute the whole of an individual, 
and they must do what is necessary to re-balance themselves. Re-balancing often 
requires some form of mental, emotional, physical, and spiritual sacrifice. A Cleansing 
(Sweatlodge) Ritual and fastinglprayerlmeditation are examples of this type of sacrifice. 
These may be considered as fairly significant forms of suffering, but the suffering is 
sacrificial, and a way of making personal amends for one's negative or hurtful actions. It 
is an attempt to put things back into balance (personal and external) and establish a 
clear and integral connection to the spiritual realm.Il8 
The result of continued ritual sacrifice is a deeper insight into oneself and others 
(healing), and a complete understanding of how vitally important the inter-connection 
and inter-dependency one has with all material entities truly is. This in turn affects 
material reality through the dramatic change in a person's perceptions and actions. 
Persons who are acting in inappropriate or hurtful ways are considered fully responsible 
for taking the necessary action to restore their balance (or ask for help and guidance if 
they don't know how). If they choose not to, they will remain in conflict with spiritual and 
natural law, which eventually leads to serious consequences. 
To give a further clarification or understanding to the above perceptions of 
spiritual and material reality, it is important to note that these realities co-exist. All things 
are comprised of a life force or spiritual energy, which gives the appearance of material 
form. In the physical world both the spiritual and material exist together and as a part of 
one another. The material cannot exist without spiritual energy as its foundation. Human 
beings are simultaneously spiritual and material entities, as are all other material 
existences. In the material world people are "humans being" and in the spiritual world 
they are "being human." It is this understanding of material and spiritual connection that 
117 The four aspects of an individual include mental, physical, emotional and spiritual. 
118 Those who have engaged in such sacrificial rituals (including me) can attest to the powerful 
spiritual connection that develops through the experience. Please note that sacrificial rituals are 
not the only way to gain spiritual insight and connection, but for the purposes of healing someone 
significantly out of balance, they may be the most effective means because of their intensity. 
forms the basis of the Haudenosaunee world perspective and in conjunction with The 
Great Law, the basis for a mutually respectful way of life within their societie~."~ 
The Great Law of Peace 
The most significant and influential event in Haudenosaunee history was the 
founding of The Great Law of peace,l2' which was bestowed upon the Haudenosaunee 
by Tekanawita [hereinafter "The ~eacemaker"]'~' in order to advance a cooperative and 
peaceful coexistence between and within the Five Nations. Before this implementation of 
The Great Law the Haudenosaunee lived in a similar manner to other First Nations. 
Each nation was an independent body with similar dialects and similar customs, but 
there was no political alliance. The standard norm was each person and each nation to 
itself.122 
It was during this period that the Haudenosaunee often warred amongst each 
other, as well as with surrounding nations. In addition they engaged in blood feuds amid 
their own people, within their own nations, killing each other for any slight offence, as an 
individual's life was not valued. Such acts resulted in a family member seeking revenge 
for the murdered loved one. This situation became perpetual, as once a person was 
killed, his or her family members would not rest until they extracted vengeance. 
Ultimately, some families would be completely eradicated.123 
In response to this internal violence and strife, the Creator sent The Peacemaker 
to convince the Haudenosaunee to accept The Great Law of Peace and implement one 
of the most powerful political alliances on the North American continent. 
Many historians have attempted to date the origin of The Great Law, but there is 
little consensus on the matter. European historians assign a date of anywhere from 1440 
119 Traditional oral teachings, supra note 54. 
120 See Appendix 1. 
121 The Haudenosaunee refer to Tekanawita as The Peacemaker in keeping with the 
longstanding tradition of respect. 
122 A.C. Parker, Parker on the Iroquois vol. 3 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968) at 8. 
123 A.C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations (Ohsweken: lrocrafts Ltd., 1 984) at 1 6-1 7. 
to 1600.~'~ In contrast, the late Chief Jake Thomas, an oral reciter of The Great Law and 
Haudenosaunee historian, asserted that it is over 2000 years old.lZ5 The most recent 
historical and scientific analysis by Dr. Barbara Mann and Jerry Fields of the University 
of Toledo gives an exact date of August 31, 1 142.lZ6 Although there remains 
disagreement on the date of its founding, all historians agree that The Great Law existed 
as a principal regulating element within Haudenosaunee society. 
The Regulation of "Criminal Acts" 
Although The Great Law is detailed and lengthylZ7 it is founded on three basic 
principles: 
1. Righteousness, which means justice practiced between men and 
nations. 
2. Health, which means soundness of mind and body and the peace that 
comes from them. 
3. Power, which means the authority of law and customs backed by such 
force as is necessary for justice.lZ8 
Application and adherence to these principles and other Articles of The Great 
Law, in combination with their specific materiallspiritual perspective provided the 
foundation for Haudenosaunee methods of restraining anti-social behavior. The 
interdependence that developed among the Five Nations subsequent to The Great Law 
was a primary factor relating to this accomplishment. From this perspective, the welfare 
and interests of society as a whole became a paramount consideration. This in turn 
resulted in members of society developing relationships based upon equality, respect, 
and regard.lzg The concept of individual rights was in complete contrast to our current 
understanding. Each person retained a significant measure of such rights, but those 
124 P.A. Wallace, The White Roots of Peace (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1946) at 69. 
125 Traditional oral teachings, supra note 54. 
I26 D. George-Kanentiio, "Founding date for Confederacy thought to be 1142" TEKAWENNAKE 
[Six Nations of the Grand River] (24 February 1999) at 7. 
127 See Appendix 1. 
128 Wallace, supra note 124 at 15. 
rights and privileges never exceeded one's duties and responsibilities to others.130 Upon 
examining The Great Law it is apparent that duties and responsibilities outnumber 
individual rights. This directive kept societal members focused on acts cohesive to living 
in unity with one another as opposed to seeking gain for oneself through the assertion of 
personal rights.l3' When members were focused on the best interest of others within the 
Clan or society, the catalysts of criminal behavior, such as greed or vengeance, had 
much less opportunity to develop and emerge.13' 
One of the major factors that kept individuals content with this form of social 
organization was the practice of consensual decision making among the ~ ta tesmen. '~~  
At first glance this may appear to be only unanimity among the influential of a 
hierarchical society, but that was not the case. Statesmen or Chiefs were required to 
make decisions that were in the best interest of the people, as well as what was in the 
best interest of the coming seven generations. Those who did not were d e p 0 ~ e d . l ~ ~  
Through designated individuals such as War Chiefs or Clanmothers, all members of 
society had the opportunity to be heard on matters of national importance and any 
individual who dissented would have their opinion properly ~0ns idered . l~~  If unanimity 
could not be reached the matter would not become national p01icy.l~~ This procedure 
allowed all individuals to have a significant influence on societal matters, which in turn 
helped to develop an integral and meaningful connection of equality with the whole of 
the collective, which directly influenced a person's decisions to act in a manner that was 
in the best interest of all. 
Another feature that kept anti-social behavior in check was fervent disdain of 
ambition for personal power. All people in the society were considered equal, and none 
were compelled to do anything because of a higher personal authority. The women, who 
129 Williams & Nelson, supra note 30. 
130 W.B. Newell, Crime and Justice Amoung the Iroquois Nations (Montreal: Caughnawaga 
Historical Society, 1965) at 35. 
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held the Chieftainship titles, chose the Chiefs based upon personal honesty, integrity 
and good ~haracter . '~~ Statesmen retained their positions by the continuation of honesty, 
integrity and adherence to The Great ~ a w . ' ~ '  Their reward was the honor and esteem of 
the people. Those who dishonored their position through personal ambition were 
punished with removal and community ostraci~ation.'~~ This practice facilitated the 
development and definition of acceptable values within Haudenosaunee society. 
Honesty, integrity, generosity and other qualities considered beneficial to all, were the 
standards for which individuals were expected to strive. Holding the Chiefs (who were 
intended to be mentors) to the strictest measure of these values sent an unmistakable 
message to society in regard to the behavior expected from its members. Those who 
violated these norms would often be ostracized, which was considered one of the 
harshest sanctions that could be imposed.'40 
The Clan system prescribed by Articles 42-54 of The Great Law also acted to 
regulate delinquent behavior. Under this system the lineal descent of the people is 
through the female line. All of a woman's children became members of her Clan. All 
people of the same Clan were directly accountable to each other and forbidden to 
marry.l4l Further, all members of the same Clan were considered relations, even if from 
another nation within the League. Therefore, a person's parents were not of the same 
Clan, a spouse was from a different Clan, and a spouse's parents were of different 
Clans. All Haudenosaunee members of the same Clan were obliged to treat one another 
with hospitality and kindness. Not to do so was considered a grave misdeed. In addition, 
each individual was also intricately linked to other Clans through their mother's father, 
their own father, or a spouse and their family. In this manner, an individual could 
undoubtedly be connected to all Haudenosaunee Clans directly or indirectly through 
their mother, father, spouse, or other relations. If one were to commit a crime against 
another, there was a good possibility that the victim would be either a relation, or the 
relation of someone close to the offender. This placed an obligation on all people to treat 
137 See Appendix 1, Article 53. 
13' Ibid. Articles 25&27. 
139 H.C. Colden, The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada, 7727, vol. 1 (New York: 
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each other with respect or suffer the consequences of public, or, even worse familial 
ind ignat i~n. '~~ 
Specific Crimes 
Although crime was rare in Haudenosaunee societies, it did occur. When 
transgressions of The Great Law did take place, there were definite penalties to ensure 
justice was carried out. The three principles of Righteousness, Health and Power 
mandated by The Peacemaker all endorsed the concept of justice. Justice, under these 
principles, is ensuring that the essence of The Great Law (peace and unity) prevails 
within society. When an individual committed an act against this divine mandate, the 
people ensured that justice was done in accordance with The Great Law and their world 
perspective in order to deter143 the offender and others from committing such grievous 
The following is an account of the four anti-social or criminal acts that were 
known to have existed in Iroquois societies,145 and how they were dealt with to ensure 
they remained rare occurrences. 
Witchcraft 
Witchcraft was considered an offence against the whole of the nation. It was 
considered a matter of national consequence as any individual might be the next 
Witches and wizards were believed to have the power to make people violently 
ill and eventually cause death. They also were able to transform into birds or animals to 
escape pursuers. If cornered they could shape-shift into rocks or rotten logs to evade 
142 Traditional oral teachings, supra note 54. 
143 Deterrence in this context does not necessarily mean applying highly punitive sanctions in 
order to deter out of fear. It also includes a rehabilitative component through the rebalancing of 
the individual. 
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145 Morgan, supra note 12 at 325. 
I46 Newell, supra note 130 at 47-48. 
capture.'47 If caught, a witch could be sentenced to death. A council was called and the 
witch arraigned before it in the presence of the accuser. Any witch who confessed and 
promised to mend their ways would be set free. If they denied the accusation, witnesses 
were called and evidence given. If the evidence of guilt was to the satisfaction of the 
council, which was often the case, the accused would be sentenced to death. Volunteers 
from within the nation would then carry out the penalty.'48 
The Great Law doesn't speak directly to the practice of witchcraft, but individuals 
engaging in such acts as causing sickness and death were certainly in violation of the 
core principles of peace and unity. Death may seem a harsh penalty, but it was only 
imposed upon the unrepentant. If the Haudenosaunee were to remain united in peace, 
they had to ensure The Great Law remained the guiding principle of life. The accused 
would always be spared execution if they confessed and pledged to amend their 
behavior. Such a pledge would require the individual to engage in a process of 
rebalancing through some consistent form of ceremonial self-sacrifice. Only after this 
had occurred would the individual be unconditionally accepted back into the community. 
As with other anti-social acts, the harshest penalties were reserved for the unrepentant. 
Those who were remorseful and willing to abide by The Great Law were typically 
forgiven for their  misdeed^.'^' 
Murder 
Murder was considered a serious offence and The Great Law refers to it in Article 
20, which speaks of murder being committed by a Chief. Such an act was considered a 
matter of national importance since the Chiefs were considered the mentors of society. 
Such action by a Statesman could not be tolerated and any who committed such an act 
were deposed and banished (often permanently) from the League. Hereditary 
Chieftainship titles would then be bestowed upon a sister family, as the title was never 
intended to have any association with bloodshed. This continued to hold true in a 
situation of war. All Chiefs were required to renounce their titles temporarily in order to 
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take part in any warfare campaign.l5' Statesmen generally were held to a stricter 
standard in regard to delinquent acts, firstly because they were representatives of The 
Great Law, and secondly because Haudenosaunee societies utilized the practice of 
teaching acceptable conduct by example. 
Murder committed by individuals other than Chiefs was treated differently. It was 
considered a private concern for which the Statesmen had no authority to impose a 
punishment or grant a pardon. Punishment or pardon was always a matter for the 
families and Clans to determine.l5' If a murder occurred between different families or 
Clans, the Council of each Clan would meet to discuss a settlement. If it occurred within 
a specific Clan the members of that Clan would settle the issue. 
There were two defined sanctions available as a remedy. The first was execution 
of the offender by a member of the victim's Clan. The second was the acceptance of a 
belt of white wampum given by the offender to the victim's family. This act was meant to 
forever eradicate the memory of the offence and symbolically demonstrate that the 
accused was willing to confess the crime and make atonement. In addition, it was a 
petition for forgiveness from the victim's family and Clan. If wampum was accepted, one 
hundred yards was required for the death of a man and two hundred yards for the killing 
of a woman.I5' Wampum during this period was extremely labor intensive to produce, 
therefore the imparting of the above amounts, which were of considerable value, was 
intended to "put things right". 
In the situation of a death that would fall under contemporary common law 
classifications of second-degree murder or manslaughter, members of the victim's Clan 
would always make extensive efforts to effect reconciliation between the aggrieved 
immediate family and the offender. If the offender were to be executed in these 
circumstances, there was always the prospect that this type of private retaliation could 
lead to the rampant blood feuds that existed before the founding of The Great Law. A 
150 See Appendix 1, Article 90. 
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return to this state of violence and chaos was not considered an option, so clemency 
was the usual r e ~ u 1 t . l ~ ~  
Cases of premeditated murder rarely received the same compassion. Such acts 
were not tolerated within Haudenosaunee society and the customary sanction was 
execution. A member of the victim's Clan would be appointed to carry out the sentence, 
a duty that they could accept or refuse. If they did agree and the offender had fled, they 
were required to complete it, regardless of the time or distance required to do so.154 
The rationale for executing offenders in situations of premeditated murder was 
not primarily one of revenge. The utmost purpose in demanding the life of the wrongdoer 
was to satisfy the spirit of the victim who could not find peace among the departed ones 
(spirit world) until the soul of the offender joined him/her.155 All members of society knew 
that execution was the prescribed sanction for this offence, and most who were 
condemned to it readily met their fate without fear.156 Executing a friend or ClanINation 
member was not an act that most individuals would look forward to or enjoy. The 
principal aim of capital punishment was to "put things right" with the victim and re- 
establish the principles of peace and unity mandated by The Great Law. Achieving both 
would ensure the blood feuds of the past did not again become a divisive factor within 
the League. 
Theft 
The Great Law addresses the issue of theft in Article 107. The Article, entitled 
"Protection of the House" forbids anyone from entering another's home when a stick is 
leaning against the entrance. This signal gives a clear indication that the owners are not 
in their residence and also mandates that any passers by must keep as much distance 
from the dwelling as their business will permit. Although this Article of The Great Law 
would appear to be directed only to the entering of a residence, its scope also included 
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the principle of respect for personal property. Contrary to the prevailing belief that First 
Nations did not employ the concept of personal property ownership, the Haudenosaunee 
had an unmistakable understanding of ownership and defined sanctions for any 
violations. Article 44, which mandates land and Longhouse ownership to the women, 
illustrates this custom. Again, although the Article speaks only to the specifics of land 
and Longhouse ownership, the principle advanced applied to other affairs of life, as in 
this instance the issue of personal ownership of goods, which all were required to 
A further factor that kept theft a very rare occ~r rence '~~ was the Haudenosaunee 
viewpoint towards the accumulation of personal property. Although property rights did 
exist, there was no desire by members of society to possess more than others. No social 
status or esteem was gained through material accumulation. In fact, one of the greatest 
insults was to suggest that one hoarded material goods and did not share with others.15' 
Generosity was highly admired. It was common for the Statesmen to own the least 
materially, having presented most of their goods to the populace, and in return receiving 
the respect and esteem of the sarne.l6O 
Since generosity was the prevailing tradition, theft was considered a dereliction 
from the path of integrity and therefore was considered a very despicable act. Those 
who engaged in this behavior suffered the penalty of public di~regard,'~' which, as 
mentioned earlier, was considered a severe form of punishment. As Morgan describes, 
But in justice to them it must be acknowledged, that no people ever 
possessed a higher sense of honor and self-respect in this particular, or 
looked down with greater disdain upon this shameful practice, than did 
the Iroquois. To this day, amoung (sic) their descendants, this offence is 
almost unknown. No locks, or bolts, or private repositories were ever 
necessary for the protection of property amoung themse~ves.'~~ 
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lbid. 
The custom of generosity undoubtedly helped to maintain the guiding principles 
of peace and unity within the League. The Haudenosaunee believed that greed was a 
key factor in criminal incidences, and consequently practiced traditions to prevent its 
development. This in turn kept the principles of The Great Law foremost in the thoughts 
and actions of the population. 
Adultery 
In traditional Haudenosaunee society, adultery was considered a moderately 
serious anti-social or criminal act. The Iroquois did not permit polygamy, and marriage, 
although deemed a sacred union and permanent partnership, could be dissolved by 
either party by simply declaring it ended. However, such dissolution was not undertaken 
lightly as the longstanding tradition was one of permanen~e. '~~ 
The act of adultery was considered serious because of the ease of spousal 
separation coupled with the deceit and dishonesty of the deed itself. Infidelity was not 
considered a sensible alternative when the option of divorce was easily obtainable. Such 
acts displayed a deficiency of character and a glaring disrespect for societal norms. This 
betrayal could also lead to significant societal turmoil, conflict, and possible blood feuds 
through the extracting of vengeance by an aggrieved spouse. As with other crimes that 
violated the principles of The Great Law, adultery was not acceptable behavior. 
The primary sanction for infidelity was public ostrasization of both parties 
involved. Societal denunciation on a daily basis was a very effective deterrent that kept 
adultery a rare oc~urrence. '~~ Again, criminal sanctions were designed in such a manner 
as to ensure the principles of internal peace and unity remained the central factors 
adhered to within the Five Nations. 
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Sanctions 
In this section I will clarify how the above stated sanctions were integrated within 
and between the Haudenosaunee philosophy of reality and The Great Law. The process 
is somewhat complex, but I will attempt to keep it as brief and simplistic as I am able. 
Ostracization 
The most widely utilized punitive sanction imparted to offenders by the Five 
Nations was ostracization. This was considered worse than a death sentence because 
of the daily humiliation one had to endure.I6= The condemnation was primarily imposed 
for such   offence^"'^^ as theft, greed, dishonesty, confessed witchcraft and infidelity. The 
use of ostracization was to denounce the "bad character" of the individual. This in turn 
left the offender somewhat disconnected from the spiritual link with the rest of the 
community. Once the offender made the necessary community and personal amends to 
prove a change back to "good character", helshe would be accepted back into society.16' 
Execution 
Although execution was a defined sanction within Haudenosaunee society, it was 
rarely utilized. The death sentence was imposed for Chiefs who consistently disregarded 
the will of the people, pre-meditated murder, and for denying and subsequently being 
found guilty of witchcraft. In the case of an obstinate chief16' and an accusation of 
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witchcraft, execution could be prevented if the accused admitted their wrongdoing and 
repented for their a ~ t i 0 n s . l ~ ~  
While capital punishment in our contemporary society seems barbaric to many, 
the Haudenosaunee understood death in an entirely different manner. In their reality the 
deceased returned to the place of their beginning where their ancestors were waiting to 
greet them. The spirit world was a much kinder, gentler place in which to exist. 
Therefore, to the Iroquois death was not considered something to fear, nor was there 
any "hell" to which one might be condemned. Thus, execution was not perceived in the 
same manner as Euro-Canadian society. 
However, the Haudenosaunee were well aware that each individual was 
bestowed life by the Creator and consequently had a purpose to serve. Also, execution 
was not considered an appropriate way to "put things right" as the offender would not 
have the opportunity to correct the harm they had done. In keeping with this perception 
the death sentence was reserved for only the most severe cases, such as pre-meditated 
murder or those who would not take responsibility for their misdeeds. The continued 
presence of these few individuals would only serve to further harm the community and 
nation.170 
Reparation 
The most common method of addressing illicit behavior was negotiated 
settlement. If an individual committed an offence, the Council of that individual's family, 
or Clan, would meet with the Council of the victim's Clan to discuss the matter. If the 
offence involved members of the same Clan, the Clan Council would discuss it among 
themselves. The discussion would result in some settlement in which the offender would 
have to make reparation to the victim, or in the case of murder, to the victim's family. 
Reparation usually consisted of giving the aggrieved party something of great value such 
as wampum. This type of resolution was employed for numerous types of offences that 
were not injurious or malicious enough to warrant the harsher penalties. After the 
169 Morgan, supra note 12 at 321 -322. 
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offender carried out the settlement, the offence was to be forever obliterated from the 
memory of the comm~nity.'~' 
Banishment 
For those offenders who continued to engage in anti-social acts or hurtful 
behaviour, banishment or elimination of their nameq7* would be used as a last resort.173 
The point of banishment or elimination of a name174 was firstly to protect the community, 
but secondly to attempt to return the offender to a spiritual state of social inter- 
connection. When one attempted to survive alone, or was forced to live with other 
communities in shame, intense personal reflection that often led to a spiritual re- 
awakening was thought to take place. Consequently, the offender would make the 
character changes necessary to interact positively within their community. Banishment 
rarely occurred for life, and the individual often returned home after a prescribed period 
of exile and would be allowed to remain if they had fully embraced the principles of 
peace and unity. The Great Law decrees that individuals acting in disruptive manners be 
given three opportunities to ~hange."~ This dictate also applied to most defined 
sentences including bani~hrnent.'~~ 
The above sanctions were developed, and always applied, through the 
Haudenosaunee spiritual/cultural perspective and The Great Law of Peace. All members 
of society were taught this perspective and the dictates of The Great Law of Peace from 
a very young age. To act in a manner contrary to either was considered somewhat 
peculiar, but the frailties and limitations of being human were well understood, and 
always taken into consideration when determining an appropriate sanction. Most 
problems were solved without dissension or further harm. Contrary to the prevailing 
belief that Aboriginal societies came to peaceful resolutions because of a dependence 
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on each other for survival, the Haudenosaunee at least, came to peaceful resolutions 
because of the spiritual and material unity decreed by The Great Law and their world 
perspective. 
Having established the political and cultural information necessary to assess the 
Haudenosaunee inherent right to criminal justice jurisdiction in Chapters 1 and 2, 
Chapter 3 will review the Supreme Court of Canada decisions that have set out the legal 
framework and legal principles applicable to the assertion of an Aboriginal right. 
In 1990 the Supreme Court of Canada undertook its first detailed examination of 
section 35(1)'77 of the Constitution Act, 1982 in R. v. The decision is 
considered a milestone in the development and recognition of Aboriginal inherent rights, 
and certainly put the legitimacy of these rights into the forefront of the political and public 
agenda. This case also set out a legal framework and provides the general guidelines 
and legal principles applicable to the assessment of any Aboriginal rights claim. The 
result is that any judicial assessment of an Aboriginal rights claim must address the four 
sets of issues outlined in Table 1. However, the Sparrow case was decided fourteen 
years ago. Since that time there has been a significant number of Aboriginal rights cases 
before the Supreme Court and new facts and circumstances often require the courts to 
alter or expand the existing principles of law. Nonetheless, considering that Sparrow set 
authoritative legal precedent that Canadian courts must observe when adjudicating any 
Aboriginal rights claim, it is the appropriate case with which to begin. 
177 Section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 states, "The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of 
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Table I: Overview Of An Aboriginal Rights Analysis 
Stage 1: What is an Aboriginal right and what is required to establish the existence of an 
Aboriginal right? 
(a) Any practice, custom, or tradition claimed as an Aboriginal right must be characterized in a 
manner that precisely states the nature and purpose of the modern activity claimed to be an I 
. . 
Aboriginal right. 
(b) Aboriginal rights are those practices, customs or traditions that were integral or of central 
significaice to a distinctive Aboriginal culture before contact with ~uro~eans.  
(c) There must be continuity between the traditional practice and the modern activity claimed as 
an Aboriginal right. If the practice arose solely in response to contact with Europeans it cannot be 
claimed as an Aboriginal right. 
If the claimant proves all of the above elements the analysis moves to Stage 2. 
Stage 2: Can an Aboriginal right be extinguished and what is required to prove 
extinguishment of an Aboriginal right? 
(a) Prior to the enactment of section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Crown could 
unilaterally extinguish an Aboriginal right with "clear and plain" legislation or Constitutional 
enactment. Aboriginal rights can also be extinguished through "surrender" provisions in a treaty 
or other valid agreement. 
(b) What is essential to satisfy the "clear and plain" test is clear evidence that the government 
actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Aboriginal rights 
on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the right. 
(c) An intention to extinguish a right can be implicit if the continued existence and application of 
the Aboriginal right nullifies, or is irreconcilable with, the effect of the legislation. 
If the Crown cannot prove extinguishment of the right claimed the analysis moves to Stage 3. 
Stage 3: Can federal or provincial governments infringe an Aboriginal right and what is 
required to demonstrate a prima facie infringement of an Aboriginal right? 
(a) Aboriginal rights are now protected from infringement unless the government is able to justify 
the infringement. 
(b) To demonstrate a prima facie infringement of section 35 (1) rights, those challenging the 
infringement must show that it (i) it is an unreasonable limitation; (ii) has the effect of imposing 
undue hardship; or (iii) denies the right holders their preferred means of exercising the right. 
If the claimant demonstrates a prima facie infringement the analysis moves to Stage 4. 
Stage 4: What is required to defend or justify any prima facie infringement of an Aboriginal 
ria ht? 
- 
To justify any infringement the government must demonstrate the following two factors: 
(a) That it was acting pursuant to a valid legislative objective. Under this principle a court would 
inquire into whether the objective of the legislation or regulations found to infringe an Aboriginal 
right are "compelling and substantial". 
(b) That its actions are consistent with the fiduciary duty of the government towards Aboriginal 
peoples. For example, in a situation involving a fishery the government must demonstrate that it 
has given the Aboriginal fishery priority. The Crown's fiduciary duty to Aboriginal peoples also 
requires the Court to consider such additional questions as: (a) whether there has been as little 
infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result; (b) whether, in a situation of 
expropriation, fair compensation is available; and (c) whether the Aboriginal group in question has 
been consulted with respect to the conservation measures being implemented. However, this list 
is not exhaustive. 
R. V. Sparrow: The Foundation Of Post-Constitutional Aboriginal 
Law 
Ronald Edward Sparrow, a member of the Musqueam First Nation, was charged 
under s. 61 (1) of the Fisheries ~c t " '  with the offence of fishing with a drift net longer 
than that permitted by the terms of the Band's Indian food fishing licence. Mr. Sparrow 
admitted the facts of the alleged offence, but defended the charge on the basis that he 
was exercising an existing Aboriginal right to fish and that the net length restriction 
contained in the Band's licence was inconsistent with s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982. The issue before the court was whether Parliament's power to regulate fishing 
was limited by s. 35(1) of the Constitution AC~, '~ '  and, more specifically, whether the net 
length restriction in the licence was inconsistent with that provision. 
In its analysis the Supreme Court first addressed the meaning of "existing" 
Aboriginal rights and the content and scope of the Musqueam right to fish. They 
conclude that the word "existing" makes it clear that the rights to which s. 35(1) applies 
are those that were in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect. This 
means that any previously extinguished Aboriginal rights could not be revived by the 
implementation of s. 35 (1).18' Further, an existing Aboriginal right cannot be read so as 
to incorporate the specific manner in which it was regulated before 1982. The notion of 
freezing existing rights would incorporate into the Constitution a "crazy patchwork of 
regu~ations".'~~ In addition, the phrase "existing Aboriginal rights" must be interpreted 
flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time, as "the word 'existing' suggests that 
those rights are affirmed in a contemporary form rather than in their primeval simplicity 
and v i g o ~ r " . ' ~ ~  Therefore, the interpretation of Aboriginal rights cannot include a frozen 
rights approach. The constitutional guarantee embodied in s. 35(1) demands more.184 
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The evidence before the court revealed that the Musqueam Nation lived in the 
Ladner Reach and Canoe Passage area as an organized society long before the coming 
of Europeans and that the taking of salmon was and is an integral part of their lives. 
However, the Crown argued that the Musqueam's right to fish had been extinguished by 
the progressive restriction and detailed regulations of the Fisheries Act. Therefore, 
from the Crown's perspective, extinguishment of the right need not be explicit but may 
take place where legislation is developed or exercised in a manner "necessarily 
inconsistent" with the continued enjoyment of the Aboriginal right. 
In response to the Crown's argument, the Court stated, "The test of 
extinguishment to be adopted, in our opinion, is that the Sovereign's intention must be 
clear and plain if it is to extinguish an Aboriginal right."186 There was nothing in the 
Fisheries Act or its detailed regulations that demonstrated a clear and plain intention to 
extinguish the Musqueam right to fish. The fact that the express provisions permitting the 
Musqueam to fish for food may have applied to all Indians, and, that for an extended 
period permits were discretionary and issued on an individual rather than a communal 
basis, in no way demonstrated a clear intention to extinguish the right. The permits were 
simply a manner of controlling the fisheries, not defining underlying rights.lB7 Therefore, 
the Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving exting~ishment.'~~ 
The Court then began its examination of the scope of the existing Musqueam 
right to fish. The anthropological evidence revealed that the salmon fishery had always 
constituted an integral part of the Musqueam's distinctive culture. The salmon fishery 
played a highly significant role not only for subsistence purposes, but also on ceremonial 
and social occasions. Thus, the Musqueam have always fished for reasons connected to 
their cultural and physical survival and the continued right to do so may be exercised in a 
contemporary manner. The historical policy on the part of the Crown is not only 
incapable of extinguishing the existing Aboriginal right without clear intention, but is also 
incapable of delineating that right. The nature of government regulations cannot be 
determinative of the content and scope of an existing Aboriginal right. Government policy 
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can continue to regulate the exercise of that right, but any such regulation must be in 
keeping with s. 35(1).189 
The approach to be taken when interpreting the meaning of s. 35(1) is derived 
from general principles of constitutional interpretation, existing principles relating to 
Aboriginal rights, and the purposes behind the constitutional provision itself. The nature 
of s. 35(1) suggests that it be construed in a purposive way. When the purposes of the 
affirmation of Aboriginal rights are considered, it is clear that a generous, liberal 
interpretation of the words in the constitutional provision is demanded. Ig0 
In addition, the Court found that the Crown owed a fiduciary obligation to the 
Musqueam. The sui generis nature of Indian title, and the historic powers and 
responsibility assumed by the Crown constituted the source of such a fiduciary 
obligation. Referring to G~er in '~ '  and ~aylor '~ ' ,  the court stated: 
.... the Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with 
respect to Aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the Government 
and Aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary 
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights must be defined in light of 
this historic relationship.Ig3 
The Court then elaborated on the interrelationship between s. 35 and the 
Crown's fiduciary obligation stating: 
. . ..we find that the words "recognition and affirmation" incorporate the 
fiduciary relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on 
the exercise of sovereign power. Rights that are recognized and affirmed 
are not absolute. Federal legislative powers continue, including, of 
course, the right to legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) 
of the Constitution Act, 1867. These powers must, however, now be read 
together with s. 35(1). In other words, federal power must be reconciled 
with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to 
demand the justification of any government regulation that infringes upon 
or denies Aboriginal rights. Such scrutiny is in keeping with the liberal 
interpretive principle enunciated in Nowegijick, supra, and the concept of 
holding the Crown to a high standard of honourable dealing with respect 
I89 Ibid. at para 44. 
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to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada as suggested by Guerin v. The 
Queen, supra. 194 
Therefore, s. 35(1) suggests that regulations affecting Aboriginal rights are 
possible but any such regulation must be enacted according to a valid legislative 
objective. The manner in which such an objective is to be attained must uphold the 
honour of the Crown and must be in keeping with the unique contemporary relationship 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Further, the extent of legislative or 
regulatory impact on an existing Aboriginal right may be scrutinized by the courts and 
the government will bear the burden of justifying any legislation that has a negative 
effect on any rights protected under s. 35(1).Ig5 
Using the above framework as guidance, the Court then set out the test for a 
prima facie interference with an existing Aboriginal right as well as the justification 
requirement of such an interference stating: 
The first question to be asked is whether the legislation in question has 
the effect of interfering with an existing Aboriginal right. If it does have 
such an effect, it represents a prima facie infringement of s. 
35(1). Parliament is not expected to act in a manner contrary to the rights 
and interests of Aboriginals, and, indeed, may be barred from doing so by 
the second stage of s. 35(1) analysis. The inquiry with respect to 
interference begins with a reference to the characteristics or incidents of 
the right at stake. Our earlier observations regarding the scope of the 
Aboriginal right to fish are relevant here. Fishing rights are not traditional 
property rights. They are rights held by a collective and are in keeping 
with the culture and existence of that group. Courts must be careful, 
then, to avoid the application of traditional common law concepts of 
property as they develop their understanding of what the reasons for 
judgment in Guerin, supra, referred to as the "sui generis" nature of 
Aboriginal rights.Ig6 
To determine whether the fishing rights have been interfered with such as 
to constitute a prima facie infringement of s. 35(1), certain questions must 
be asked. First, is the limitation unreasonable? Second, does the 
regulation impose undue hardship? Third, does the regulation deny to 
the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising that right? The 
onus of proving a prima facie infringement lies on the individual or group 
challenging the legislation. In relation to the facts of this appeal, the 
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regulation would be found to be a prima facie interference if it were found 
to be an adverse restriction on the Musqueam exercise of their right to 
fish for food. We wish to note here that the issue does not merely require 
looking at whether the fish catch has been reduced below that needed for 
the reasonable food and ceremonial needs of the Musqueam Indians. 
Rather the test involves asking whether either the purpose or the effect of 
the restriction on net length unnecessarily infringes the interests protected 
by the fishing right. If, for example, the Musqueam were forced to spend 
undue time and money per fish caught or if the net length reduction 
resulted in a hardship to the Musqueam in catching fish, then the first 
branch of the s. 35(1) analysis would be met.lg7 
If a prima facie interference is found, the analysis moves to the issue of 
justification. This is the test that addresses the question of what 
constitutes legitimate regulation of a constitutional Aboriginal right. The 
justification analysis would proceed as follows. First, is there a valid 
legislative objective? Here the court would inquire into whether the 
objective of Parliament in authorizing the department to enact regulations 
regarding fisheries is valid. The objective of the department in setting out 
the particular regulations would also be scrutinized. An objective aimed 
at preserving s. 35(1) rights by conserving and managing a natural 
resource, for example, would be valid. Also valid would be objectives 
purporting to prevent the exercise of s. 35(1) rights that would cause 
harm to the general populace or to Aboriginal peoples themselves, or 
other objectives found to be compelling and substantial.lg8 
If a valid legislative objective is found, the analysis proceeds to the 
second part of the justification issue. Here, we refer back to the guiding 
interpretive principle derived from Taylor and Williams and Guerin, supra. 
That is, the honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with Aboriginal 
peoples. The special trust relationship and the responsibility of the 
government vis-a-vis Aboriginals must be the first consideration in 
determining whether the legislation or action in question can be 
justified.lg9 
The nature of the constitutional protection afforded by s. 35(1) in this 
context demands that there be a link between the question of justification 
and the allocation of priorities in the fishery. The constitutional 
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights may give rise to conflict 
with the interests of others given the limited nature of the resource. There 
is a clear need for guidelines that will resolve the allocational problems 
that arise regarding the fisheries. The constitutional nature of the 
Musqueam food fishing rights means that any allocation of priorities after 
valid conservation measures have been implemented must give top 
priority to Indian food fishing. If the objective pertained to conservation, 
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the conservation plan would be scrutinized to assess priorities. While the 
detailed allocation of maritime resources is a task that must be left to 
those having expertise in the area, the Indians' food requirements must 
be met first when that allocation is established. The significance of giving 
the Aboriginal right to fish for food top priority can be described as 
follows. If, in a given year, conservation needs required a reduction in the 
number of fish to be caught such that the number equalled the number 
required for food by the Indians, then all the fish available after 
conservation would go to the Indians according to the constitutional 
nature of their fishing right. If, more realistically, there were still fish after 
the Indian food requirements were met, then the brunt of conservation 
measures would be borne by the practices of sport fishing and 
commercial fishing.200 
The constitutional entitlement embodied in s. 35(1) requires the Crown to 
ensure that its regulations are in keeping with that allocation of 
priority. The objective of this requirement is not to undermine 
Parliament's ability and responsibility with respect to creating and 
administering overall conservation and management plans regarding the 
salmon fishery. The objective is rather to guarantee that those plans treat 
Aboriginal peoples in a way ensuring that their rights are taken 
In addition to the above principles, the court also stated that there are further 
questions that must be asked within the stage of justification, eg., whether there has 
been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a 
situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, whether the Aboriginal 
group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation measures being 
implemented. At the same time, since any additional justification analysis depends upon 
the circumstances of each case, so the above list of factors is not exhaustive.202 
In concluding the case, the Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal 
and affirmed the Court of Appeal's previous setting aside of the conviction. They also 
ordered a new trial on the questions of infringement and whether any infringement was 
consistent with s. 35(1).203 
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Although the Sparrow decision is directly concerned with the issue of the 
Musqueam right to fish, it also developed an authoritative framework and set of legal 
principles that must be applied to all Aboriginal rights litigation, whatever the specific 
right claimed. In basic terminology, any Aboriginal rights analysis must address 
systemically the following questions: (a) does the right claimed exist?; (b) has the right 
been extinguished prior to 1982?; (c) has the right been infringed by legislation?; and (d) 
can any such infringement be justified? In its examination into these specific inquiries, a 
court must properly apply the guiding principles set out in Sparrow in order to come to a 
well-founded decision. 
However, the inherent rights claimed by Aboriginal Peoples are not confined to 
the right to fish. As divergent claims come before the courts, some adjustment or 
expansion to the Sparrow framework may be required in order to properly assess the 
claim. Thus, an inquiry into the inherent right to criminal justice jurisdiction, that is the 
focus of this thesis, must follow the same fundamental four-step process set out in 
Sparrow, but the analysis and queries required to come to a conclusion on each of those 
steps will require adaptation to the unique issues involved in its assertion. Fortunately, 
the Supreme Court has now confronted several divergent Aboriginal rights claims and 
consequently amended the Sparrow doctrine where required. Accordingly, these cases 
will now be examined and categorized according to their significance to each of the four 
stages necessary to the analysis of an Aboriginal rights claim. 
Is There An Existing Aboriginal Right? 
In 1996 the Supreme Court gave further clarification to the nature of inherent 
rights in R. v. Van der ~ e e t . ~ ' ~  In this case the appellant Dorothy Van der Peet was 
charged under s. 61 (1) of the Fisheries AC?'~ with the offence of selling fish caught 
under the authority of an Indian food fish licence, contrary to s. 27(5) of the British 
Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations, SOR.184-248. The charges arose from the sale 
by Ms Van der Peet of 10 salmon on September 1 1, 1987. She based her defence on 
the position that the restrictions imposed by s. 27(5) of the Regulations infringed her 
'04 R. V .  Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Van der Peefl. 
*05 Fisheries Act, supra note 179 . 
existing Aboriginal right to sell fish and are therefore invalid on the basis that they violate 
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Before engaging in an analysis of the case Chief Justice Lamer commented on 
the Court's evaluation of an Aboriginal rights claim: 
The task of this Court is to define Aboriginal rights in a manner which 
recognizes that Aboriginal rights are rights but which does so without 
losing sight of the fact that they are rights held by Aboriginal people 
because they are Aboriginal. The Court must neither lose sight of the 
generalized constitutional status of what s. 35(1) protects, nor can it 
ignore the necessary specificity which comes from granting special 
constitutional protection to one part of Canadian society. The Court must 
define the scope of s. 35(1) in a way which captures both the Aboriginal 
and the rights in Aboriginal rights. 
The way to accomplish this task is, as was noted at the outset, through a 
purposive approach to s. 35(1). It is through identifying the interests that 
s. 35(1) was intended to protect that the dual nature of Aboriginal rights 
will be comprehended. In Hunter v. Southam Inc., [I9841 2 S.C.R. 145, 
Dickson J. explained the rationale for a purposive approach to 
constitutional documents. Courts should take a purposive approach to the 
Constitution because constitutions are, by their very nature, documents 
aimed at a country's future as well as its present; the Constitution must be 
interpreted in a manner which renders it "capable of growth and 
development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities 
often unimagined by its framers": Hunter, supra, at p. 155. A purposive 
approach to s. 35(1), because ensuring that the provision is not viewed as 
static and only relevant to current circumstances, will ensure that the 
recognition and affirmation it offers are consistent with the fact that what it 
is recognizing and affirming are "rights". Further, because it requires the 
court to analyze a given constitutional provision "in the light of the 
interests it was meant to protect"(Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, at p. 344), 
a purposive approach to s. 35(1) will ensure that that which is found to fall 
within the provision is related to the provision's intended focus: Aboriginal 
people and their rights in relation to Canadian society as a whole.206 
Lamer C.J. then went on to state: 
Before turning to a purposive analysis of s. 35(1), however, it should be 
noted that such analysis must take place in light of the general principles 
which apply to the legal relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples. In Sparrow, supra, this Court held at p. 1106 that s. 35(1) should 
be given a generous and liberal interpretation in favour of Aboriginal 
peoples. 
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This interpretive principle, articulated first in the context of treaty rights ... 
arises from the nature of the relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples. The Crown has a fiduciary obligation to Aboriginal 
peoples with the result that in dealings between the government and 
Aboriginal peoples the honour of the Crown is at stake. Because of this 
fiduciary relationship, and its implication of the honour of the Crown, 
treaties, s. 35(1), and other statutory and constitutional provisions 
protecting the interests of Aboriginal peoples, must be given a generous 
and liberal interpretation. This general principle must inform the Court's 
analysis of the purposes underlying s. 35(1), and of that provision's 
definition and scope. 
The fiduciary relationship of the Crown and Aboriginal peoples also 
means that where there is any doubt or ambiguity with regards to what 
falls within the scope and definition of s. 35(1), such doubt or ambiguity 
must be resolved in favour of Aboriginal peoples. In R. v. Sutherland, 
[I9801 2 S.C.R. 451, at p. 464, Dickson J. held that paragraph 13 of the 
Memorandum of Agreement between Manitoba and Canada, a 
constitutional document, "should be interpreted so as to resolve any 
doubts in favour of the Indians, the beneficiaries of the rights assured by 
the paragraph". This interpretive principle applies equally to s. 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 and should, again, inform the Court's purposive 
analysis of that provision.207 
The Chief Justice then asserted that any purposive analysis of s. 35 (I) must be 
carried out with the following premise in mind: 
When the court identifies a constitutional provision's purposes, or the 
interests the provision is intended to protect, what it is doing in essence is 
explaining the rationale of the provision; it is articulating the reasons 
underlying the protection that the provision gives. With regards to s. 
35(1), then, what the court must do is explain the rationale and foundation 
of the recognition and affirmation of the special rights of Aboriginal 
peoples; it must identify the basis for the special status that Aboriginal 
peoples have within Canadian society as a whole. 
In identifying the basis for the recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal 
rights it must be remembered that s. 35(1) did not create the legal 
doctrine of Aboriginal rights; Aboriginal rights existed and were 
recognized under the common law. At common law Aboriginal rights did 
not, of course, have constitutional status, with the result that Parliament 
could, at any time, extinguish or regulate those rights. It is this which 
distinguishes the Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed in s. 35(1) 
from the Aboriginal rights protected by the common law. Subsequent to 
s. 35(1) Aboriginal rights cannot be extinguished and can only be 
207 Ibid. at para. 23-25. 
regulated or infringed consistent with the justificatory test laid out by this 
Court in Sparrow, supra.208 
Utilizing the above principles, Lamer C.J. went on to develop what is called the 
"distinctive practices" test, which is designed to identify the "crucial elements" of pre- 
contact distinctive Aboriginal societies. The test will determine if the claim is a practice, 
custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the 
right. This standard, which was first emphasized in Sparrow,209 must be met in order for 
any legal recognition of an Aboriginal right. The "distinctive practices" test is meant to 
further refine the factors that must be considered, however, "courts adjudicating 
Aboriginal rights claims must, [therefore], be sensitive to the Aboriginal perspective, but 
they must also be aware that Aboriginal rights exist within the general legal system of 
~ a n a d a . " ~ ' ~  Keeping this perspective in mind, Chief Justice Lamer then went on to 
formulate the requisite characteristics of the "distinctive practices" test. 
Characterization of the Claim 
The first step when assessing a claim to an Aboriginal right requires the court to 
specifically identify the nature of the right being claimed. It is necessary to be precise in 
order to determine whether the claim meets the test of being integral to the distinctive 
culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right. The correct characterization of the 
claim or right is of the utmost importance because the evidence being called to support 
the claim will have to substantiate and correspond to the precise nature of the claim 
itself. 
For instance, the British Columbia Court of Appeal characterized Ms. Van der 
Peet's claim as the right to sell fish "on a commercial basis".211 However, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that Ms. Van der Peet's claim was not a claim to "sell fish on a 
commercial basis," but a claim to "sell fish".212 In addition the court stated: 
208 Ibid. at para. 27-28. 
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To characterize an applicant's claim correctly, a court should consider 
such factors as the nature of the action which the applicant is claiming 
was done pursuant to an Aboriginal right, the nature of the governmental 
regulation, statute or action being impugned, and the practice, custom or 
tradition being relied upon to establish the right. In this case, therefore, 
the Court will consider the actions which led to the appellant's being 
charged, the fishery regulation under which she was charged and the 
practices, customs and traditions she invokes in support of her claim.213 
and, 
It should be acknowledged that a characterization of the nature of the 
appellant's claim from the actions which led to her being charged must be 
undertaken with some caution. In order to inform the court's analysis the 
activities must be considered at a general rather than at a specific level. 
Moreover, the court must bear in mind that the activities may be the 
exercise in a modern form of a practice, custom or tradition that existed 
prior to contact, and should vary its characterization of the claim 
accordingly.214 
After the court has determined the precise nature of the right being claimed, they 
must then evaluate the traditional practice being claimed as an Aboriginal right to 
establish if that practice, custom or tradition was integral to the claimant's Aboriginal 
culture or society. The Court has termed this the 'integral to distinctive culture test'. 
Evaluation Of The Traditional Practice 
To satisfy the 'integral to a distinctive culture test' the claimant must do more than 
demonstrate that a practice, custom or tradition was an aspect of, or took place in, the 
Aboriginal society of which he or she is a part. The claimant must demonstrate that the 
practice, custom or tradition was a central and significant part of the society's distinctive 
culture, i.e., one of the things that made the culture of the society distinctive or truly 
made the society what it was. Because the Aboriginal rights protected by s. 35(1) are 
said to have the purpose of reconciling pre-existing Aboriginal societies with the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty over Canada, it is necessary to identify the distinctive 
features of those societies, as it is precisely those distinctive practices or characteristics 
which need to be acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty of the Crown. The 
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most practical way to decipher whether in fact a practice is integral to an Aboriginal 
society is to ask whether, without this practice, custom or tradition, the culture in 
question would be fundamentally altered to something other than what it is. The 
practice, custom or tradition must be a defining feature of the culture in question.215 
Further, any such practice, custom or tradition cannot exist simply as an incident 
to another practice, custom or tradition, but must be of integral significance to the 
Aboriginal society. Where two customs exist, but one is merely incidental to the other, 
the custom which is integral to the Aboriginal community in question will qualify as an 
Aboriginal right, but the custom that is merely incidental will not. Incidental practices, 
customs and traditions cannot qualify as Aboriginal rights through a process of 
piggybacking on integral practices, customs and traditions. To clarify, if an Aboriginal 
society fished for food on a consistent and regular basis, but traded that fish for goods 
with other First Nations only on an occasional basis, trading fish for goods would only be 
considered "incidental" to fishing for food, and would therefore not likely be considered 
an inherent right by the court.*I6 
If the court establishes that the claimed right is indeed of central significance to 
the Aboriginal society concerned, they must then evaluate the continuity between the 
traditional practice and the modern Aboriginal right claimed. 
Assessment Of Continuity Between Traditional Practice And 
Modern Activity 
The time period that a court should consider in identifying whether the right 
claimed meets the standard of being integral to the Aboriginal community claiming the 
right is the period prior to contact with European societies. This is primarily because 
Aboriginal societies lived on the land prior to the arrival of Europeans and it is this fact 
that underlies the Aboriginal rights protected by s. 35(1). Therefore, it is to that pre- 
contact period that the courts must look when identifying Aboriginal rights.217 
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However, looking to the pre-contact time period should not suggest that the 
Aboriginal group claiming the right must accomplish the next to impossible task of 
producing conclusive evidence from pre-contact times about the practices, customs and 
traditions of their community. It would be entirely contrary to the spirit and intent of s. 
35(1) to define Aboriginal rights in such a fashion. Doing so would preclude in practice 
any successful claim for the existence of such a right. Therefore, when determining 
whether a claimant has produced evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the activity in 
question is an aspect of a practice, custom or tradition integral to a distinctive Aboriginal 
culture, a court should approach the rules of evidence, and interpret the evidence that 
exists, with a consciousness of the speciai nature of Aboriginal claims, and of the 
evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there were no 
written records of the practices, customs and traditions engaged in. The courts must not 
undervalue the evidence presented by Aboriginal claimants simply because that 
evidence does not conform precisely to the evidentiary standards that are normally 
applied under the common law.218 
Further, the evidence relied upon by the claimant and the courts may relate to 
Aboriginal practices, customs and traditions post-contact, if they are directed at 
demonstrating those aspects of the Aboriginal community that have their origins pre- 
contact. Those integral practices, customs and traditions that are rooted in the pre- 
contact societies of the Aboriginal community in question will constitute Aboriginal rights. 
Once the applicant establishes that the claimed right is embedded in the pre- 
contact practices of the Aboriginal community in question, that practice will be subject to 
the requirement of continuity or connection with the practices, customs and traditions 
that existed pre-contact. The evolution of practices, customs and traditions into modern 
forms will not, provided that continuity is demonstrated, prevent their protection as 
Aboriginal rights. Nevertheless, the concept of continuity does not require Aboriginal 
groups to provide evidence of an unbroken chain of continuity between their current 
practices, customs and traditions and those that existed prior to contact. It could be that 
for a period of time an Aboriginal group ceased to engage in a practice, custom or 
tradition that existed prior to contact, but then resumed the practice, custom or tradition 
218 Ibid. at para 68. 
at a later date. Such an interruption will not preclude the establishment of an Aboriginal 
right. In such an instance courts should adopt the same flexibility regarding the 
establishment of continuity that is used to establish pre-contact practices, customs and 
 tradition^."^ 
Finally, the fact that Europeans in North America may have engaged in the same 
practices, customs or traditions as those claimed as an Aboriginal right will only be 
relevant to an Aboriginal claim if the practice, custom or tradition in question only arose 
because of the influence of European culture. If the claimed right was an integral part of 
the Aboriginal community's culture prior to contact with Europeans, and was then 
modified in response to European arrival, such an adaptation is not relevant to 
determination of the claim. European arrival and influence cannot be used to deprive an 
Aboriginal group of an otherwise valid claim to an Aboriginal right. However, if the 
practice, custom or tradition stems solely as a response to European influences then 
that practice, custom or tradition will not meet the standard for recognition of an 
Aboriginal right. For instance, in the case at hand, Ms. Van der Peet's claim to sell fish 
as an Aboriginal right did not demonstrate sufficient continuity with a pre-contact practice 
because the exchange of fish for money or goods developed after contact with 
Europeans and any trading that took place before contact was only incidental to the 
traditional practice of fishing for food or ceremonial p~rposes.''~ 
Thus, any Haudenosaunee claim to criminal justice jurisdiction will require them 
to demonstrate all three elements of the 'distinctive practices test'. To summarize, they 
must (a) state precisely the nature of the claim; (b) establish that their criminal justice 
practices were integral to their culture; and, (c) substantiate that the expression of the 
right in contemporary society has continuity with pre-contact integral practices. However, 
the manner in which they may perform their inherent right to criminal justice jurisdiction 
can evolve into contemporary form. If their evidence of the claim passes the scrutiny of 
the above "distinctive practices" test, the court will then move to stage two of the 
analysis which examines whether the claimed right was extinguished prior to the 
implementation of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
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Although Lamer C.J.'s judgment was accepted by the majority in this decision 
there were dissenting opinions by other justices that are clearly important to future 
Aboriginal rights claims. For instance, L'Heureux-Dube J. stated: 
The Chief Justice concludes that the Sto:lo do not possess an Aboriginal 
right to exchange fish for money or other goods and that, as a result, the 
appellant's conviction under the Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, 
should be upheld. Not only do I disagree with the result he reaches, but I 
also diverge from his analysis of the issue at bar, specifically as to his 
approach to defining Aboriginal rights and as to his delineation of the 
Aboriginal right claimed by the appellant.221 
In her analysis of the case, Justice L'Heureux-Dube asserted that Aboriginal 
rights protected under s. 35(1) have to be interpreted in the context of the history and 
culture of the specific Aboriginal society and in a manner that gives the rights meaning to 
the Aboriginal peoples themselves. Therefore, a proper interpretation of Aboriginal rights 
requires that the Aboriginal perspective of those rights holds more weight than that of the 
common 
With this in mind, L'Heureux-Dube favoured a generic approach to defining the 
nature and extent of Aboriginal rights. This approach starts from the proposition that the 
notion of "integral part of [Aboriginals'] distinctive culture" constitutes a general 
statement regarding the purpose of s. 35(1). Instead of focusing on a particular practice, 
tradition or custom, this conception refers to a more abstract and profound concept 
whereby the Aboriginal rights protected under s. 35(1) should be contemplated on a 
multi-layered or multi-faceted basis. 
Accordingly, s. 35(1) should be viewed as protecting the "distinctive culture" of 
which Aboriginal activities are manifestations and not the individualized practices, 
traditions or customs, as with the Lamer C.J. approach. Simply put, the emphasis would 
be on the significance of these activities to Aboriginal peoples rather than on the 
activities themselves.223 The Aboriginal practices, traditions and customs that form the 
core of the lives of native people and which provide them with a way and means of living 
as an organized society will fall within the scope of the constitutional protection under s. 
221 Ibid. at para. 97. 
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35(1). Such protected activities are readily distinguishable from the practices or habits 
that were merely incidental to the lives of a particular group of Aboriginal people and, as 
such, would not warrant protection under s. 35(1). 
Taking an approach that is based on a dichotomy between Aboriginal and non- 
Aboriginal practices, traditions and customs literally amounts to defining Aboriginal 
culture and Aboriginal rights as that which is left over after features of non-Aboriginal 
cultures have been taken away. Such a strict construction of constitutionally protected 
Aboriginal rights flies in the face of the generous, large and liberal interpretation of s. 
35(1) that was advocated in Therefore, a better approach is to examine the 
question of the nature and extent of Aboriginal rights from a certain level of abstraction 
and generality. This rationale should inform the characterization of Aboriginal activities 
that warrant constitutional protection as Aboriginal rights. From this perspective, 
Aboriginal practices, traditions and customs that form the core of the lives of Aboriginal 
Peoples and provide them with a way and means of living as an organized society, will 
fall within the scope of the constitutional protection under s. 3 5 ( 1 ) . ~ ~ ~  
Justice L'Heureux-Dube also emphasized that using a pre-contact approach 
when investigating for evidence of an Aboriginal right was fundamentally flawed for the 
following reasons: 
First, relying on the proclamation of sovereignty by the British imperial 
power as the "cut-OW' for the development of Aboriginal practices, 
traditions and customs overstates the impact of European influence on 
Aboriginal communities: see Bowker, "Sparrow's Promise: Aboriginal 
Rights in the B.C. Court of Appeal", supra, at p. 22. From the native 
people's perspective, the coming of the settlers constitutes one of many 
factors, though a very significant one, involved in their continuing societal 
change and evolution. Taking British sovereignty as the turning point in 
Aboriginal culture assumes that everything that the natives did after that 
date was not sufficiently significant and fundamental to their culture and 
social organization. This is no doubt contrary to the perspective of 
Aboriginal people as to the significance of European arrival on their rights. 
Second, crystallizing Aboriginal practices, traditions and customs at the 
time of British sovereignty creates an arbitrary date for assessing existing 
Aboriginal rights: see Sebastien Grammond, "La protection 
constitutionnelle des droits ancestraux des peuples autochtones et I'arret 
224 Sparrow, supra note 178. 
225 Van der Peet, supra note 204 at para. 160-161 
Sparrow" (1991), 36 McGill L.J. 1382, at pp. 1403-4. In effect, how would 
one determine the crucial date of sovereignty for the purpose of s. 
35(1)? Is it the very first European contacts with native societies, at the 
time of the Cabot, Verrazzano and Cartier voyages? Is it at a later date, 
when permanent European settlements were founded in the early 
seventeenth century? In British Columbia, did sovereignty occur in 1846 - 
the year in which the Oregon Boundary Treaty, 1846 was concluded - as 
held by the Court of Appeal for the purposes of this litigation? No matter 
how the deciding date is agreed upon, it will not be consistent with the 
Aboriginal view regarding the effect of the coming of Europeans. 
As a third point, in terms of proof, the "frozen right" approach imposes a 
heavy and unfair burden on the natives: the claimant of an Aboriginal right 
must prove that the Aboriginal practice, tradition or custom is not only 
sufficiently significant and fundamental to the culture and social 
organization of the Aboriginal group, but has also been continuously in 
existence, but as the Chief Justice stresses, even if interrupted for a 
certain length of time, for an indeterminate long period of time prior to 
British sovereignty. This test embodies inappropriate and unprovable 
assumptions about Aboriginal culture and society. It forces the claimant 
to embark upon a search for a pristine Aboriginal society and to prove the 
continuous existence of the activity for "time immemorial" before the 
arrival of Europeans. This, to say the least, constitutes a harsh burden of 
proof, which the relaxation of evidentiary standards suggested by the 
Chief Justice is insufficient to attenuate. In fact, it is contrary to the 
interpretative approach propounded by this Court in Sparrow, supra, 
which commands a purposive, liberal and favourable construction of 
Aboriginal rights. 
Moreover, when examining the wording of the constitutional provisions 
regarding Aboriginal rights, it appears that the protection should not be 
limited to pre-contact or pre-sovereignty practices, traditions and 
customs. Section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that the 
"'Aboriginal peoples of Canada' includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis 
peoples of Canada" (emphasis added). Obviously, there were no Metis 
people prior to contact with Europeans as the Metis are the result of 
intermarriage between natives and Europeans: see Pentney, "The Rights 
of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada in the Constitution Act, 1982, Part II - 
- Section 35: The Substantive Guarantee", supra, at pp. 272-74. Section 
35(2) makes it clear that Aboriginal rights are indeed guaranteed to Metis 
people. As a result, according to the text of the Constitution of Canada, it 
must be possible for Aboriginal rights to arise after British sovereignty, so 
that Metis people can benefit from the constitutional protection of s. 
35(1). The case-by-case application of s. 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 
1982 proposed by the Chief Justice does not address the issue of the 
interpretation of s. 35(2). 
Finally, the "frozen right" approach is inconsistent with the position taken 
by this Court in Sparrow, supra, which refused to define existing 
Aboriginal rights so as to incorporate the manner in which they were 
regulated in 1982. 
This broad proposition should be taken to relate, not only to the meaning 
of the word "existing" found in s. 35(1), but also to the more fundamental 
question of the time at which the content of the rights themselves is 
determined. Accordingly, the interpretation of the nature and extent of 
Aboriginal rights must "permit their evolution over time".226 
L'Heureux-Dube then went on to promote the "dynamic rights" approach for 
interpreting the nature and extent of Aboriginal rights. This methodology starts from the 
proposition that the phrase "existing Aboriginal rights" must be interpreted flexibly so as 
to permit their evolution over time. According to this view, Aboriginal rights must be 
permitted to maintain contemporary relevance in relation to the needs of Aboriginal 
peoples as their practices, traditions and customs change and evolve with the overall 
society in which they live. 
Instead of considering the assertion of British sovereignty as the turning point in 
Aboriginal culture, it would be regarded as having recognized and affirmed the practices, 
traditions and customs that are sufficiently significant to the culture and social 
organization of Aboriginal peoples. This concept specifically relates to the "doctrine of 
continuity", founded in British imperial constitutional law, to the effect that when new 
territory is acquired the /ex loci of organized societies continues at common law.227 
Consequently, in order for an Aboriginal right to be recognized and affirmed 
under s. 35(1), it is not essential that the practices, traditions and customs exist prior to 
the assertion of British sovereignty or prior to European contact. Rather, the determining 
factor would only require that the activity claimed as an Aboriginal right formed a 
significant and fundamental part of a distinctive Aboriginal culture for a substantial 
continuous period of time. The substantial continuous period of time for which the activity 
must have been engaged in will depend on the circumstances and on the nature of the 
Aboriginal right claimed, although in most cases a period of twenty to fifty years would 
seem adequate. An evaluation of the substantial continuous period of time necessary for 
the recognition of Aboriginal rights should be assessed upon the following three factors: 
(1) the type of Aboriginal practices, traditions and customs; (2) the particular Aboriginal 
culture and society; and (3) the reference period of 20 to 50 years. However, this time 
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frame does not nullify the fact that in order to benefit from s. 35(1) protection, Aboriginal 
activities must still form the core of the lives of the Aboriginal Peoples making the 
In L'Heureux-Dube's opinion the significant advantage of the "dynamic rights" 
approach is the proper consideration given to the perspective of Aboriginal people on the 
meaning of their existing rights. It recognizes that a distinctive Aboriginal culture is not a 
reality of the past, preserved and exhibited in a museum, but a characteristic that has 
evolved with Aboriginal peoples as they have evolved and modernized with the rest of 
Canadian society. The "dynamic rights" approach would seemingly provide a process 
which Aboriginal Peoples could rely upon to take full account of their perspective with 
regard to the meaning of the constitutional protection provided to Aboriginal rights 
through s. 35(1).~~' 
Justice ~ c ~ a c h l i n ~ ~ '  (as she was then) also delivered a dissenting opinion in this 
case that ruled in favour of Ms. Van der Peet. On the issue of what constitutes an 
Aboriginal right, McLachlin asserted that the court must look at what the law has 
historically accepted as fundamental Aboriginal rights, which would "encompass the right 
to be sustained from the land or waters upon which an Aboriginal people have 
traditionally relied for s~stenance."~~' Further, the right is limited to the extent of the 
Aboriginal people's historic reliance on the resource, as well as the power of the Crown 
to limit or prohibit exploitation of the resource incompatible with its responsible use. She 
also stated that it is necessary to distinguish between an Aboriginal right and the 
exercise of an Aboriginal right. Rights are generally cast in broad general terms and 
remain constant over centuries. The exercise of rights, on the other hand, may take 
many forms and vary from place to place and from time to time.232 McLachlin also 
disagreed with Chief Justice Lamer's assertion that it is essential that a practice be 
traceable to pre-contact times for it to qualify as a constitutional right. In her opinion: 
228 Ibid. at para. 177-178. 
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Aboriginal rights find their source not in a magic moment of European 
contact, but in the traditional laws and customs of the Aboriginal people in 
question. One finds no mention in the text of s. 35(1) or in the 
jurisprudence of the moment of European contact as the definitive all-or- 
nothing time for establishing an Aboriginal right. The governing concept is 
simply the traditional customs and laws of people prior to imposition of 
European law and customs. What must be established is continuity 
between the modern practice at issue and a traditional law or custom of 
the native people. 233 
and, 
While Aboriginal rights will generally be grounded in the history of the 
people asserting them, courts must, as I have already said, take 
cognizance of the fact that the way those rights are practiced will evolve 
and change with time. The modern exercise of a right may be quite 
different from its traditional exercise. To deny it the status of a right 
because of such differences would be to deny the reality that Aboriginal 
cultures, like all cultures, change and adapt with time. 234 
McLachlin also concluded that Aboriginal rights and practices are those that had 
obtained legal recognition prior to the adoption of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Therefore, rights granted by treaties or recognized by the courts prior to 1982 remain 
rights protected by s. 35(1)235 although they are not confined to those rights formally 
recognized by treaty or the courts before 1982. Considering that s. 35 calls for a just 
settlement for Aboriginal peoples236 the better approach to defining Aboriginal rights is 
an empirical approach. Such an approach would look to history to see what sort of 
practices have been identified as Aboriginal rights in the past and from this the court 
may draw inferences as to the sort of things that may qualify as Aboriginal rights. 
Therefore, when confronted by a rights claim the court should ask, "Is this like the sort of 
thing that the law has recognized in the past?" Because this is the time-honoured 
methodology of the common law, courts should look to the past to see how the law has 
dealt with similar situations.237 
233 Ibid. at para. 247. 
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Justice McLachlin is apparently suggesting that Aboriginal rights are those 
practices that Aboriginal people traditionally utilized to sustain themselves from the land 
and that courts must look to the past for guidance in identifying what is a "time- 
honoured" Aboriginal right. However, her judgment may not be as restrictive as it 
appears. It is important to note that she also maintained that Aboriginal rights are not 
confined to those rights formally recognized by treaty or the courts before 1982; that 
courts may draw inferences as to the sort of things that may qualify as Aboriginal rights; 
that the exercise of such rights can take many forms; and, that the governing concept is 
simply the traditional customs and laws of people prior to imposition of European law 
and customs. Clearly she is not confining Aboriginal rights to the principle of harvesting 
fish, game, or plants. 
It is important to note that until this case, there had not been any Aboriginal rights 
litigation heard by the Supreme Court that extended beyond the practices of hunting, 
fishing, or gathering. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that Justice McLachlin was 
simply developing an interpretive principle that courts should utilize when evaluating 
future Aboriginal rights claims. In addition, Justice McLachlin also ties the concept of 
Aboriginal rights with "the right to be sustained".238 Webster's Dictionary defines 
sustenance as: 
1. means of support, maintenance, or subsistence 
2. the act of sustaining; the state of being sustained 
3. something that gives support, endurance, or strength 
Consequently, the idea of social cohesion, or peace and order, within a 
community can readily fall with the definition of sustenance itself. Communities that are 
peaceful, orderly, and cohesive generally tend to nurture the mental, emotional, physical, 
and spiritual growth and evolution of the individuals residing within. Therefore, such 
communities provide a means of support, maintenance and strength. Accordingly, 
criminal justice jurisdiction could also fit Justice McLachlin's characterization through its 
subsequent creation of peaceful, orderly and cohesive communities. 
23e Ibid. at para. 227 
If the court concludes its analysis in favour of the existence of an Aboriginal right, 
it then moves to the second stage which queries whether the identified right has been 
extinguished prior to 1982. 
Has The Aboriginal Right Claimed Been Extinguished Prior To 
The Enactment Of Section 35 (1) Of The Constitution Act, 1982? 
The test for determining when an Aboriginal right has been extinguished was first 
laid out by the Supreme Court in with a more contemporary analysis of that 
test articulated in Gladstone.240 Donald and William Gladstone are members of the 
Heiltsuk First Nation. They were charged under s. 61(1) of the Fisheries A C ~ ~ '  with the 
offences of offering to sell herring-spawn-on-kelp caught under the authority of an Indian 
food fish licence, contrary to s. 27(5) of the British Columbia Fishery (General) 
Regulations, SOFV84-248, and of attempting to sell herring-spawn-on-kelp not caught 
under the authority of a Category J herring-spawn-on-kelp licence, contrary to s. 20(3) of 
the Pacific Herring Fishery Regulations, SOFV84-324. 
The Court applied the "distinctive practices" test according to the ruling in Van 
der and concluded that the Heiltsuk had demonstrated an Aboriginal right to sell 
herring-spawn-on-kelp to an extent best described as commercial. Having established 
this right, the court then considered the issue of extinguishment, which begins with the 
premise that "the Sovereign's intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an 
Aboriginal right".243 TO clarify, the clear-and-plain test of extinguishment was borrowed 
from an American test,244 enunciated in United States v. Dion, which asserts that: 
. . .[w]hat is essential [to satisfy the "clear and plain" test] is clear evidence 
that [the government] actually considered the conflict between its 
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intended action on the one hand and lndian treaty rights on the other, and 
chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty" or right.245 
With this in mind, the court in Gladstone engaged in an in-depth analysis of the 
legislation the Crown asserted had extinguished the Heiltsuk right. In regard to the 
regulations, the Court stated: 
None of these regulations, when viewed individually or as a whole, can be 
said to express a clear and plain intention to extinguish the Aboriginal 
rights of the Heiltsuk Band. While to extinguish an Aboriginal right the 
Crown does not, perhaps, have to use language which refers expressly to 
its extinguishment of Aboriginal rights, it must demonstrate more than 
that, in the past, the exercise of an Aboriginal right has been subject to a 
regulatory scheme. In this instance, the regulations and legislation 
regulating the herring-spawn-on-kelp fishery prior to 1982 do not 
demonstrate any consistent intention on the part of the Crown. At various 
times prior to 1982 Aboriginal peoples have been entirely prohibited from 
harvesting herring-spawn-on-kelp, allowed to harvest herring-spawn-on- 
kelp for food only, allowed to harvest herring-spawn-on-kelp for sale with 
the written permission of the regional director and allowed to take herring 
roe pursuant to a licence granted under the Pacific Fishery Registration 
and Licensing Regulations. Such a varying regulatory scheme cannot be 
said to express a clear and plain intention to eliminate the Aboriginal 
rights of the appellants and of the Heiltsuk Band. As in Sparrow, the 
Crown has only demonstrated that it controlled the fisheries, not that it 
has acted so as to delineate the extent of Aboriginal rights.246 
The Crown also argued, however, that even if the regulations did not extinguish 
the Heiltsuk's rights, they were extinguished by the enactment of Order in Council, P.C. 
2539, of September 11, 191 7. After reviewing the Order-in-Council the Court concluded 
that the language of the Regulation suggested that the government had two purposes in 
enacting the amendment. First, the government wished to ensure that conservation 
goals were met so that salmon reached their "spawning grounds"; and secondly, the 
government wished to pursue those goals in a manner that would ensure the special 
protection granted to the lndian food fishery would continue. Further, there was an 
obvious attempt to meet these goals by prescribing the lndian commercial fishery to the 
general regulatory system governing commercial fishing in the province. 
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Under the Sparrow test for extinguishment, this Regulation did not meet the 
standard necessary to extinguish the Heiltsuk's right to fish commercially. The 
government's purpose through the Regulation was to ensure that conservation goals 
were met, and that the Indian food fishery's special protection would continue. There 
was no clear and plain intention to eliminate Aboriginal rights to fish commercially. Even 
though the same type of special protection granted to Aboriginal food fishing was not 
extended to commercial fishing, the failure to recognize an Aboriginal right, and the 
failure to grant special protection to it, do not constitute the clear and plain intention 
necessary to extinguish the right. The evidence, which negated the intention to 
extinguish was two-fold. First, Aboriginal people were not prohibited, and have never 
been prohibited, since the scheme was introduced in 1908, from obtaining licences to 
fish commercially under the regulatory scheme applicable to commercial 
fishing. Secondly, and more importantly, the government has periodically given 
preferences to Aboriginal commercial fishing. Greatly reduced licensing fees for 
Aboriginal fishers and extensive attempts to encourage Aboriginal participation in the 
commercial fishery are significant examples. Such encouragement of the Aboriginal 
commercial fishery is not consistent with the assertion that the Regulation, which was 
aimed at ensuring conservation of the fishery and continued the special protection given 
to the Aboriginal food fishery, demonstrated a clear and plain intention to extinguish the 
Aboriginal right to fish commercially. 
In addition the Regulation was not a constitutional provision, which can also act 
as a valid method of extinguishing an Aboriginal right. For instance in both ~ o r s e m a n ~ ~ '  
and ~ a d g e ? ~ ~  the Natural Resources ~ransfer~greement,'~' was utilized to extinguish 
certain harvesting rights of the Aboriginal peoples in Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba. Because the NRTA is a constitutional document, the enactment of it provided 
for a permanent settlement of the legal rights of the Aboriginal groups to whom it 
247 R. v. Horseman [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Horseman]. 
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subsistence, Canada agrees that the laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to 
time shall apply to the lndians within the boundaries thereof, provided, however, that the said 
lndians shall have the right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, trapping and 
fishing game and fish for food at all seasons of the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and on 
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applies. Its aim was to achieve a permanent clarification of the province's legislative 
jurisdiction and of the legal rights of Aboriginal peoples within the respective provinces. 
The Regulation, by contrast, was merely a statutory document dealing with an 
immediate conservation concern and was subject to amendment through nothing more 
elaborate than the normal legislative process. Its aim was only directed at dealing with 
the immediate problems caused by an insufficient number of salmon reaching their 
spawning grounds. Therefore the intention of the government when enacting the 
Regulation must, as a consequence, be viewed quite differently from the government's 
intention when enacting the NRTA. The NRTA demonstrates the clear and plain 
intention necessary to extinguish certain Aboriginal rights while the Regulation lacks 
such an obvious or clear and plain intention.250 
Although not discussed in the   lad stone^^' decision, surrender is the final 
method by which Aboriginal rights can be legally extinguished. A prime example of the 
Supreme Court's analysis of surrender can be found in the 1996 case R. v. ~ d a r n s . ~ ~ ~  
Mr. Adams, a Mohawk, was charged with the regulatory offence of fishing without a 
licence in Lake St. Francis in the St. Regis region of Quebec. He challenged his 
conviction on the basis that he was exercising an Aboriginal right to fish as recognized 
and affirmed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. One of the arguments presented 
by the Crown proposed that Mr Adam's Aboriginal right to fish in the area had been 
extinguished by an 1888 surrender agreement entered into by the Mohawks and the 
Crown. In this agreement the Mohawks allegedly surrendered any rights to the lands 
around the fishing area in exchange for $50,000 in compensation. 
In response to the Crown's assertion the court responded with the following 
analysis: 
The surrender of lands, because of the fact that title to land is distinct 
from the right to fish in the waters adjacent to those lands, equally does 
not demonstrate a clear and plain intention to extinguish a right. The 
surrender agreement dealt only with the Mohawks proprietary interest to 
the lands in question; it did not deal with the free-standing Aboriginal right 
to fish for food which existed in the waters adjacent to those lands. There 
250 Gladstone, supra note 240 at para 38. 
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is no evidence to suggest what the parties to the surrender agreement, 
including the Crown, intended with regards to the right of the Mohawks to 
fish in the area; absent such evidence the Sparrow test for 
extinguishment cannot be said to have been met.253 
Considering the above reasoning and conclusion of the Court, along with the 
decisions in   lad stone^^^ and ~ a d g e r , ~ ~ ~  it would appear that the standard necessary for 
the surrender of an Aboriginal right requires that any such surrender be precise and 
specific as to its nature and intent and that there be clear evidence that the government 
considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and the inherent 
right on the other. 
Applied to the Haudenosaunee criminal justice issue, this stage requires the 
Crown to prove extinguishment of the right by, (a) clear and plain legislation; (b) 
surrender by treaty or other valid agreement; or, (c) constitutional enactment. If the 
Crown cannot prove extinguishment of the right, the Court would then move on to step 
three of the analysis, which would require the Haudenosaunee to demonstrate a prima 
facie infringement by either federal or provincial legislation. 
Does The Legislation In Question Have The Effect Of Interfering 
With An Existing Aboriginal Right To The Extent That It 
Represents A Prima Facie Infringement S. 35(1)? 
In order to resolve this question the court must engage in a three-stage process 
that analyzes whether, (a) the limitation imposed by the regulationllegislation is 
"unreasonable"; (b) the regulation imposes "undue hardship"; and (c) whether the 
regulation denies to the holders of the right their preferred means of exercising that 
right. In coming to a conclusion on these issues, a court will look to the evidence 
presented in each specific case and attempt to determine whether the purpose or effect 
of the regulation unnecessarily infringes the interests protected by the right. For 
example, if a fishing regulation on net length caused undue time and money per fish 
caught, or resulted in hardship to the First Nation forced to use nets under the 
253 Ibid. at para. 49. 
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regulation, it would be found a prima facie infringement. On the other hand, if a licence 
to hunt or fish was required under legislation, but there was no fee for a First Nations 
person to obtain that licence, and the purpose of the licence was only to identify the First 
Nations individual as a holder of an inherent right to hunt or fish, that would not be 
considered a prima facie infringement. 
For instance, in  lads stone'^^ the Supreme Court stated that the appellants' 
challenge was focused on a single regulation, while recognizing also that the scope of 
the challenge was much broader than the specific terms of the regulation. Therefore, Mr 
Gladstone's arguments on the points of infringement effectively impugned the entire 
approach taken by the Crown in managing the herring-spawn-on-kelp fishery. The 
specific regulation was a constituent part of a larger regulatory scheme that set the 
amount of herring that, (a) could be caught; (b) could be allotted to the herring-spawn- 
on-kelp fishery; and, (c) could be allocated to different users of the resource. Therefore, 
the specific regulation could not be scrutinized for the purposes of infringement without 
considering the entirety of the regulation of which it is a part, because all aspects of the 
regulatory scheme potentially infringed the rights of the appellants. To consider the 
specific regulation apart from the broader herring fishery legislation would distort the 
Court's inquiry.257 
Since each of the regulatory constituent parts has a different objective, and each 
involves a different pattern of government action, the infringement analysis of the 
government scheme should be considered as a whole because it is the legislation's 
cumulative effect on the appellants' rights that the court must consider. This cumulative 
effect acts to limit the total amount of herring-spawn-on-kelp that can be harvested by 
the Heiltsuk Band for commercial purposes. Thus, in order to demonstrate that there had 
been a prima facie infringement of their rights, the appellants had to demonstrate that 
limiting the amount of herring-spawn-on-kelp that they could harvest for commercial 
purposes constituted a prima facie interference. 
After considering the relevant legislation and its objectives, the court concluded: 
256 Gladstone, supra note 240. 
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.... it seems clear that the appellants have discharged their burden of 
demonstrating a prima facie interference with their Aboriginal rights. Prior 
to the arrival of Europeans in North America, the Heiltsuk could harvest 
herring-spawn-on-kelp to the extent they themselves desired, subject only 
to such limitations as were imposed by any difficulties in transportation, 
preservation and resource availability, as well as those limitations that 
they thought advisable to impose for the purposes of conservation; 
subsequent to the enactment of the regulatory scheme described above 
the Heiltsuk can harvest herring-spawn-on-kelp for commercial purposes 
only to the limited extent allowed by the government. To use the language 
of Cory J. in R. v. Nikal, supra, at para. 104, the government's regulatory 
scheme "clearly impinge[sIw upon the rights of the appellant and, as such, 
must be held to constitute a prima facie infringement of those rights.258 
Applying this to the criminal justice issue, the onus will lie with the 
Haudenosaunee to demonstrate there has been a prima facie infringement of their right 
to criminal justice jurisdiction. This essentially requires them to demonstrate that the 
limitation imposed by the regulation/legislation is either unreasonable, imposes undue 
hardship, or denies them their preferred means of exercising the right. If a prima facie 
infringement is established, the next and final stage requires the government to justify 
that infringement. 
Can The Infringement Be Justified? 
The infringement justification stage requires the court to employ a two-part test 
that was first articulated in In stage one the government must demonstrate 
that it was acting pursuant to a valid legislative objective: 
Here the court would inquire into whether the objective of Parliament in 
authorizing the department to enact regulations regarding fisheries is 
valid. The objective of the department in setting out the particular 
regulations would also be scrutinized. An objective aimed at preserving 
s. 35(1) rights by conserving and managing a natural resource, for 
example, would be valid. Also valid would be objectives purporting to 
prevent the exercise of s. 35(1) rights that would cause harm to the 
general populace or to Aboriginal peoples themselves, or other objectives 
found to be compelling and substantial.260 
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In stage two, the government must demonstrate that its actions are consistent 
with the fiduciary duty of the government towards Aboriginal peoples. For example, in a 
situation involving a fishery the government must demonstrate that it has given the 
Aboriginal fishery priority in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in 
Jack v. The ~ u e e n . ~ ~ '  In this case it was held that the correct order of priority in the 
fisheries is "(i) conservation; (ii) Indian fishing; (iii) non-Indian commercial fishing; or (iv) 
non-Indian sports fishing". Further, in Sparrow the same court also articulated that the 
Crown's fiduciary duty to Aboriginal peoples would require the Court to ask such 
additional questions as: 
. . . whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to 
effect the desired result; whether, in a situation of expropriation, fair 
compensation is available; and, whether the Aboriginal group in question 
has been consulted with respect to the conservation measures being 
implemented. . . . 
and, 
We would not wish to set out an exhaustive list of the factors to be 
considered in the assessment of justification. Suffice it to say that 
recognition and affirmation requires sensitivity to and respect for the 
rights of Aboriginal peoples on behalf of the government, courts and 
indeed all ~ a n a d i a n s . ~ ~ ~  
It was with these principles in mind that the Court in Gladstone asserted that the 
Aboriginal right to sell herring-spawn-on-kelp commercially had no internal limitation on 
the amount that could be harvested. The only limits on the Heiltsuk's need for herring- 
spawn-on-kelp for commercial sale were the external limitations of market demand and 
the availability of the resource. Taking into account this lack of internal limitation, the 
Court once again referred to Jack where the court had specifically distinguished between 
food and commercial fishing: 
[The appellants'] position, as I understand it, is one which would give 
effect to an order of priorities of this nature: (i) conservation; (ii) Indian 
fishing; (iii) non-Indian commercial fishing; or (iv) non-Indian sports 
Jack v.The Queen, [I9801 1. S.C.R. 294 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Jack]. 
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fishing; the burden of conservation measures should not fall primarily 
upon the Indian fishery.263 
and, 
I agree with the general tenor of this argument. Article 13 calls for distinct 
protection of the lndian fishery, in that pre-Confederation policy gave the 
Indians a priority in the fishery. That priority is at its strongest when we 
speak of lndian fishing for food purposes, but somewhat weaker when we 
come to local commercial purposes.264 
Relying on the above account, the Court then began a thorough justification 
analysis stating that ". . .. the evidence in this case does not justify limiting the right to 
harvest herring-spawn-on-kelp on a commercial basis to, for example, the sale of 
herring-spawn-on-kelp for the purposes of obtaining a "moderate livelihood".265 However, 
because there is no internal limitation on the resource, to give priority to that right would 
result in the right-holder gaining exclusivity over any person not having an Aboriginal 
right to participate in the herring-spawn-on-kelp fishery. When the resource is scarce, 
non-Aboriginal fishermen would not have access to a livelihood simply because they are 
not Aboriginal. In this instance a situation exists where the resource has no internal 
limitation and therefore,  parr rod^^ should not be seen as the final word on the question 
of priority in such a situation. The articulation in S p a r r ~ d ~ ~  of the meaning of resource 
priority, and its suggestion that it can mean exclusivity under certain limited 
circumstances, must be refined to take into account the varying circumstances that arise 
when the Aboriginal right in question has no internal limitations. 
When such circumstances arise the doctrine of priority does not require that, 
after conservation goals have been met, the government allocate the fishery so that 
those holding an Aboriginal right to exploit a fishery on a commercial basis are given an 
exclusive right to do so. What the doctrine of priority does require is that when allocating 
the resource, the government take into account the existence of Aboriginal rights and 
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allocate the resource in a manner respectful of the fact that those rights have priority 
over the exploitation of the fishery by other users. 
Therefore, priority under Sparrow's justification test cannot be assessed against 
a precise standard but must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether 
the government has acted in a fashion that reflects how it has taken into account the 
existence of Aboriginal rights. For example, under the minimal impairment branch of the 
0akes2" test a court does not scrutinize legislation to determine whether the 
government took the least rights-impairing action possible, but instead considers the 
reasonableness of the government's actions, taking into account the need to assess 
"conflicting scientific evidence and differing justified demands on scarce resources."269 
Similarly, when the Sparrow priority doctrine is applied to Aboriginal rights with no 
internal limitation, courts should assess the government's actions to determine whether 
the government has taken into account the existence and importance of Aboriginal rights 
as opposed to focusing on any exclusivity to that right. 
Aboriginal rights are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) in order to reconcile the 
existence of distinctive Aboriginal societies prior to the arrival of Europeans and the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty. However, these distinctive Aboriginal societies exist 
within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and economic community, over which 
the Crown is sovereign. Therefore, in order to pursue objectives of compelling and 
substantial importance to that community as a whole, some limitation of Aboriginal rights 
will be justifiable. Aboriginal societies are a part of a broader political community; 
therefore, limits placed on Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of reconciliation when 
the objectives of those limitations are of sufficient importance to the broader community 
as a whole. 
When these considerations are applied to the issue of Haudenosaunee criminal 
justice jurisdiction, the onus is on government to prove that it was acting pursuant to a 
substantial and compelling legislative objective, and also, that it has acted in accordance 
with its fiduciary obligation to the Haudenosaunee. If it can establish the criterion 
necessary on both branches of the justification test, the Six Nations' claim will be 
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dismissed. However, if it is unable to meet the legal threshold required by either branch 
of the test, the legislation, to the extent of its infringement on the Haudenosaunee right, 
will be declared of no force and effect. 
Although this is the final stage in an Aboriginal rights legal analysis, there are 
three additional issues that are directly relevant to this examination. First, a review of 
existing legal precedent is necessary to determine if self-government is considered an 
inherent Aboriginal right; second, considering that the Haudenosaunee are not currently 
situated on their original territory, and that the assertion of criminal justice jurisdiction is 
founded on a residual right of self-government, an examination of case law on these 
specific issues is essential to the final outcome of this assessment; and third, much of 
the evidence that will be utilized throughout the pending analysislapplication in Chapter 
3 will come directly from Haudenosaunee oral history. Accordingly, case precedent on 
the use of oral history as evidence also will be discussed. 
Is Self-Government An Inherent Aboriginal Right? 
The first case to come before the Supreme Court on the issue of self-government 
was ~ a r n a j e w o n . ~ ~ ~  In this case the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations' both 
passed by-laws dealing with lotteries, although neither of these by-laws was passed 
pursuant to s. 81 of the lndian A C ~ . ~ ~ '  Nor did either First Nation have a provincial 
licence authorizing gambling operations. Howard Pamajewon and Roger 
Jones, both members of the Shawanaga First Nation, were charged with keeping a 
common gaming house contrary to s. 201 (1) of the Criminal Arnold Gardner, 
Jack Pitchenese and Allan Gardner, all members of the Eagle Lake First Nation, were 
charged with conducting a scheme for the purpose of determining the winners of 
property, contrary to s. 206(l)(d) of the Criminal Code. In their defence the Shawanaga 
First Nation asserted an inherent right to self-government and the Eagle Lake First 
Nation asserted the right to be self-regulating in its economic activities. The primary 
issue before the Court was whether the regulation of high stakes gambling by the 
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Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations fell within the scope of the Aboriginal rights 
recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
The court began its legal analysis with an application of the evidence to the 
"distinctive practices" test developed in Van der ~ e e t . ~ ' ~  In the first stage of the test the 
court concluded that: 
.... the applicants rely in support of their claim on the fact that the "Ojibwa 
people ... had a long tradition of public games and sporting events, which 
pre-dated the arrival of Europeans". Thus, the activity in which the 
appellants were engaged and which their bands regulated, the statute 
they are impugning, and the historical evidence on which they rely, all 
relate to the conduct and regulation of gambling. As such, the most 
accurate characterization of the appellants' claim is that they are 
asserting that s. 35(1) recognizes and affirms the rights of the 
Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations to participate in, and to 
regulate, gambling activities on their respective reserve lands.274 
The court stated that this characterization of claim was of a broad and general 
nature, which was not consistent with the established precedent of looking at the specific 
circumstances of each case and the specific history and culture of the Aboriginal group 
claiming the right. Any asserted right to self-government must be evaluated in a precise 
and unambiguous manner.275 
The court then proceeded with stage two of the analysis to determine if gambling 
was integral to the distinctive cultures of the Shawanaga or Eagle Lake First Nations and 
concluded: 
The evidence presented at both the Pamajewon and Gardner trials does 
not demonstrate that gambling, or that the regulation of gambling, was an 
integral part of the distinctive cultures of the Shawanaga or Eagle Lake 
First Nations. In fact, the only evidence presented at either trial dealing 
with the question of the importance of gambling was that of James 
Morrison, who testified at the Pamajewon trial with regards to the 
importance and prevalence of gaming in Ojibwa culture. While Mr. 
Morrison's evidence does demonstrate that the Ojibwa gambled, it does 
not demonstrate that gambling was of central significance to the Ojibwa 
people. Moreover, his evidence in no way addresses the extent to which 
this gambling was the subject of regulation by the Ojibwa community. His 
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account is of informal gambling activities taking place on a small-scale; he 
does not describe large-scale activities, subject to community regulation, 
of the sort at issue in this 
In its final judgment the court held that the appellants had not demonstrated an 
Aboriginal right to "high stakes gambling" because "commercial lotteries such as bingo 
are a twentieth century phenomena (sic) and nothing of the kind existed amongst 
Aboriginal peoples and was never part of the means by which those societies were 
traditionally sustained or socialized."277 
Although the dismissal of this appeal was unanimous, Justice L'Heureux-Dube 
dissented on the characterization of the claim. In her opinion "the proper inquiry focuses 
broadly upon the activity itself and not on the specific manner in which it has been 
manife~ted."~~' In order to assess the scope of the right properly the court must 
characterize the claim broadly and determine whether the Shawanaga First Nation and 
the Eagle Lake First Nation possess an existing Aboriginal right to gamble. If such a 
right can be shown to exist it would oblige the government to justify the infringement 
upon that right by the Criminal In coming to this determination, the Justice 
referred to her rationale in Van der ~ e e t : ~ "  
The characterization of Aboriginal rights should refer to the rationale of 
the doctrine of Aboriginal rights, i.e., the historic occupation and use of 
ancestral lands by the natives. Accordingly, Aboriginal practices, 
traditions and customs would be recognized and affirmed under s. 35(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 if they are sufficiently significant and 
fundamental to the culture and social organization of a particular group of 
Aboriginal people. Furthermore, the period of time relevant to the 
assessment of Aboriginal activities should not involve a specific date, 
such as British sovereignty, which would crystallize Aboriginal's distinctive 
culture in time. Rather, as Aboriginal practices, traditions and customs 
change and evolve, they will be protected in s. 35(1) provided that they 
have formed an integral part of the distinctive Aboriginal culture for a 
substantial continuous period of time. [Emphasis added.12" 
276 Ibid. at para. 28. 
277 Ibid. at para. 29. 
278 Ibid. at para. 38. 
279 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter Criminal Code]. 
280 Van der Peet, supra note 204. 
281 Ibid. 
Notwithstanding her dissenting opinion on the characterization of the claim, 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube still concurred with the court's dismissal of the appeal, stating, 
"Based on the evidence adduced, it cannot be said that gambling as a practice is 
connected enough to the self-identity and self-preservation of the appellants' Aboriginal 
societies to deserve the protection of s. 35(1)."~'~ 
Although the ~arnajewon~'~  decision is a hefty blow to the Shawanaga and Eagle 
Lake First Nations, the Court did not specifically rule against the assertion of self- 
government as an existing Aboriginal right. In fact, the Court set out some clear 
guidelines for any future claims, such as that being examined in this thesis, which 
indicates that they are willing to consider self-government within the realm of existing 
Aboriginal rights. 
Does An Aboriginal Right Exist Independently Of Aboriginal 
Title? 
In ~ d a r n s ~ ~ ~  the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Aboriginal 
rights are inherently based in Aboriginal title to the land, or whether claims to title to the 
land are simply one manifestation of a broader-based conception of Aboriginal rights. 
On May 7, 1982 George Weldon Adams, a Mohawk who lives on the St. Regis 
(Akwesasne) Reserve, was fishing without a licence in the marshes of the southwest 
portion of Lake St. Francis. At the time Mr Adams was fishing during the spawning 
season and caught 300 pounds of perch with a seine net made of very fine mesh several 
hundred feet in length. He was charged with fishing for perch without a licence contrary 
to s. 4(1) of the Quebec Fishery Regulations, C.R.C., c. 852. Adams appealed his lower 
court convictions to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The court began its analysis with the Van der "distinctive practices" test, 
which asserted that: 
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Aboriginal rights arise from the prior occupation of land, but they also 
arise from the prior social organization and distinctive cultures of 
Aboriginal peoples on that land. In considering whether a claim to an 
Aboriginal right has been made out, courts must look at both the 
relationship of an Aboriginal claimant to the land and at the practices, 
customs and traditions arising from the claimant's distinctive culture and 
society. Courts must not focus so entirely on the relationship of Aboriginal 
peoples with the land that they lose sight of the other factors relevant to 
the identification and definition of Aboriginal rights. [Emphasis in 
original]286 
Therefore, while claims to Aboriginal title fall within the conceptual framework of 
Aboriginal rights, Aboriginal rights are not dependent on the existence of Aboriginal title. 
Where an Aboriginal group has shown that a particular practice, custom or tradition 
taking place on the land was integral to the distinctive culture of that group, then, even if 
they have not shown that their occupation and use of the land was sufficient to support a 
claim of title to the land, they nonetheless will have demonstrated an Aboriginal right to 
engage in that practice, custom or tradition. The Van der ~ e e t ' ~ ~  test is meant to protect 
those activities that are integral to the distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group claiming 
the right. Consequently, the test does not require that an Aboriginal group satisfy the 
further hurdle of demonstrating that their connection with the land on which the activity 
was taking place, was of a central significance to their distinctive culture sufficient to 
make out a claim to Aboriginal title to that land. Section 35 of the Constitution AC?" 
recognizes and affirms the rights of the Aboriginal peoples who occupied North America 
prior to the arrival of the Europeans. That recognition and affirmation is not limited to 
those circumstances where an Aboriginal group's relationship with the land is of a kind 
sufficient to establish title to the land.289 
The reason why Aboriginal rights cannot be inexorably linked to Aboriginal title is 
essentially because some Aboriginal peoples were nomadic, varying the location of their 
settlements with the season and changing circumstances. This does not alter the fact 
that nomadic peoples survived through reliance on the land prior to contact with 
Europeans and, further, that many of the practices, customs and traditions of nomadic 
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peoples that took place on the land were integral to their distinctive cultures. Moreover, 
some Aboriginal Peoples, such as the Mohawks, varied the location of their settlements 
both before and after contact. The facts in Adams clearly demonstrate this. Even though 
nomadic necessity "mayJJ preclude the establishment of Aboriginal title to the lands on 
which the Mohawk people temporarily settled, temporary settlement in no way dismisses 
the fact that, wherever they were settled before or after contact, prior to contact the 
Mohawks engaged in practices, customs or traditions on the land which were integral to 
their distinctive culture.290 
That being said, it is important to note that even where an Aboriginal right exists 
on a tract of land to which there is no claim to Aboriginal title, the exercise of those rights 
may well be site specific, and therefore, only applicable to that specific tract of land. For 
example, if a claimant demonstrates the right to hunt upon a specific tract of land, 
independent of title, that right is defined as, and limited to, the right to hunt on that 
specific tract of land. The right does not allow the claimant to hunt on any tract of land 
heishe sees fit. The right continues to be a right to hunt on the tract of land in 
question.=' 
Title-independent Aboriginal rights were also explored in In July 1984, 
the appellants, accompanied by a number of young Algonquin students, entered the 
Controlled Harvest Zone of Bras-Coupe-Desert for the purpose of teaching the students 
traditional hunting and fishing practices. They refused to pay the required fee for motor 
vehicle access and Mr. Cote then fished the waters of Desert Lake to demonstrate 
traditional Algonquin fishing practices. He did so without a valid fishing licence. All were 
collectively charged with the provincial offence of failing to pay the access fee required293 
and Mr. Cote was charged with the additional federal offence of fishing without a licence 
contrary to s. 4(1) of the Quebec Fishery ~ e g u l a t i o n s , ~ ~ ~  promulgated under the 
lbid at para. 27-28. 
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Fisheries AC~.*'= In their defence, the appellants claimed that the federal and provincial 
regulations were inoperative in relation to their activities as they were exercising an 
Aboriginal right and a concurrent treaty right to fish on their ancestral lands. 
In his analysis of the decision Chief Justice Lamer turned to the verdict in 
~dams~~~sta t ing :  
For the reasons I have given in the related appeal in Adams, supra, I find 
that Aboriginal rights may indeed exist independently of Aboriginal 
title. As I explained in Adams,at para. 26, Aboriginal title is simply one 
manifestation of the doctrine of Aboriginal rights:" 
We wish to reiterate the fact that there is no a priori reason why the 
defining practices, customs and traditions of such societies and 
communities should be limited to those practices, customs and traditions 
which represent incidents of a continuous and historical occupation of a 
specific tract of land. However, as I stressed in Adams, at para. 30, a 
protected Aboriginal right falling short of Aboriginal title may nonetheless 
have an important link to the land. An Aboriginal practice, custom or 
tradition entitled to protection as an Aboriginal right will frequently be 
limited to a specific territory or location, depending on the actual pattern 
of exercise of such an activity prior to contact. As such, an Aboriginal 
right will often be defined in site-specific terms, with the result that it can 
only be exercised upon a specific tract of land."' 
The Court then went on to examine further aspects of the case which are not 
directly relevant to the content of this thesis, however, the Court found that the Quebec 
Fishery Regulations did infringe Mr. Cote's s.35 rights and could not be justified. 
Accordingly, an acquittal was entered on that charge. 
Will The Court Accept Oral History Evidence? 
The ~ e l g a m u u k d ~ ~  ecision is currently the leading precedent relating to the 
use of Aboriginal oral history as evidence. Although the case itself focuses on the issue 
of Aboriginal title, it also gave direction regarding the use of Aboriginal oral history as 
evidence in Aboriginal rights claims. For instance, the court began their discussion of 
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oral history by stating that receiving and interpreting oral evidence from Aboriginal 
claimants requires a "special approach"299 when "such evidence does not conform 
precisely with the evidentiary standards" that would be applied in private law  case^.^" 
Further, "those histories play a crucial role in the litigation of Aboriginal rightsW3'' and "the 
laws of evidence must be adapted in order that this type of evidence can be 
accommodated and placed on an equal footing with the types of historical evidence that 
courts are familiar with, which largely consists of historical do~urnents".~'~ The court's 
reasoning for this directive is based on the reality that Aboriginal Peoples did not keep 
written records. Therefore, requiring them to conform to strict evidentiary rule would 
"impose an impossible burden of proof''303 and "render nugatoryW3O4 any rights they might 
have. The sui generis categorization of Aboriginal rights, which recognizes their 
distinctive source and nature, "demand[s] a unique approach to the treatment of 
evidence which accords due weight to the perspective of Aboriginal peoples".305 The 
court also reaffirmed the evidentiary principles enunciated in Van der pee?'=, which 
stated: 
... the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America by Aboriginal 
peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty required that account be 
taken of the "Aboriginal perspective while at the same time taking into 
account the perspective of the common law" and that "[tlrue reconciliation 
will, equally, place weight on each". I also held that the Aboriginal 
perspective on the occupation of their lands can be gleaned, in part, but 
not exclusively, from their traditional laws, because those laws were 
elements of the practices, customs and traditions of Aboriginal peoples: at 
para. 41. As a result, if, at the time of sovereignty, an Aboriginal society 
had laws in relation to land, those laws would be relevant to establishing 
the occupation of lands which are the subject of a claim for ~ b o r i ~ i n a l  
299 Ibid. at para. 80. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid. at para. 84. 
302 Ibid. at para. 87. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid. at para. 82. 
306 Van der Peet, supra note 204. 
307 Delgamuukw, supra note 298 at para. 148. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has directed that Aboriginal oral history, perspective, 
and laws must be given the same equal attention and validity as all other types of 
evidence that happen to conform with normal evidentiary standards. Considering that 
there is formal academic and legal recognition of the connection between oral tradition 
and the actual occurrence of historic events, and that the oral traditions of Canada's First 
Nations have begun to play an increasingly crucial role in the litigation of Aboriginal 
rights,308 evidentiary accommodation is the only way true reconciliation can be achieved. 
Having ended the discussion on applicable case law, the analysis will now move 
to the stage of applying the foregoing legal principles to the evidence relevant to this 
inquiry. The evidence itself will include combinations of oral history, historical and 
contemporary documentation, as well as anthropological and archeological findings. 
The oral history evidence to be considered in this thesis will be entirely based 
upon my own traditional oral teachings. However, if the case were ever to go to litigation, 
oral history experts such as Hereditary Chiefs, Clanmothers, Elders and Faithkeepers 
would be required to testify. My own teachings have originated with these 
Haudenosaunee individuals, although I am not considered an expert and my renditions 
can only be considered an example of the type of oral history that would likely be 
presented. 
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CHAPTER 4: APPLICATION OF THE EVIDENCE 
Characterization Of The Claim 
For the purposes of this argument, the claim will be characterized as "The right of 
the Haudenosaunee of the Grand River to develop, administer and implement an 
autonomous system of criminal justice within their existing territorial boundaries". 
However, characterizing the claim in such a broad manner may appear to conflict with 
the standards set out in Van der ~ e e t , ~ "  which requires the claim to be specific and 
precise. The generality of 'criminal justice' includes the definition and related penalties of 
hundreds of specific criminal acts such as theft, manslaughter, etc. The difficulty with 
characterizing the claim to the specifics of each individual criminal act are varied. The 
most obvious obstacle is the immeasurable amount of time and resources required to 
challenge the inherent right to jurisdiction for each specific criminal act. In addition, 
focusing on each specific act would distort the Court's enquiry. The situation is 
analogous to that in  lads stone^" where the court stated: 
. . ..In this case, while the appellants' constitutional challenge is focused on 
a single regulation -- s. 20(3) of the Pacific Herring Fishery Regulations -- 
the scope of the challenge is much broader than the terms of s. 
20(3). The appellants' arguments on the points of infringement and 
justification effectively impugn the entire approach taken by the Crown to 
the management of the herring-spawn-on-kelp fishery. 
The fact that the appellants' challenge to the legislation is broader than 
that of the appellant in Sparrow arises from the difference in the nature of 
the regulation being challenged. Restrictions on net length have an 
impact on an individual's ability to exercise his or her Aboriginal rights, 
and raise conservation issues, which can be subject to constitutional 
scrutiny independent of the broader regulatory scheme of which they are 
a part. The Category J licence requirement, on the other hand, cannot be 
scrutinized for the purposes of either infringement or justification without 
- - 
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considering the entire regulatory scheme of which it is a part. The 
requirement that those engaged in the commercial fishery have licences 
is, as will be discussed in more detail below, simply a constituent part of a 
larger regulatory scheme setting the amount of herring that can be 
caught, the amount of herring allotted to the herring-spawn-on-kelp 
fishery and the allocation of herring-spawn-on-kelp amongst different 
users of the resource. All the aspects of this regulatory scheme 
potentially infringe the rights of the appellants in this case; to consider s. 
20(3) apart from this broader regulatory scheme for the herring fishery 
would distort the Court's inq~iry.~" 
Attempting to connect this claim to individual criminal acts would distort the 
Court's enquiry because each specific act is a constituent part of the Criminal a 
larger legislative scheme that, in its entirety, potentially infringes the inherent rights of 
the Haudenosaunee. Further, the Criminal code3I3 and all of its constituent parts are the 
principal basis of the challenge. Therefore, from this perspective the claim must be 
characterized in the manner declared. 
The matter of the Haudenosaunee perspective in relation to claim 
characterization is also at issue. From the Haudenosaunee standpoint, one cannot 
separate anti-social acts into individual manifestations or behaviours. Haudenosaunee 
practices and laws are interwoven and integrally linked. One cannot separate this 
foundation of worldview into individual behaviours without fracturing the whole.314 
Therefore, if the court is to give equal weight to the Haudenosaunee perspective as 
required in ~ e l g a m u u k w , ~ ~ ~  there must be due consideration given in relation to 
characterization of the claim. Not to do so completely disregards the Iroquois outlook on 
this point and does not conform with established precedent. 
Evaluation Of The Traditional Practice 
To satisfy the "integral-to-a-distinctive-culture" test the claimant must do more 
than demonstrate that a practice, custom or tradition was an aspect of, or took place in, 
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the Aboriginal society of which he or she is a part. The claimant must demonstrate that 
the practice, custom or tradition was a central and significant part of the society's 
distinctive culture. He or she must demonstrate that the practice, custom or tradition 
was one of the things that made the culture of the society distinctive or truly made the 
society what it was.316 
Information necessary to evaluate the "integral-to-distinctive-culture test is found 
in Chapter 2, which illustrated that the Haudenosaunee have a distinctive understanding 
of spiritual and material reality, inter-societal relations, individual responsibilities, and 
acceptable standards of behaviour. These understandings, which are integrally 
connected to the mandates of The Great Law, are the foundations of their society and 
are directly related to how their society develops and regulates norms of behaviour. Any 
alterations to these understandings or their social regulation practices would effectively 
change Haudenosaunee society in a very fundamental manner. Thus, the integration 
between philosophy, The Great Law and practical methods of social control were 
central, significant and one of the primary cultural components that made the 
Haudenosaunee 'who they were'. Without this, their societies would have been 
fundamentally altered to something other than 'what they were'. Therefore, the evidence 
presented in Chapter 2 clearly indicates that social control methods or 'criminal justice' 
was indeed integral to the distinctive culture of the Haudenosaunee. 
Assessment Of Continuity Between The Traditional Practice And 
The Modern Activity 
As previously discussed, Chapter 1 of this thesis serves two distinct roles. In 
addition to summarizing Haudenosaunee political history, it also illustrates continuity of 
Haudenosaunee social regulation practices with an historical overview of 
Haudenosaunee and British relations. Consistent resistance by the Haudenosaunee to 
British intrusions into their sovereign affairs and jurisdictional authority reveals their 
intention to retain their sovereign autonomy, and consequently, their traditional methods 
of criminal justice. The legal standard required to demonstrate continuity would certainly 
require additional anthropological, archeological, historical and oral tradition evidence. 
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However, the evidence exhibited in Chapter 1 certainly allows one to draw rational, 
sound conclusions on the matter. 
Conclusion On Continuity 
In view of the examination on continuity found in Chapter 1, there are two 
significant issues that need to be addressed in order to pass court scrutiny of this topic 
of inquiry. The first of these is the migration of the Six Nations from their traditional 
territories, in what is now the state of New York, to their current territory on the Grand 
River. This undoubtedly negates the ability to establish the legal requirements for 
Aboriginal title, which could result in the Crown taking the position that the 
Haudenosaunee cannot establish an inherent right in an area that was not their 
homeland prior to the assertion of British sovereignty. 
However, as the Supreme Court concluded in ~ d a r n s ~ ' ~  and Aboriginal 
rights are not dependent on the existence of Aboriginal title. In this instance, the 
Haudenosaunee migrated to their new territory in order to escape further aggression 
from the United States. As noted, they secured land guarantees from the British before 
agreeing to act as their military allies, heedful of the possibility of an American ~ictory.~" 
Considering that they acted as British allies, they had a justifiable belief that remaining in 
their original territory might subject them to violent retaliation from the Americans. In 
essence, the survival and continued well-being of their society was dependent on this 
migration. 
Further, the right at question is not a right that is integrally tied to a specific tract 
of land, such as the right to hunt and fish, but is a right associated with the relationships 
between individuals and the community, including the regulation of specific behaviours. 
The legal requirement to demonstrate that an inherent right exists is dependent upon an 
Aboriginal group substantiating that a particular practice, custom or tradition was integral 
to the distinctive culture of that group, and even if they have not shown that their 
occupation and use of the land was sufficient to support a claim of title to the land, they 
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will nonetheless have demonstrated an Aboriginal right.320 Thus, the issue of migration 
should not pose a significant problem. 
The apparent lack of traditional criminal justice methods utilized by the 
Haudenosaunee during the last 100 years is a further issue that must be addressed. As 
discussed, the RCMP began a coercive occupation of Haudenosaunee territory in 1922 
with the aim of enforcing Canadian criminal justice legislation within that territory. 
However, the fact that the RCMP engaged in a longstanding process of foreign criminal 
enforcement does not lead to the conclusion that the Haudenosaunee either ceased to 
utilize their cultural practices or abandoned them outright. In fact, the oral history asserts 
that traditional procedures continued to be employed but were done so in a concealed 
manner for fear of arrest.321 Further, the vast majority of the community also refused to 
cooperate with RCMP investigations and engaged in a concerted effort of trickery and 
petty harassment in an attempt to drive the RCMP from the area.322 Essentially, the 
Haudenosaunee were required to adapt to a coercive foreign occupation but still 
maintained whatever parts of their cultural practices they could, while at the same time 
resisting the occupation with nonviolent means. These efforts and activities are well 
known within the community itself, and although such oral history may not meet the 
evidentiary requirements to establish continuity, it certainly can verify that 
Haudenosaunee criminal justice practices were not abandoned. 
The key to overcoming this particular issue is the Supreme Court's conclusion 
that the concept of continuity does not require Aboriginal groups to provide evidence of 
an unbroken chain of continuity between their current practices and those that existed 
prior to contact. It could be that for a period of time an Aboriginal group ceased to 
engage in a practice that existed prior to contact, but then resumed the practice at a later 
date, and if so, it will not preclude the establishment of an Aboriginal right. Such an 
instance requires the courts to adopt the same flexibility that is used to establish pre- 
contact practices, customs and traditions.323 
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This tenet is certainly applicable to the situation at hand. Although the 
Haudenosaunee practice at issue was not defunct or abandoned, it was significantly 
diminished because of the imposition of foreign jurisdiction. This diminishment may 
make it difficult to establish continuity in the absence of evidence that verifies a 
consistent utilization of traditional criminal justice practices throughout the majority of the 
1900s. Thus, this situation must be within the realm of possibilities that the court was 
contemplating when establishing this specific directive. There are undoubtedly many 
instances of Aboriginal peoples unable to engage in traditional practices, customs or 
traditions solely because of the colonial policies of the Crown. This makes it impossible 
to establish continuity because a discriminatory law or policy has acted to prohibit an 
Aboriginal right for a period of time, which the Courts have recognized and consequently 
acted to remedy with the development of this specific legal directive. 
The above summary of Haudenosaunee/Crown relations has confirmed several 
factors relevant to the confirmation of continuity. First, it is clear that the Confederacy 
and the British maintained a relationship as sovereign allies with little interference into 
one another's internal practices until the late 1800s. Secondly, the Haudenosaunee have 
always maintained a position of national sovereignty and have consistently resisted any 
attempts by the Crown to intrude into their internal sphere of jurisdiction. Lastly, the Six 
Nations are currently investigating the prospect of creating an alternative justice system 
that incorporates traditional Haudenosaunee values. 
Obviously this brief summary of Haudenosaunee history does not, in and of itself, 
meet the legal requirements to prove continuity, however, if further oral, historical, and 
anthropological/archeological evidence is obtained and subsequently evaluated 
according to applicable case law, it is virtually certain that continuity can be established. 
Having demonstrated the existence of the Haudenosaunee inherent right to 
criminal justice jurisdiction, the next step places the onus on the Crown to prove that the 
right was extinguished before the enactment of s. 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Extinguishment 
The three methods by which an inherent right could have been extinguished 
before the enactment of s. 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 are (1) clear and plain 
legislative intention; (2) surrender by treaty or other valid agreement; and (3) 
constitutional enactment. Each of these will now be examined to determine if any of 
these areas has met the legal requirements necessary for the extinguishment of 
Haudenosaunee criminal justice jurisdiction. 
Clear And Plain Intention 
Several statutes deal directly or indirectly with the issue of Imperial and Dominion 
government criminal justice jurisdiction within Canada both before and after 
confederation. Each piece of legislation will be individually examined in chronological 
order to determine if they have met the requirements of a clear and plain intention to 
extinguish. 
The Hudson's Bay Charter, 1670 
On May 2, 1670 King Charles II issued a Royal ~ h a r t e ? ' ~  granting jurisdiction 
over the northwest part of America to the Governor and Company of Adventurers of 
England trading into Hudson's Bay, including the following legislative authority: 
... to make ordeyne and constitute such and soe many reasonable 
LawesConstitucions Orders and Ordinances as to them or the greater 
part of them being then and there present shall seeme necessary and 
convenient for the good Government .. 
The Charter also conferred to The Hudson's Bay Company limited criminal 
jurisdiction which authorized it to establish and impose "... such paines penaltyies and 
punishments upon all offenders contrary to laws ...," provided that those laws were "... 
reasonable and not contrary or repugnant but as neare as may be agreeable to the 
Lawes Statutes or Customes of this Our Realm." In addition, the Governor and his 
Council were also appointed the power: 
... to judge all persons belonging to the said Governor and Company or 
that shall live under them in all Causes whether Civill or Criminal 
according to Lawes of this Kingdome and to execute Justice accordingly. 
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Although this Charter extended the law of England to the somewhat vague 
territory declared within, it applied exclusively to the white settlements under the 
jurisdiction of the Hudson's Bay Company. A plain reading of the document reveals that 
the Charter only conferred criminal jurisdiction over company employees and did not 
attempt to "grant" the Company the right to interfere with existing First Nations' methods 
of social control and sovereignty. Therefore, as long as First Nations' members were not 
company employees, they remained self-governing and clearly outside of the jurisdiction 
of English 
The Royal Proclamation Of 1763 
On October 7, 1763 English King George Ill issued a Royal ~ r o c l a m a t i o n ~ ~ ~ n  
response to the defeat of France and concerns regarding the 1762 uprising of Odawa 
Chief Pontiac and the efforts of the Shawnee to form an alliance with the Iroquois in 
order to mount a military offensive against the ~ n g l i s h . ~ ' ~  Many First Nations were long 
angered by the sharp dealings of English fur traders and land speculators (as well as 
settler trespass) and had become determined to protect their Nations' interests. The 
Crown, having recognized the danger of the situation, set about to remedy it with legal 
protections for Aboriginal interests through the Royal Proclamation. The document set 
aside huge tracts of land, reserving them as Aboriginal hunting grounds, and prohibited 
grants or purchases of this land, or settlement on it, without a licence. These lands could 
be purchased only by the Crown, at the inclination of the "said Indians", and only after a 
public meeting with the "said Indians." 
The Proclamation is clearly directed at protecting Aboriginal possession or use of 
land reserved to them, but the document also describes the Crown's understanding of 
Aboriginal status in relation to the two parties. The Proclamation refers to Native people 
as Nations or Tribes with whom they are connected. The use of these terms clarifies 
that Aboriginal people were considered Nations to which the Crown did not hold 
Sovereign authority over. The use of the word "Tribes" can only been seen as an 
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incidental clarifying feature (for the understanding of the English settlers at the time) to 
the document, as the term "Nations" directly precedes it. What is important is the 
recognition of Aboriginal nationhood not bound by English rule. 
In addition to land protections, the Proclamation also speaks to the issue of 
criminal justice jurisdiction. It reserved for the Crown a right to pursue on lndian 
territories white offenders who had committed a crime in one of the British colonies, and 
who were then seeking refuge on lndian territory. In the last paragraph the Proclamation 
reads: 
And we do further expressly enjoin and require all Officers whatever, as 
well Military as those Employed in the Management of lndian Affairs, 
within the Territories reserved for the use of the same Indians, to seize 
and apprehend all Persons whatever, who standing charged with 
Treason, Misprisions of Treason, Murders, or other Felonies or 
Misdemeanors, shall fly from Justice and take Refuge in the said 
Territory, and to send them under a proper guard to the Colony where the 
Crime was committed of which they stand accused, in order to make their 
Trial for the same. 
What can be concluded from a plain reading is that the document only reserves 
British authority to crimes committed within their colonies. The wording of the 
Proclamation clearly indicates that Crown policy and law during this period recognized 
First Nations' jurisdiction over criminal justice within their societies and territories. If the 
Crown had presumed that its criminal jurisdiction extended to territory reserved for the 
Indians, then the explicit retention of criminal jurisdiction on lndian territory would not 
have been necessary. In fact, the above provision indicates that the British Crown 
implicitly recognized that crimes committed among First Nations on 'reserved lands' 
remained an internal matter subject only to lndian criminal juri~diction.~" Therefore, the 
Proclamation cannot be considered a clear and plain decree of extinguishment. Quite 
the opposite, it must be regarded as a confirmation of existing Aboriginal rights and 
jur isd i~t ion.~~~ 
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The Canada Jurisdiction Act, 1803 
In 1803 the Imperial Government implemented The Canada Jurisdiction A C ~ ~ ~ ~  in 
order to extend the jurisdiction of the existing courts. In the preamble and section one, 
the Act stipulates: 
Whereas crimes and offences have been committed in the lndian 
Territories, and other parts of America, not within the limits of the 
Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, or either of them, or of the 
jurisdiction of any of the Courts established in those Provinces, or within 
the limits of any civil Government of the United States and are therefore 
not cognizable by any jurisdiction whatever, and by reason thereof great 
crimes and offences have gone and may hereafter go unpunished, and 
greatly increase: For remedy whereof ... be it enacted ... that, from and 
after the passing of this Act, all offences committed within any of the 
lndian Territories, or parts of the said Provinces of Lower or Upper 
Canada, or of any civil Government of the United States of America, shall 
be deemed to be offences of the same nature, and shall be tried in the 
same manner and subject to the same punishment, as if the same had 
been committed within the Provinces of Lower or Upper Canada. 
With a careful reading of this clause it is apparent that First Nation territories 
were not within "the limits of the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada" or "the 
jurisdiction of any of the Courts established in those Provinces" nor were they "within 
the limits of any civil Government of the United States" which concludes them to be "not 
cognizable by any jurisdiction whatever". This conclusion indicates a clear recognition 
that First Nations' territories were not within British jurisdiction, and therefore, any 
activities that took place on lndian territories that were considered criminal under British 
law could not be prosecuted.331 In an attempt to remedy this situation, the Imperial 
Government tried to ensure that all offences committed within any of the lndian 
Territories would be tried in the same manner "as if the same had been committed within 
the Provinces of Lower or Upper Canada". In addition the Act also states: 
That it shall be lawful for the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, or Person 
administering the Government for the Time being of the Province of 
Lower Canada, by Commission under his Hand and Seal, to authorize 
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and empower any Person or Persons, wheresoever resident or being at 
the Time, to act as Civil Magistrates and Justices of the Peace for any of 
the lndian Territories or Parts of America not within the Limits of either of 
the said Provinces, or of any Civil Government of the United States of 
America, as well as within the Limits of either of the said Provinces, either 
upon Informations taken or given within the said Provinces of Lower or 
Upper Canada, or out of the said Provinces in any Part of the lndian 
Territories or Parts of America aforesaid, for the Purpose only of hearing 
Crimes and Offences, and committing any Person or Persons guilty of 
any Crime or Offence to safe Custody, in order to his or their being 
conveyed to the said Province of Lower Canada, to be dealt with 
according to Law; and it shall be lawful for any Person or Persons 
whatever to apprehend and take before any Persons so commissioned as 
aforesaid, or to apprehend and convey, or cause to be safely conveyed 
with all convenient Speed, to the Province of Lower Canada, any Person 
or Persons guilty of any Crime or Offence, there to be delivered into safe 
Custody for the Purpose of being dealt with according to ~ a w . ~ ~ ~  
At first glance this legislation may appear to have the intent and effect of 
extinguishing First Nations traditional jurisdiction over criminal justice related matters. It 
purportedly extends the authority of British courts, magistrates and Justices of the Peace 
into lndian territories and extends that authority to empower appointed individuals to 
commit "any Person or Persons guilty of any Crime or Offence to safe Custody". 
However, the standard required to extinguish an Aboriginal right is 'clear and plain' 
intention. On close examination of the document, it is evident that the Act does not refer 
expressly or specifically to lndians as being subject to Imperial jurisdiction. The 
terminology "any Person or Persons" cannot be readily construed to include First 
Nations Peoples. It is well documented that Europeans of the time did not consider or 
legally define lndians as people or persons. In fact, subsequent lndian Act legislation 
between 1876 and 1951 explicitly defined "persons" to exclude ~ n d i a n s . ~ ~ ~  
In addition, it is highly unlikely that the lmperial Government intended lndians to 
act as Civil Magistrates or Justices of the Peace, which under the Act, is a position 
available to "any Person or Persons". When reading the document as a whole and in the 
context of the time period in which it was created in order to determine its intent, it is 
cogent to conclude that lndians were not intended to be subject to Imperial Government 
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jurisdiction in regard to their internal affairs. The Act itself would appear to be a 
reaffirmationlextension of the criminal jurisdiction principles already expressed in the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763. 
Further, such a significant change in the existing jurisdictional relationships 
between First Nations and the Imperial Government would undoubtedly require some 
reference to, or indication of, this change within the terms of the Act itself.334 The fact 
that no such reference occurred indicates that the historical relationships developed 
through treaties and custom remained unaffected. 
The Act For Regulating The Fur Trade, 1821 
In response to an armed conflict between th e Metis and the white settlers at 
Seven Oaks on the Red River in 1816, a Royal Commission was appointed to look into 
the governance of Rupert's Land. The Commission's report was submitted to the 
Imperial Parliament in 181 9,335 which then approved An Act for Regulating the Fur 
Trade, and Establishing a Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction within Certain Parts of North 
~ m e r i c a ~ ~ '  in 1821. This Act was implemented to end the ongoing rivalry in the fur trade 
between the Hudson's Bay Company and the Northwest Company, which had resulted 
in "...great Inconvenience and Loss, not only to the said Company and Associations, but 
to the said Trade in general, and also of great Injury to the native Indians, and of other 
Persons Subjects of His Majesty.. ." and "... many breaches of the peace, and violence 
extending to the loss of lives, and continual destruction of property, have occurred 
therein..". 
The stated intent of the Act was "...for Remedy of such Evils, it is expedient and 
necessary that some more effectual Regulations should be established for the 
apprehending, securing and bringing to Justice all Persons committing such Offences, 
and that His Majesty should be empowered to regulate the Trade. ..". Further, it 
appears that there was some uncertainty regarding the territorial range stated in the 
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1803 Act for Extending the Jurisdiction of the Courts of ~ u s t i c e ~ ~ ~ .  The Royal Charter of 
1670 had granted the Hudson's Bay Company and the Governor criminal jurisdiction 
over company employees. In 1809, Thomas Douglas, Lord Selkirk, sought advice on the 
Hudson's Bay Company's jurisdiction in Rupert's Land and was informed by the legal 
opinion of five eminent Chancery lawyers that the 1803 Act did not apply within Rupert's 
Land.338 Therefore, the present Act purported to end this uncertainty with stipulations in 
its preamble and fifth section: 
And Whereas Doubts have been entertained, whether the Provisions of 
an Act passed in the Forty third Year of the Reign of His late Majesty King 
George the third, intituled (sic) An Act for extending the Jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Justice in the Provinces of Lower and Upper Canada, to the 
Trial and Punishment of Persons guilty of Crimes and Offences within 
certain Parts of North America adjoining to the said Provinces, extended 
to the Territories granted by Charter to the said Governor and Company; 
and it is expedient that such Doubts should be removed, and that the said 
Act should be further extended.. . 
and, 
And be it declared and enacted, That the said Act passed in the Forty 
third Year of the Reign of His late Majesty, intituled An Act for extending 
the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Justices in the Provinces of Lower and 
Upper Canada, to the Trial and Punishment of Persons guilty of Crimes 
and Offences within certain Parts of North America adjoining to the said 
Provinces, and all the Clauses and Provisoes (sic) therein contained, 
shall be deemed and construed, and it is and are hereby respectively 
declared, to extend to and over, and to be in full force in and through all 
the Territories heretofore granted to the Company of Adventurers of 
England trading to Hudson's Bay, any thing in any Act or Acts of 
Parliament, or this Act, or in any Grant or Charter to the Company, to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 
Consequently, the 1821 Act erased any previous ambiguities and brought 
Rupert's Land under the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts in Upper ~ a n a d a . ~ ~ '  
However, under section XIV the Governor and Company still retained the authority 
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granted by the 1670 Charter, which amounted to concurrent jurisdiction of the parties. 
This somewhat confusing situation of concurrent jurisdictions within the same territorial 
boundaries left the question of criminal authority uncertain, however, a close 
examination of the document reveals its intent in regard to any type of extinguishment of 
First Nations' jurisdiction over their internal forms of social control and sanction. 
Throughout the Act the wording consistently makes reference to Indians, 
Persons and Offenders. When reading the Act as a whole it is apparent that there is a 
clear attempt to distinguish lndians from Persons and Offenders. If the drafters of the Act 
had intended to extinguish lndian forms of justice within their societies and at the same 
time supercede that jurisdiction with British authority, they would have taken the same 
careful measures to include lndians within the meaning of Persons and Offenders as 
they did to distinguish them from that meaning. As previously stated, Europeans of the 
time did not consider or legally define lndians as persons and in subsequent legislation 
specifically excluded them from the definition of persons.340 
Further, as far as First Nations are concerned, the preamble of the Act indicates 
that it was intended to assure them that the British Crown was committed to protecting 
them from the continuing injuries arising from the fur trade. The preamble states: 
WHEREAS the Competition in the Fur Trade between the Governor and 
company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson's Bay, and 
certain Associations of Persons trading under the Name of 'The North 
West Company of Montreal,' has been found for some Years past to be 
productive of great Inconvenience and Loss, not only to the said 
Company and Associations, but to the said Trade in general, and also of 
great Injury to the native Indians.. . 
The stated inconveniences were the "evils" that the Act was passed to remedy. It 
did not declare to interfere with internal First Nations' lndian justice systems but only 
reaffirmed the Crown's jurisdiction over inter-societal crime as had been previously 
agreed to in existing treaties.341 The fact that internal social disorder among First Nations 
remained a matter of exclusive lndian jurisdiction and of no interest to the Imperial 
Crown is well illustrated by Sir George Simpson, Governor of Rupert's Land from 1821 to 
340 lndian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98, s. 2 (i) reads: In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, 
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1860. In his report to the Select Committee of the Imperial House of Commons on the 
Hudson's Bay Company, he stated that the Indians of Rupert's Land "... are under our 
jurisdiction, ... when crimes are committed upon whites, but not when committed upon 
each other; we do not meddle with their 
Taking into consideration the totality of the above analysis, it is prudent and 
reasonable to conclude that this Act did not have the clear and plain intention required to 
extinguish First Nations internal criminal jurisdiction. 
The Enfranchisement Act, 1869 
In 1869, the Parliament of Canada enacted the Act for the gradual 
enfranchisement of with the primary intention of continuing the formal policy of 
assimilation previously introduced through the Act to Encourage the Gradual Civilization 
of the lndian tribes, 1 857.344 The purpose of the Act was to abolish traditional First 
Nations' self-government structures and confine those powers to marginal matters, 
subject to approval by the Governor in It further introduced a system of 
Colonial governmental control that was continued under subsequent lndian Acts. The 
Act also implicitly mentioned criminal jurisdiction over First Nations in section 5: 
Any lndian or person of lndian blood who shall be convicted of any crime 
punishable by imprisonment in any Penitentiary or other place of 
confinement, shall, during such imprisonment, be excluded from 
participating in the annuities, interest money, or rents payable to the 
lndian tribe, band or body, of which he or she is a member; and whenever 
any lndian shall be convicted of any crime punishable by imprisonment in 
a Penitentiary, or other place of confinement, the legal costs incurred in 
procuring such conviction, and in carrying out the various sentences 
recorded, may be defrayed by the Superintendent General of lndian 
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Affairs, and paid out at any annuity or interests coming to such Indian, or 
to the band or tribe, as the case may be. 
Through this section, as with the Civilization Act, it was presumed that lndians 
were subject to Colonial criminal law jurisdiction. However, although the 
Enfranchisement Act proclaimed a general but tacit assertion of criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians, there is no clear and plain intention to extinguish First Nations' jurisdiction. The 
wording "Any lndian or person of lndian blood who shall be convicted of any crime" 
indicates that the Dominion Government merely assumed that some previous legislation 
had in fact legally extended their criminal justice jurisdiction into First Nations internal 
structures and practices. However, considering that no previous extinguishments had 
taken place, this legislation can only be considered a continuation of existing 
Governmental 'policy' that directed the encroachment of criminal justice authority into 
First Nations' What is required for extinguishment is clear and plain 
intention, which this Act does not assert either expressly or implicitly. Therefore, this 
legislation is only 'necessarily inconsistent' with the expression of First Nations' criminal 
justice jurisdiction. 
The lndian Act, 1876 
In 1876 the Parliament of Canada exercised its jurisdiction over "Indians, and 
Land reserved for the lndiansWM7 with the passage of the first lndian A C ~ . ~ ~ ~  The purpose 
of this Act was to amend and consolidate all laws respecting Indians, thereby 
streamlining the federal administration of lndian affairs.M9 In addition to abolishing many 
traditional residual forms of First Nations' self-government, the Act also imposed 
significant changes to the distribution of criminal jurisdiction as affecting Indians. Early 
versions of the Act consolidated prior legislation that prohibited the sale of alcohol to 
First Nation individuals and prohibited trespass on their lands, fraudulent acquirement 
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and removal of cultural articles by non-Indians, and the settlement of squatters.350 Later 
amendments to the Act implemented a process of cultural destruction with the 
criminalization of First Nations spiritual practices. For instance, an I884 amendment 
reads: 
Every lndian or other person who engages in or assists in celebrating the 
lndian festival known as the "Potlatch" or in the lndian dance known as 
the "Tamanawas" is guilty of a misdemeanour, and shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than six nor less than two months in 
any gaol or other place of confinement and any lndian or other person 
who encourages, either directly or indirectly, an lndian or lndians to get 
up at such festival or dance, or to celebrate the same, or who shall assist 
in the celebration of the same is guilty of a like offence, and shall be liable 
to the same p~nishment.~~'  
The administration and enforcement of lndian Act laws was delegated to 'Indian 
agents', who by 1882, were acting as Stipendiary and Police Magistrates in order to 
adjudicate any infractions of the A C ~ . ~ ~ '  In 1884, a further amendment extended lndian 
agents' authority to: 
... any other matter affecting lndians with jurisdiction wheresoever any 
contravention of [the lndian Act, 18801 occurs, or wheresoever it is 
considered by him most conducive to the ends of justice that the trial be 
held.353 
This amendment essentially conferred on lndian agents the authority to hold 
trials for violations of the lndian Act that had occurred outside of reserve territory, as well 
as granting a general judicial authority over all other existing criminal acts. 
Consequently, lndian agents acted as Justices of the Peace over all statutory and 
common law offences with the single jurisdictional limitation that non-Indians could only 
be tried for violations of the lndian A C ~ . ~ ~ ~  However, an 1886 amendment diminished this 
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broad jurisdiction and re-established lndian Agents' jurisdiction only to violations of the 
lndian Act, regardless of the offender's race and where the offence had occurred.355 
In 1890, the lndian Act was amended356 once again to expand lndian Agent 
jurisdiction to include the sexual offences stipulated under section 157 of the Act 
respecting Offences against Public Morals and Public C ~ n v e n i e n c e . ~ ~ ~  This legislation 
created the offences of enticing a woman to a brothel, or to knowingly conceal her within 
such brothel and also forbade men to seduce and have illicit connections with any 
woman of previously chaste character. In addition, bawdyhouse provisions were re- 
enacted with additional prohibitions against residency in, or attendance at, such 
b a ~ d y h o u s e s . ~ ~ ~  However, Indians would soon receive specific attention in regard to 
these types of sexual offences in subsequent Criminal legislation. 
Upon examining the lndian Act, it is obvious that it is legislation directed towards 
regulating the legal status of First Nation individuals, their internal government structures 
and numerous other matters integral to their societies. However, the creation and 
imposition of lndian Agent courts does not meet the requirements necessary to 
demonstrate a clear and plain extinguishment of First Nations' jurisdiction over their 
internal systems of criminal justice. The extension of Dominion government jurisdiction 
into lndian territories was "nothing more than the establishment of an outpost of the 
general, non-Aboriginal justice system on lndian reserves provided with the mandate to 
enforce non-Aboriginal laws - including the lndian Act - against The lndian 
Acts themselves make no explicit references to the extinguishment of internal systems of 
First Nations' justice, nor do they even mention existing forms of justice as a matter to be 
considered. 
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Hence, the most rational conclusion one can surmise is that the Dominion 
government erroneously assumed that any First Nations jurisdiction had been 
extinguished previously, or that there was no necessity to enact valid legislation that 
clearly and plainly stated any such intent to extinguish. Therefore, lndian Act legislation 
cannot be considered the legislative instrument by which First Nations' jurisdiction was 
extinguished, but only as legislation which is 'necessarily inconsistent' with the exercise 
of First Nations' jurisdiction. 
The Criminal Code, 1892 
The first Canadian Criminal Code was enacted in 1 892,361 thereby codifying 
criminal common law and repealing prior collections of criminal legislation. The drafters 
of the Code gave no direct consideration to traditional First Nations' systems. However, 
two provisions were included to deal specifically with lndian offences. The first of these 
is found in section 98, which reads: 
Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years' 
imprisonment who induces, incites or stirs up any three or more Indians, 
non-treaty Indians or half-breeds, apparently acting in concert: 
(a.) to make any request or demand of any agent or servant of the 
Government in a riotous, routous, (sic) disorderly or threatening manner, 
or in a manner calculated to cause a breach of the peace; or 
(b.) to do any act calculated to cause a breach of the peace. 
In addition, section 190 reads: 
Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a penalty not 
exceeding one hundred dollars and not less than ten dollars, or six 
months imprisonment : 
(a) who, being the keeper of any house, tent or wigwam, allows or suffers 
any unenfranchised lndian woman to be or remain in such house, tent or 
wigwam, knowing or having probable cause for believing that such lndian 
woman is in or remains in such house, tent or wigwam with the intention 
of prostituting herself therein; or 
(b) who, being an lndian woman, prostitutes herself therein; or 
361 Criminal Code, supra note 359. 
(c) who, being an unenfranchised lndian woman, keeps, frequents or is 
found in a disorderly house, tent or wigwam used for any such purpose. 
2. Every person who appears, acts or behaves as master or mistress, or 
as the person who has the care or management, of any house, tent or 
wigwam in which any such lndian woman is or remains for the purpose of 
prostituting herself therein, is deemed to be the keeper thereof, 
notwithstanding he or she is not in fact the real keeper thereof. 
In regard to the enforcement of these provisions, lndian Agents were delegated 
jurisdiction over Indians for the stated offences by way of part Xlll of the Code and an 
amendment to the 1894 lndian A C ~ . ~ ~ ~  Under the existing principles of statutory law, 
lndian Agent authority to enforce these Criminal Code offences under lndian Act 
legislation was considered concurrent with that of other Criminal Therefore, 
lndian Agents acting as Justices of the Peace, were considered the exclusive overseers 
of justice pertaining to First ~ a t i o n s . ~ ~ ~  
The validity of this legislation and its jurisdiction was commonly accepted without 
question by the judiciary of the time. For example, in the 1908 case of R. v. ~ e b o n i n g ~ ' ~  
the First Nations defendant was charged with the offence of theft under s. 347 of the 
Criminal code3" for allegedly taking a quantity of hay without 'colour of right'. As part of 
his defence the accused argued that ss. 21, 22 and 127 of the lndian Act essentially 
prohibited the application of the Criminal Code to reserve territory. In essence, this 
argument asserted that the lndian Act was /ex specialis or a special law, and therefore, 
its subject matter was an exception to the general application of the Criminal Code. In 
response to this contention, Osler J.A. stated: 
According to the circumstances, the act may be a theft or in the nature of 
a mere trespass upon the reserve, and there is nothing in the Code or in 
the lndian Act which suggests that it can only be dealt with under the 
latter, where the elements of the graver offence exist . . . 367 
In a more colonial tone, Meredith J.A. declared: 
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The suggestion that the Criminal Code does not apply to lndians is also 
so manifestly absurd as to require no refutation; nor can I imagine any 
good reason why the provisions of the lndian Act for the imposition of a 
fine upon an lndian for trespassing upon land in the reserve held by 
another Indian, and cutting and carrying away, among other things, hay, 
can repeal or modify the provisions of the Criminal Code respecting theft, 
in so far as they affect Indians, or in any manner exempt lndians from its 
Although the Justices in this case clearly declare that the Criminal Code did 
apply to lndians and First Nations' territory, they make this declaration without any 
indication or enunciation of the legislation that extinguished Indian jurisdiction and 
consequently necessitated Dominion criminal authority over First Nations. This lack of 
clarification would appear to indicate that the judiciary, as well as the Dominion 
government, merely presumed that the Code had extinguished First Nations' jurisdiction. 
However, this presumption is clearly unfounded. The Criminal Code on one hand 
attempts to distinguish lndians with the application of ss. 98 and 190, while on the other 
hand, the judiciary attempts to overlook this distinction by including lndians within the 
meaning of 'everyone9, 'person' or other terminology used to define offenders. Further, 
the Code does not make any explicit reference to First Nations' internal justice systems 
or their extinguishments, which does not amount to a 'clear and plain' intention. Actually, 
in regard to statutory intention, what could be less 'clear and plain'? 
Therefore, any such intention to extinguish could only have been implied. In 
order for an implied intention to be considered 'clear and plain', the exercise of the rights 
that the statute had intended to extinguish must be irreconcilable with the general intent 
of the statute itself. In other words, the legislation must necessarily imply that the 
legislative scheme was specifically to prevail to the extent that it is inconsistent with the 
relevant Aboriginal right.369 Framed in the context of this subject matter, the continued 
existence and application of First Nations' internal criminal jurisdiction and practices 
must nullify, or be irreconcilable with, the effect of the Criminal 
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However, the idea that First Nations traditional justice systems would act to 
'nullify' the 'effect' of the Criminal Code is without merit. Current and historical reality 
demonstrates that parallel systems of criminal law have always existed in Canada 
without any noteworthy disruption to ingrained political culture or criminal justice.371 For 
instance, Canadian soldiers are regulated and sanctioned under the National Defence 
A C ~ ~ ~ ~  and young offenders under differing statutes since 1 9 0 8 . ~ ~ ~  Thus, criminal law in 
Canada has never been dealt with in a uniform manner, the reality of which, indicates 
that the continuation and application of First Nations' justice systems, were not and are 
not, irreconcilable with the intended and actual effect of Criminal Code legislation.374 
Although Imperial and Dominion government legislation have acted to intrude 
upon the traditional social control or criminal justice systems of First Nations situated in 
Canada, the above analysis has illustrated that none of this legislation has acted to 
'clearly and plainly' extinguish First Nations' internal criminal justice jurisdiction. Simply 
carrying out a policy of control and regulation regarding First Nations does not act to 
extinguish First Nations' jurisdiction or inherent rights, and is therefore, only 'necessarily 
inconsistent' with the exercise of those rights.375 Further, the legislation discussed has 
not demonstrated a consistent intention on the part of the Crown to effect 
extinguishment. It has touched First Nations expression of jurisdiction to varying degrees 
in different periods of time, from outright acceptance to prohibition. More recent 
government actions would suggest a cautious but evident recognition of First Nations 
criminal jurisdiction. 
There are numerous examples of government programs and processes that have 
acted to return a significant measure of control over criminal justice to First Nations and 
First Nations territories. For instance, in June 1991 the federal government introduced 
the First Nations Policing Policy (FNPP) in order to provide First Nations across Canada 
with access to police services that are "professional, effective, culturally appropriate, and 
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accountable to the communities they serve".376 The FNPP operates on the principle of 
"partnership" to negotiate "tripartite agreements" for police services that are responsive 
to the particular needs of each community. Under the program, First Nations 
communities can choose to develop and administer their own police service, or select a 
force delivered by a body of First Nations officers working within an existing police force. 
In addition, the program applies to all First Nation reserves, Inuit communities, and other 
Indian communities on Crown land and "is designed to give First Nations communities 
greater control over the delivery and management of policing services in their 
communities."377 
In addition, the Aboriginal Justice Strategy has also been implemented with a 
primary mandate to "enter into self-government negotiations in the field of administration 
of A principal objective of the Strategy is to "support Aboriginal communities 
as they take greater responsibility for the administration of justice". The program also 
supports four different types of alternative justice programs including Tribal Courts, 
which to date, have been primarily managed by First Nations and Tribal Councils.379 
These programs clearly signify that First Nations have a valid jurisdictional claim 
to criminal justice. It is nonsensical to assert that legislation has extinguished an inherent 
right while at the same time support programs that effectually allow and even encourage 
the expression of that right. The situation is analogous to that in  lads stone^^^ where a 
varying legislative scheme acted to prohibit, allow, and then protect the exercise of 
Heiltsuk inherent rights. In this decision, the Supreme Court clearly asserted that simple 
control over an Aboriginal right is not sufficient to extinguish that right and there must be 
a consistent intention on the part of the Crown to cause extinguishment. The same is so 
with the varying pieces of criminal justice legislation that gradually exerted control over 
First Nations. In the words of the Supreme Court, "such a varying regulatory scheme 
376 Canada, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, First Nations Policing Policy 
[http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca I abor~policing/fir~nat~policing~e.asp#oveiew] [hereinafter First 
Nations Policing Policy] (January 16, 2004). 
377 Ibid. 
378 Canada, Department of Justice, "The Aboriginal Justice Strategy" [http://canada.justice 
.gc.calenlpsl ajln/strat.html] [hereinafter Aboriginal Justice Strategy] (January 16,2004). 
379 Ibid. 
380 Gladstone, supra note 240 at para. 34. 
cannot be said to express a clear and plain intention to eliminate (the) Aboriginal 
rights.. .".381 
Surrender 
The principle of surrender essentially requires a First Nation to have agreed to 
the extinguishment of a specified right or rights within the context of a treaty or other 
valid agreement. The common law has always presumed that inherent rights can be 
surrendered in this manner, however, there are certain established principles set out by 
the Supreme Court that must be utilized when interpreting any surrender provision. For 
instance, in Simon the court concluded that a treaty between the Crown and First 
Nations is an agreement sui generis, or a special agreement like no other and should be 
given a "fair, large and liberal construction in favour of the ~ n d i a n s . " ~ ~ ~  These principles 
were subsequently affirmed in where the Supreme Court also concluded that 
treaties and statutes relating to First Nations should be liberally construed and that any 
uncertainties ought to be resolved in favour of First Nations. In 1996 the ~ a d g e ? ~ ~  
decision set out the following authoritative guidelines and principles of treaty 
interpretation which are now the foundation of all treaty rights litigation: 
1. A treaty represents an exchange of solemn promises between the 
Crown and the various First Nations. It is an agreement whose nature is 
sacred. 
2. The honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealings with First 
Nations. It is always assumed that that the Crown intends to fulfill its 
promises. No appearance of 'sharp dealing' will be sanctioned. 
3. Any ambiguities or doubtful expressions in the wording of the treaty or 
document must be resolved in favour of First Nations. A counterpart to 
this principle is that any limitations which restrict the rights of First Nations 
must be narrowly construed. 
4. The scope of treaty rights will be determined by their wording, which 
must be interpreted in accordance with the principles set out by the 
Supreme Court. The historical context and oral history are relevant and 
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important to this determination. Further, First Nations' treaties should be 
interpreted as their Indian signatories would have understood them. 
5. The onus of proof that a treaty right has been extinguished lies upon 
the Crown. There must be strict proof of the fact of extinguishment and 
evidence of a clear and plain intention on the part of the government to 
extinguish treaty rights prior to the enactment of s. 35 (1). 
6. Treaties should be interpreted in a manner that maintains the integrity 
of the Crown, particularly the Crown's fiduciary obligation toward 
Aboriginal peoples. 
7. The justification of any infringement of a treaty right will be subject to 
the infringementljustification test found in Sparrow. 
With these guiding principles in mind, it is also important to understand what 
treaties and treaty making meant to the Haudenosaunee in order to ascertain a 
reasonable idea of what they understood their treaties with the British to truly mean. 
For the Iroquois, treaty making was essentially an extension of The Great Law of 
Peace to a broader context. The rituals, established orations, and exchanges of gifts 
mandated by The Great Law provided the basic paradigm for all diplomatic relations with 
foreign peoples, be they First Nation or European. What was most important to the 
Haudenosaunee throughout the process of external diplomacy was the status of 
peaceful relationships and the intention to create and maintain this status.385 For the 
Haudenosaunee the intent of treaty making was to invite the foreign nation to accept the 
peace, power and righteousness as mandated by The Great Law. Doing so was 
integrally connected to the procedures utilized throughout the process itself. In effect, 
what this means is that when a foreign nation accepted and adopted the diplomatic 
procedures prescribed by the Confederacy, that nation was in fact placing itself under 
The Great ~ a w . ~ ~ ~  This applied equally to European nations, who until approximately the 
1830s, knowingly adopted and adapted each element of Haudenosaunee Council and 
treaty procedure. Therefore, by following the processes prescribed by The Great Law, 
they were, in effect, placing themselves under the Tree of Peace. For the Iroquois, 
"these relationships were consistent with The Great Law as they respected the internal 
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lawmaking powers and sovereignty of the nations while linking those nations together in 
a union of peace and 
In addition, the Iroquois always engaged in the treaty process with the 
understanding that all parties to the accord were obligated to renew the bonds that had 
been created. In fact, treaty renewal "was regarded as a continuing constitutional 
obligation of treaty partners".388 Thus, the bonds and understandings created by treaty 
agreements needed to be continually renewed and strengthened, whereas neglecting to 
do so would generally dissolve those bonds and  understanding^.^^^ 
Thus, it would seem apparent that the Haudenosaunee understood treaty making 
to represent a foreign nations' acceptance of The Great Law of Peace, which in turn 
created a status of sovereign alliance between the parties. The idea that one nation 
could interfere with the internal sovereignty of the other was not a possible outcome of 
such compacts. To do so was in violation of The Great Law itself.390 Therefore, this 
understanding must be given due consideration in any treaty provisions that allegedly 
surrender a Haudenosaunee inherent right. 
In regard to the treaties themselves, the Haudenosaunee and British have 
entered into numerous formal treaties and other compacts, the documentation of which 
exceeds 10,000 pages. However, only two of those treaties speak directly to the issue of 
criminal justice jurisdi~tion,~~' both of which will now be examined. 
The Two Row Wampum Or Fort Albany Treaty, 1664 
The earliest treaty record between the Haudenosaunee and the British was made 
at Fort Albany, New York, on September 24, 1664 between Colonel George Cartwright, 
the commanding officer at Albany, and sachems of the "Maquaes" and "Synicks". The 
English had recently defeated the Dutch, who surrendered their claims to New 
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Netherlands and the King of England then placed the territory under the authority of his 
brother, the Duke of York, who named the colony New ~ork .~ ' *  The treaty was intended 
to replace the previously existing Dutch relationship with the Haudenosaunee with a 
similar British relationship and provided that the English "for the future" would supply 
"the lndian Princes above named and their subjects" with the same wares and 
commodities as had historically been given by the Dutch. 
The treaty clearly stipulated separate criminal jurisdiction between the parties. 
Each was responsible for the conduct of its own subjects and any conflicts and 
"satisfaction" were to be resolved at a government-to-government level, with any 
grievances to be made to the Haudenosaunee sachems on one side and to the governor 
of New York or the officer in charge at Albany on the other: 
That if any English, Dutch, or Indian under the protection of the English 
do any wrong, injury or violence to any of ye said Princes, or their 
Subjects, in any sort whatsoever, if they complained to the Governor at 
New York or to the Officer in Chief at Albany, if the person so offending 
can be discovered, then that person shall suffer punishment and all due 
satisfaction shall be given, and the like shall be done for all other English 
Plantations. 
That if any lndians belonging to any of the Sachims aforesaid, do any 
wrong, injury or damage to the English, Dutch, or lndians under the 
protection of the English, if complaint be made to ye Sachims, and the 
person be discovered who did the injury, then the person so offending 
shall be punished and all just satisfaction shall be given to any of His 
Majesties subjects in any Colony or other English plantation in 
~ m e r i c a . ~ ' ~  
In addition to the written treaty itself, the meaning and intent of the relationship 
was also symbolized in the form of a wampum belt, formally known as the Two Row 
Wampum. Since the founding of The Great Law the Haudenosaunee had always used 
wampum belts to record important events and to exchange at treaty  conference^,^'^ and 
in keeping with this tradition, the Two Row Wampum was likely completed for the Fort 
Albany meeting. Haudenosaunee tradition states that the belt dates back to 1664, and 
the treaty in September of that year would have been the most likely time for the belt to 
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have been exchanged, but there are no British documents confirming the belt itself. 
Unfortunately, few historical records describe any belts in However, lroquois 
protocol required treaty commitments to be regularly renewed and maintained, so it is 
virtually certain that several Two Row belts were exchanged between the two parties.396 
In fact, three of the ancient belts have been preserved and two are kept at the Grand 
River Territory while the third remains in the Museum of the American Indian. All three 
belts, as well as any versions that may have been lost, stand for the same basic 
principles: 
The symbol of the relationship is a wampum belt nine rows wide, with two 
parallel rows of dark wampum running its entire length. The two dark rows 
symbolize the sailing ship of the British and the bark canoe of the 
Haudenosaunee. Their paths are parallel because, while they are to 
remain close allies, they are not to interfere in each other's course. The 
three white rows separating the two dark rows signify peace, trust, and 
respect and friendship (that is, respect and friendship can be 
interchanged). These three concepts, it is said, are what keep the two 
craft close together, yet at a respectful distance from each other. 
That treaty established our equal rights in this land and our separate and 
equal coexistence on this land between our two peoples, the canoe of the 
Indian and the boat of the white man going down the river of life in peace 
and friendship forever. The last three principles were memorialized in the 
great Silver Covenant Chain with the three binding us together forever, 
peace and friendship forever. As long as the grass grows green, as long 
as the water runs downhill, and as long as the sun rises in the east and 
sets in the west shall we hold this treaty.397 
In 1692 the original Two Row Wampum treaty relationship was further solidified 
at a Treaty Council between the two parties, but thereafter, became known as the Silver 
Covenant The Treaty was so named as a metaphor for the relationship, which 
was considered a chain that tied the British ship and the lroquois canoe to the Tree of 
Peace. An actual silver chain was constructed by the British in order to symbolize their 
agreement, and the three links of that chain were said to represent peace, friendship, 
and forever, which were the basic principles inherent in the Two Row Wampum. The 
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parties also agreed to meet regularly to polish the chain to restore their original 
friendship and to pass the treaty down from generation to generation, so that its intent 
would never be forgotten.399 
That the British fully understood this intent is well illustrated with the personal 
seal that Sir William Johnson designed for himself as Imperial Superintendent General of 
Indian affairs. The seal is constructed with the interpretive symbols of both the Two Row 
Wampum and the Silver Covenant Chain. Around the outside of the seal is an endless 
Silver Covenant Chain, grasped by seven arms, with one wearing a shirt and coat and 
said to be Sir William himself, and the others representative of the Six Nations. The 
interior of the circular Silver Covenant Chain contains a pine tree or the Tree of Peace, a 
pipe of peace, a council house, and a sailing ship and a canoe, side by side.400 
The forgoing examination clearly indicates that the Haudenosaunee and the 
British entered the Two Row Wampum and Silver Covenant Chain with the definitive 
understanding that each party would bear responsibility for the criminal acts of its 
citizens who injured citizens of the other. The language of the written agreement 
implicitly confirms the sovereignty of both the Haudenosaunee and the British. Each is 
recognized as having national 'subjects' and the same type of jurisdictional authority and 
terms vested in each party. There is a clear separation of laws and government with 
neither party being subordinate to the other. In addition the symbolic significance of the 
Two Row Wampum and Silver Covenant Chain demonstrate that both parties 
recognized the sovereign authority of the other to personal jurisdiction in criminal 
matters. Further, the recognition of the sovereignty of the other undoubtedly suited both 
parties: 
For the British, it meant leverage: it meant that the entire Confederacy 
would be responsible for atoning for the actions of any wayward 
individuals. British law for at least a hundred years after 1664 was not in a 
position to enforce criminal sanctions in the frontier territory. For the 
Haudenosaunee, it was an extrapolation of a principle of the Kainerekowa 
(The Great Law): just as the clan was responsible to other clans for 
actions and injuries of its members, and the nation was responsible to 
other nations, so was it true at the international level between the British 
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and the Haudenosaunee. Separate criminal jurisdiction, with each side 
liable to give 'satisfaction', was consistent with the spirit and intent of The 
Great Law of Peace and another indication that the British were 
governing themselves by the spirit of that law. Separate jurisdiction meant 
that territory was irrelevant: it was the individual, rather than his location, 
that mattered.401 
Therefore, considering the plain reading of the text, the spirit and intent found 
within the Two Row Wampum, and the advantages to both parties entering into the 
compact, it is prudent to conclude that this treaty only acted to reaffirm Haudenosaunee 
criminal jurisdiction. 
Treaty Of Niagara, 1764 
In 1764, Sir William Johnson sought an extension of the Covenant Chain to 
include the Western or Lakes Confederacy and also requested a change in the criminal 
justice provisions as set out in the 1664 Albany Treaty. Johnson believed it important to 
secure British criminal jurisdiction over the Haudenosaunee in cases of murder and 
robbery where the victims were not Indians. Apparently such incidents were escalating 
because the victims had no clans to resolve matters according to Iroquois criminal 
justice practice. The presence of two sovereigns in one territory led to uncertainty, and 
Haudenosaunee institutions were under attack as settlers and citizens challenged the 
established methods of resolving conflict. 402 
In March 1762, Haudenosaunee and British representatives held a conference at 
Johnson Hall and the discussion centered on the application of British criminal law. Sir 
William Johnson demanded that the Haudenosaunee hand over several young Senecas 
who had been accused of murdering an English subject so they could be tried and 
sanctioned by the British. In their response, the Confederacy stated: 
... this accident affords us as much uneasiness as it can you, and after 
mature deliberation we are of opinion, as it is not in our power to deliver 
up the murderers, having no laws for that purpose, that the same should 
be amicably settled according to the antient (sic) Custom of our 
Forefathers, and Yours, who first entered into that Agreement together in 
such cases, which they have always abided by, as our Forefathers were 
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of opinion, that it was better to accommodate Matters already bad 
enough, than to shed further Blood thereon. 
Arguing for the British position on the matter, Johnson threatened that the 
English would withdraw from their longstanding alliance and trade relationship with the 
Haudenosaunee if they did not concede: 
I well know the customs of your Forefathers, and I look upon that 
Agreement to have been made when times were very different, and when 
you did not act as you now do. We have writings, and know the 
transactions of them times very well. At the same time, you must be 
convinced that such a Covenant would in time require to be altered, as it 
would be productive of many Quarrels ... 
We don't want the Blood of any one, merely out of a thirst of revenge. No. 
We want only to preserve the Peace, which we can never do, if either of 
us may Murder at Discretion. 
If people are not punished for capital offences, they will often repeat 
them; but if proper examples are made of the guilty, it will put a stop to 
the committing of crimes, which it is in your interest, more than ours to 
consider.. . 
... in case you are licensed to murder, our people will claim the same 
privilege, and, not only that, but we must be obliged to stop up the road of 
peace, and withdraw all our traders and smiths from amongst you. 
Johnson's threats seemingly convinced the Haudenosaunee to comply with his 
demands. During this period, the Iroquois had come to rely on English trade goods, and 
losing their historic alliances with the British would have weakened the Confederacy 
substantially. Consequently, the Senecas ratified the Treaty of Niagara and surrendered 
their jurisdiction over the crimes of murder and robbery: 
That should any Indian commit Murder, or rob any of His Majesty's 
subjects, he shall be immediately delivered up to be tried, and punished 
according to the equitable laws of England, and should any White man be 
guilty of the like crime towards the Indians, he shall be immediately tried 
and punished if guilty. 
And the Senecas are never for the future to procure themselves 
Satisfaction, otherwise than as before mentioned, but to lay all matters of 
complaint before Sir William Johnson, or His Majesty's Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs for the time bein , and strictly to maintain and abide by the 
Covenant Chain of Friendship. $03 
The text of the treaty itself states that the surrender applies only to the murder 
and robbery of 'His Majesty's subjects', however, the Confederacy's own traditions state 
that the jurisdiction extends to cases of rape and it is not restricted to those crimes 
where the victim is non-Aboriginal. How the Iroquois came to the conclusion that the 
surrender comprised additional subject matter and applied to all six nations of the 
League is not documented, but there is evidence that the Confederacy conceded this to 
be the case. For example, correspondence from Haudenosaunee sachem William 
Jacobs to Britain's Joseph Howe on May 7, I872 states: 
There is three things in ou Law we wish to be like yours the way to 
punish the bad this is all. 4 x  
Those 'three things' are identified as murder, rape and theft.405 Confirmation of 
this understanding can also be documented up to the 1940s when the Confederacy at 
the Grand River territory chose not to exert jurisdiction in a case of theft within Six 
Nations boundaries. John Noon, a researcher of the Grand River Haudenosaunee 
during this era states: 
The Chiefs claimed to have made an agreement with the British 
Government to relinquish jurisdiction over the crimes of theft, rape and 
murder. Since this charge made by the plaintiff falls within this group of 
crimes, they may have, for this reason, considered the case beyond their 
jurisdi~tion.~'~ 
Unfortunately, there does appear to be significant ambiguity in regard to this 
treaty. A plain reading of the text suggests that it is only the Senecas who were subject 
to the surrender of jurisdiction over the two crimes of murder and robbery. However, the 
Haudenosaunee tradition stresses that they understood and accepted the spirit and 
intent of the treaty to include the additional crime of rape, and that the surrender applied 
to all six nations of the Confederacy. In addition, it appears the Confederacy also 
understood the term robbery to include theft, which according to Canadian criminal law, 
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are two separate categories of offences. Robbery denotes the use of a weapon, or the 
application, or threat of the application of violence to gain something from the victim.407 
Theft on the other hand does not include the application of violence or threats of 
violence.408 These distinctions are quite significant in both the measure of severity and 
the type and length of prescribed sanction. Therefore, further examination into this 
specific issue would be required in order to determine what exactly the Confederacy 
understood the meaning of robbery and theft to include. 
What is clear is that the Seneca surrendered jurisdiction over murder and 
robbery by the terms of this treaty. It is also clear that the Haudenosaunee understood 
that this agreement applied to the Confederacy as a whole and also included the crime 
of rape. However, one vital factor that remains to be addressed is whether this surrender 
was subject to the renewal and reaffirmation required under lroquois treaty protocol. As 
noted earlier, the lroquois considered treaties to be an ongoing relationship that required 
consistent renewal by the parties.409 Therefore, if the British and the Haudenosaunee did 
not subsequently reaffirm this treaty, it may have been understood by the lroquois as 
either a temporary surrender, or as having been dissolved. 
Thus, no clear conclusion regarding the Treaty of Niagara can be made at this 
time. Further research regarding Haudenosaunee understandings of the Treaty's terms, 
as well as confirmation of any subsequent renewals of those terms, is necessary to fully 
resolve this issue. 
Constitutional Enactment 
The final method by which an inherent right can be extinguished is by 
constitutional enactment. However, as with all other methods of extinguishment, 
constitutional enactments are also subject to specified principles of interpretation when 
analyzing their effect. These principles include: 
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1. Interpretations of statutory provisions which have an impact upon treaty 
or Aboriginal rights must be approached in a manner which maintains the 
integrity of the Crown. 
2. Any ambiguities or doubtful expressions in the wording of the 
document must be resolved in favour of the Indians. 
3. There must be "strict proof of the fact of extinguishment" and evidence 
of a clear and plain intention on the part of the government to extinguish 
treaty or inherent rights.410 
In accordance with these interpretive principles, the three existing constitutional 
enactments that directly affect First Nations will now be examined. 
The British North America Act, 1867 
The British North America Act, 1867 was enacted by the Imperial Parliament and 
the British Crown in order to distribute jurisdictions between the federal parliament and 
the three existing provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. In this new 
division of powers, the federal authority was accorded exclusive administrative authority 
over Indians and Indian Lands and the criminal law. The relevant provisions read: 
VI. DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS. 
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate and House of Commons, to make laws for the Peace, 
Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not 
coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to 
the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as 
to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is 
hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive 
Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters 
coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that 
is to say, 
24. Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians. 
27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal 
Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters. 
The method by which the federal government has acted to express and 
discharge its jurisdiction in both of these areas has been through the creation and 
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enactment of legislation, specifically the lndian A C ~ "  and Criminal Code.412 However, as 
previously demonstrated, none of the legislation enacted under the authority of these 
constitutional provisions has operated to extinguish the Haudenosaunee inherent right to 
criminal justice jurisdiction. Therefore, it must be determined if the constitutional 
provisions themselves express an implicit intention to extinguish that right. At first 
glance, both areas of jurisdiction might appear to exhibit such an implicit intention, but 
the clause itself only provides the federal government with the authority to enact 
legislation in the stipulated areas of jurisdiction. There is clearly no "strict proof of the 
fact of extinguishment" and the provisions cannot be interpreted to effect extinguishment 
over criminal justice jurisdiction any more than federal government jurisdiction over "Sea 
Coast and Inland ~ isher ies"~ '~  can be concluded to extinguish the inherent right of 
Aboriginal peoples to fish. 
Further, the BNA Act's effect on the Aboriginal inherent right to self-government 
was directly confronted by the British Columbia Supreme Court in  ampb bell.^'^ After 
reviewing the applicable case law the court made the following conclusions: 
Thus, what was distributed in ss. 91 and 92 of the British North America 
Act was all of (but no more than) the powers which until June 30, 1867 
had belonged to the colonies. Anything outside of the powers enjoyed by 
the colonies was not encompassed by ss. 91 and 92 and remained 
outside of the power of Parliament and the le islative assemblies just as it 
had been beyond the powers of the colonies. 91 5 
... the object of the division of powers in ss. 91 and 92 between the 
federal government and the provinces was not to extinguish diversity (or 
Aboriginal rights), but to ensure that the local and distinct needs of Upper 
and Lower Canada (Ontario and Quebec) and the maritime provinces 
were protected in a federal system.416 
A consideration of these various observations by the Supreme Court of 
Canada supports the submission that Aboriginal rights, and in particular a 
right to self-government akin to a legislative power to make laws, survived 
as one of the unwritten "underlying values" of the Constitution outside of 
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the powers distributed to Parliament and the legislatures in 1867. The 
federal-provincial division of powers in 1867 was aimed at a different 
issue and was a division "internal" to the 
Thus, existing case law clearly concludes that the BNA Act did not have as its 
object or effect the extinguishment of Aboriginal self-government rights. 
The Manitoba Act And The Natural Resources Transfer Agreement 
Neither the Manitoba Act nor The Natural Resources Transfer Agreement deals 
with the issue of criminal justice jurisdiction in any manner, nor do they affect 
Haudenosaunee inherent rights with their contents. However, both do contain 
extinguishment provisions that the courts have upheld. Thus, they are included to 
illustrate the type of "clear and plain" intention necessary to effectively extinguish 
Aboriginal rights. 
On May 12, 1870, the federal government passed the Manitoba Act, which 
essentially created the province of Manitoba and provided for a system of elected 
government. The enactment also extinguished "Indian Title" to certain lands in the 
province with the following clause: 
... towards the extinguishment of the Indian Title to the lands in the 
Province, to appropriate a portion of such ungranted lands, to the extent 
of one million four hundred thousand acres thereof, for the benefit of the 
families of the half-breed residents, it is hereby enacted, that, under 
regulations to be from time to time made by the Governor General in 
Council, the Lieutenant-Governor shall select such lots or tracts in such 
parts of the Province as he may deem expedient, to the extent aforesaid, 
and divide the same among the children of the half-breed heads of 
families residing in the Province at the time of the said transfer to 
Canada, and the same shall be granted to the said children respectively, 
in such mode and on such conditions as to settlement and otherwise, as 
the Governor General in Council may from time to time determine.418 
In 1929 and 1930 the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta entered 
into agreements with the federal government with the primary purpose of transferring 
control of natural resources and Crown lands from the federal authority to the three 
- 
417 Ibid. at para. 81. 
418 Manitoba Act, 1870 s. 31 . 
provinces. The agreements were subsequently affirmed by the United Kingdom 
Parliament with the passage of the Constitution Act, 1930. Entitled the Natural 
Resources Transfer Agreement, the statute has been interpreted by the Supreme Court 
to have effectively extinguished the commercial harvesting rights of First Nations within 
the stated provinces, and replaced those rights with the right to hunt, fish and trap for 
food during all seasons and on all unoccupied Crown lands, or other lands to which First 
Nations may have valid The relevant provision reads: 
In order to secure to the lndians of the Province the continuance of the 
supply of game and fish for their support and subsistence, Canada 
agrees that the laws respecting game in force in the Province from time to 
time shall apply to the lndians within the boundaries thereof, provided, 
however, that the said lndians shall have the right, which the Province 
hereby assures to them, of hunting, trapping and fishing game and fish for 
food at all seasons of the year on all unoccupied Crown lands and on any 
other lands to which the said lndians may have a right of access.420 
As already discussed, the only constitutional enactment which includes the 
subject matter of criminal justice jurisdiction is the declared federal authority over 
criminal justice in s. 91 (27) of the British North America Act, 1867. However, the 
provision itself only designates the federal government the exclusive legislative authority 
over the sphere of criminal justice, which would have authorized the development of 
independent legislation that clearly and plainly extinguished Haudenosaunee or First 
Nations criminal justice jurisdiction prior to the enactment of s. 35 (1). Section 91 (27) 
does not provide the clear and plain intent required for extinguishment as demonstrated 
in the Manitoba Act and the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement. 
The same conclusion can also be reached in relation to s. 91 (24) which only 
provided the federal government with the authority to develop further independent 
legislation as it relates to lndians and Indian reserve land. The required clear and plain 
intention to extinguish is absent. Further, applicable case law has also concluded that 
the Act only encompassed those matters internal to the Crown and did not have as its 
objective the extinguishment of Aboriginal self-government rights. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable and prudent to conclude that no constitutional enactment has extinguished 
4'9 R. V. Horse, [1988] 2 C.N.L.R. 112 (S.C.C.). 
420 Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930 s. 13. 
the Haudenosaunee right to criminal justice jurisdiction as a residual form of self- 
government. 
Conclusion On Extinguishment 
As the above analysis has demonstrated, the federal government has not 
enacted any legislation or constitutional statute that has effected extinguishment with a 
clear and plain intention. Since the late 1800s there undoubtedly have been attempts by 
the Dominion and Canadian governments to intrude upon Haudenosaunee internal 
criminal justice practices through varying pieces of legislation. However, none of this 
legislation has demonstrated a clear and plain intention to extinguish that jurisdiction. 
"Intrusion" and "legal extinguishment" are entirely different matters and the statutory and 
historical evidence openly suggest that Imperial, Dominion and Canadian governments 
have only demonstrated a continuing policy of colonial interferen~e.~~' 
The issue of surrender on the other hand is somewhat uncertain. What is clear is 
that the Seneca explicitly surrendered jurisdiction over murder and robbery in the Treaty 
of Niagara, 1764. However, with the Confederacy asserting the position that this 
agreement applied to all six nations of the League, and that it also included the 
additional crimes of rape and theft, there is significant ambiguity regarding the extent of 
the surrender. The case law on treaty interpretation affirms that any ambiguity in the 
wording of a treaty must be resolved in favour of the First   at ion,^" but this issue 
appears to go beyond a simple reading of the text, which is not ambiguous. The 
conviction that the Haudenosaunee as a whole are subject to the surrender is 
understandable in that the Seneca are an integral and necessary part of the 
Confederacy as mandated by The Great Law. Considering that all members of the 
Confederacy agreed to and ratified the treaty as one political body, one can appreciate 
their position that in doing so they were also accepting the terms their Seneca brethren 
were coerced to accept. Any subsequent renewals of this treaty are also at issue. If the 
treaty was not renewed according to Iroquois treaty protocol, then it is very possible that 
421 Leonardy, supra note 100 at 182-83. 
422 Badger, supra note 1 01 at para. 4 1. 
the Haudenosaunee understood the treaty as either a temporary surrender, or as having 
been dissolved. 
The ability to come to a definitive conclusion on these matters will require further 
dialogue with hereditary Chiefs and elders at Six Nations, as well as research into 
historic treaty documentation. Such an inquiry goes far beyond the scope of the current 
thesis. For the moment, this issue remains inconclusive.423 
After having determined the extent of extinguishment, the process proceeds to 
stage three, which queries whether the inherent right has been infringed by federal or 
provincial legislation. 
Has The Inherent Right To Criminal Justice Jurisdiction Been 
Infringed By Federal Or Provincial Legislation? 
In order for a court to determine if there is a prima facie infringement of an 
inherent right it must consider three specific issues as set out in Sparrow: 
1. Is the legislative limitation on the inherent right unreasonable? 
2. Does the legislation impose undue hardship? 
3. Does the legislation deny to the holders of the right their preferred 
means of exercising that right? 
The onus of proving an infringement lies on the Haudenosaunee and the 
following discussion is an example of existing evidence that would demonstrate a prima 
facie infringement: 
Is The Legislative Limitation Unreasonable? 
In this instance the limitation is basically the prohibition to practice autonomous 
Haudenosaunee forms of criminal justice within their own territorial boundaries and 
423 Please note that a clear position on the extent of surrender is necessary for any future 
litigation. If the Treaty is interpreted to have extinguished Haudenosaunee jurisdiction over 
murder and robbery, then any claim would have to exclude those two crimes. 
amongst their own people. This in turn has resulted in the imposition of a criminal justice 
system that treats the Iroquois Peoples in an inequitable and discriminatory manner. 
The limitation appears to presume that the Haudenosaunee are unable to control 
and regulate crime within their own society and therefore, must be subject to an imposed 
system that treats Aboriginal Peoples in a harsher manner than it does most other 
Peoples in Canada.424 However, this presumption is nonsensical. The historic evidence 
confirms that the Iroquois people had very low rates of internal criminal conduct and that 
this was achieved by adhering to the principles and values dictated by The Great Law 
and the other behavioral standards required by their societies.425 
To conclude the Haudenosaunee are no longer able to develop and administer a 
successful and effective community justice system that incorporates their cultural values 
is condescending and discriminatory. Historically they did so for centuries. Currently, 
they are one of the most highly educated First Nation communities in Canada. For the 
years 1998 to 2003, there was an average of 11 5 post secondary graduates per year in 
a diverse range of disciplines including law, administration, social work and other areas 
relevant to the operation of a contemporary justice system."' In addition, the hereditary 
Confederacy Council still remains an integral part of the community and can ensure the 
values and principles required for success are fully ingrained. There is no legitimate 
reason to assume that they cannot re-establish a system that is both capable and 
effective. 
Essentially, the purpose behind such an initiative is to improve relationships and 
quality of life for the community and the offender. To deny this in favour of a system that 
is prejudicial towards Aboriginal accused and predominantly serves to recycle 
deviance427 is clearly an unreasonable limitation on the expression of this inherent right. 
424 Please see the following section "Does the Legislation Impose Undue Hardship" for a 
thorough discussion of the longstanding discrimination and inequities experienced by Aboriginal 
Peoples dealt with by the Canadian criminal justice system. 
425 Please see "The Regulation of Criminal Acts". 
426 Six Nations of the Grand River, Grand River Post Secondary Education Office, 2002-2003 
Annual Report [http://www.grpseo.org102-03annual.html (January 20, 2004). 
427 M.E. Turpel-Lafond J., (Presentation to the College of Law, University of Saskatchewan, 25 
November 1999). 
Does The Legislation Impose Undue Hardship? 
The issue of undue hardship relates directly to the imposition of foreign values 
and the systemic discrimination and overrepresentation experienced by Aboriginal 
peoples within the mainstream Canadian criminal justice system.428 
The formal acknowledgement of these grim realities extends at least as far back 
as a Canadian Corrections Association publication entitled lndians and the ~ a w . ~ ~ '  This 
1967 report was prepared for the Department of lndian and Northern Affairs as a 
response to growing public awareness and concern about the situation of Aboriginal 
people in the justice system.430 
The report presented offence and corrections population statistics and made a 
series of recommendations for change. Recommendations included: modification of the 
nature and extent of law enforcement; implementation of judicial and correctional 
services for lndians and "Eskimos"; resolution of jurisdictional conflicts between federal 
and provincial governments; greater use of preventative and educational programs in 
schools; expansion of the lndian constable system; increased funding for friendship 
centres; and the recruitment of lndians and "Eskimos" to work in the criminal justice 
Governmental reaction to the committee's recommendations was less than 
adequate. Subsequent written works exposed continuing legal difficulties experienced by 
Aboriginal peoples. Publications such as Wahbung Our ~ o m o r r o w s ~ ~ ~  in 1971, Native 
Peoples and ~ u s t i c e ~ ~ ~  in 1975, and Report of the Metis and Non-Status lndian Crime 
428 Leonardy, supra note 100 at 183-48. 
429 Canada, lndian and Northern Affairs, lndians and the Law (Ottawa: Canadian Corrections 
Association and the Department of lndian and Northern Affairs, 1967). 
430 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Soliloquy and Dialogue: Overview of Major 
Trends in Public Policy Relating to Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Canada Communication 
Group, 1996) at 202. 
431 lndians and the Law, supra note 429 at 19. 
432 Wahbung Our Tomorrows, (Manitoba: Manitoba lndian Brotherhood, 1971). 
433 Canada, Solicitor General, Native Peoples and Justice: Report on the National Conference 
and the Federal-Provincial Conference on Native Peoples and the Criminal Justice System 
(1 975). 
and Justice ~o rn rn i ss ion~~~  in 1977 all described the enduring distress faced by 
Aboriginal peoples and the glaring idleness of government in implementing any 
recommended response to the situation.435 
In April 1985, a report entitled Reflecting lndian Concerns and Values in the 
Justice was released. The objective of this study was to "examine the current 
situation in relation to the circumstances of the lndian people of Saskatchewan and to 
recommend improvements or modifications that can be made within the existing 
constitutional and legal framework, such that the justice system would better reflect 
lndian concerns, interests, values and culture."437 
The working groups undertaking the study recommended greater participation by 
lndian communities in all aspects of the justice system, more education for lndian 
communities on how the justice system works, a community-based approach to problem 
solving with an emphasis on lndian values and customs, and co-operation between all 
levels of government and Aboriginal communities. Further recommendations were made 
to improve the Native Justice of the Peace Program and the lndian Special Constable 
Program, to encourage the use of Peacemakers, to establish local community justice 
committees, and to augment legal advisory services to assist in the development of 
these  recommendation^.^^' The working groups seemed to recognize the legitimacy of 
traditional Aboriginal concepts of justice, a recognition that paralleled broader 
discussions about criminal justice at the time. 
Additional support for the development of an Aboriginal justice system came in 
the 1988 publication Locking Up Natives in ~ a n a d a . ~ ~ '  The report examined differing 
Aboriginal justice systems and the sentencing of Aboriginal people, as well as the 
434 Native Council of Canada, Metis and Non-Status lndian Crime and Justice Commission, 
Report of the Metis and Non-Status Crime and Justice Commission (1 977). 
435 Soliloquy and Dialogue, supra note 430 at 204-212. 
436 Joint Canada-Saskatchewan-Federation of Saskatchewan lndian Nations, Reflecting lndian 
Concerns and Values in the Justice System (Ottawa: 1985). 
437 Ibid. at I. 
438 Soliloquy and Dialogue, supra note 430 at 221. 
439 M. Jackson, "Locking Up Natives in Canada" (1988-89), 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 21 5 (article 
originally prepared as a report of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on Imprisonment and 
Release in June 1 988). 
situation of Aboriginals in Canadian prisons. It revisited the idea of delivering justice in 
an alternative manner, introduced the concept of legal pluralism and considered self- 
government in relation to criminal justice. Criminal justice reform was seen as contingent 
on the recognition of the right of Aboriginal peoples to self-determinati~n.~~" The
committee concluded by recommending the development of, and funding for, parallel 
Aboriginal justice systems. It further encouraged governments to support initiatives by 
Aboriginal communities to implement traditional values into the criminal justice process 
and to assume greater control over corrections issues that affect them.441 
A surge of commissions, inquiries and special initiatives followed. Fully 16 more 
documents were produced between 1988 and 1 9 9 ~ , ~ *  including Aboriginal Peoples and 
Criminal Justice: Equality, Respect and the Search for ~ u s t i c e ~ ~ ,  Royal Commission on 
the Donald Marshall Jr.  rosec cut ion^^, Report of the OsnaburghMindigo Tribal Council 
Justice Review Committee445, and the Report of the Aboriginal Justice lnquiry of 
~ a n i t o b a . ~ ~ ~ ~ l l  came to the common conclusion that decolonization is a necessary and 
urgent reform needed to create an impartial legal system for Aboriginal people.447 
Notable is the Justice Inquiry's conclusion: 
For Aboriginal people, the essential problem is that the Canadian system 
of justice is an imposed and foreign system. In order for a society to 
accept a justice system as part of its life in its community, it must see the 
system and experience it as bein a positive influence working for that 
society. Aboriginal people do not. u! 
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443 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report No. 34, Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice: 
Equality, respect and the Search for Justice (Ottawa: The Law Reform Commission of Canada, 
1991). 
444 Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (Halifax: The 
Commission, 1989). 
445 Ontario, Report of the Osnaburgh/Windigo Tribal Council Justice Review Committee (Ontario: 
The Committee, 1990). 
446 Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, supra note 338. 
447 J. Youngblood-Henderson, "Changing Punishment for Aboriginal Peoples of Canada" (Paper 
presented to the Canadian Institute For The Administration Of Justice, 26-29 September 1999) 
[unpublished]. 
448 Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, supra note 338 at 252. 
Other studies followed, the most comprehensive and climactic coming from the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in 1996. In the Commission's publication 
Bridging the Cultural ~ i v i d e , ~ ~ '  the necessity of including Aboriginal justice systems 
within the framework of self-government was discussed. In their interim conclusions the 
Commission stated: 
Aboriginal people's alienation from the justice system is partly a result of 
the fact that justice - far from being the blind, impartial arbiter - has been 
the handmaiden to their oppression. But equally important, this alienation 
is the product of the fundamental differences Aboriginal people bring to 
the concept and process of justice. Recognition of the right of Aboriginal 
peoples to establish and control their own justice systems is an essential 
and integral part of recognizing and respecting cultural difference.450 
and, 
Based on the evidence we have considered, it is our view that the 
contemporary expression of Aboriginal concepts of justice are likely to be 
more effective than the existing non-Aboriginal justice system, both in 
responding to the wounds that colonialism has inflicted, which are evident 
in a cycle of disruption and destructive behaviour, and in meeting the 
challenges of maintaining peace and security in a changing 
and as one final recommendation they declared, 
The Commission recommends that federal, provincial and territorial 
governments recognize the right of Aboriginal nations to establish and 
administer their own systems of justice pursuant to their inherent right of 
self-government, including the power to make laws, within the Aboriginal 
nation's territory. 452 
The Supreme Court of Canada itself has criticized the discriminatory and unjust 
manner in which Aboriginal Peoples are dealt with by the Canadian criminal justice 
system. In R. v.   la due,^^^ where the court was asked to interpret s. 718 (2) (e) of the 
Criminal the following comments were made: 
449 Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra note 9. 
450 Ibid. at 58-59. 
451 Ibid. 
452 Ibid. at 224. 
453 R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C. R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Gladue]. 
454 Criminal Code, supra note 279. 
Not surprisingly, the excessive imprisonment of Aboriginal people is only 
the tip of the iceberg insofar as the estrangement of the Aboriginal 
peoples from the Canadian criminal justice system is concerned. 
Aboriginal people are overrepresented in virtually all aspects of the 
system. As this Court recently noted in R. v. Williams, [I9981 1 S.C.R. 
1128, at para. 58, there is widespread bias against Aboriginal people 
within Canada, and "[tlhere is evidence that this widespread racism has 
translated into systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system".455 
Later, they continued, 
... it must be recognized that the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders 
differ from those of the majority because many Aboriginal people are 
victims of systemic and direct discrimination, many suffer the legacy of 
dislocation, and many are substantially affected by poor social and 
economic conditions. Moreover, as has been emphasized repeatedly in 
studies and commission reports, Aboriginal offenders are, as a result of 
these unique systemic and background factors, more adversely affected 
by incarceration and less likely to be "rehabilitated" thereby, because the 
internment milieu is often culturally inappropriate and regrettably 
discrimination towards them is so often rampant in penal institutions.456 
and, 
... it must in every case be recalled that the direction to consider these 
unique circumstances flows from the staggering injustice currently 
experienced by Aboriginal peoples with the criminal justice system. The 
provision reflects the reality that many Aboriginal people are alienated 
from this system which frequently does not reflect their needs or their 
understanding of an appropriate sentence.457 
One would hope that, after three decades of studies concluding that a 
fundamental and radical change in criminal justice policy is necessary, such 
recommendations and conclusions would be implemented in an aggressive and 
committed manner. Unfortunately this has not been the case. Governments have made 
no changes that would positively affect and improve the longstanding crisis; problems of 
inequity and inmate over-representation have not improved, but continue to get worse. 
To illustrate, in 1998 Aboriginal peoples accounted for 3% of Canada's total 
population and 12% of total federal inmates. In the Prairie region they represented 64% 
455 Gladue, supra note 453 at para. 61. 
456 Ibid. at para. 68. 
457 Ibid. at para. 88. 
of the federal institution population while also representing 81.5% of total Aboriginal 
offenders.458 In the most recent statistics (2002), Natives account for 2.8% of the total 
Canadian population and 18% of the total federally incarcerated population. In prairie 
regions they represent as high as 76% (Saskatchewan) of federal inmates.450 
Further, according to the Correctional Service of Canada's most recent statistics, 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada: 
Represent 2.7 per cent of Canada's population while self-identified 
Aboriginal people represent approximately 17 per cent of all admissions 
to federal institutions 
As adults are incarcerated more than six times the national rate 
Continue to be far more likely to be incarcerated (17% versus 10.5%) 
than placed on conditional release 
Are under-represented in the federal day and full parole population and 
over-represented in the statutory release population 
Are 4% less likely to be granted federal day parole 
Are 5% less likely to be granted provincial day parole 
Are 13% less likely to be granted federal full parole 
Are 21 % less likely to be granted provincial full parole 
Are more likely to be returned to prison for a technical violation of release 
conditions 
Are referred for detention in higher proportions than non-Aboriginal 
offenders4" 
These commissions, reports, and statistics clearly demonstrate that Aboriginal 
Peoples are treated in a particularly inequitable manner when dealt within the 
mainstream justice system. When that inequality consistently results in harsher penalties 
458 Solicitor General of Canada, Consultation Paper, Towards a Just, Peaceful and Safe Society: 
The Corrections and Conditional Release Act- Five Years Later (Public Works and Government 
Services of Canada, 1998) at 22. 
459 Canada, Correctional Service of Canada, Aboriginal Offender Statistics [http:llwww.csc- 
scc.gc.ca/textlprgrm/correctional/abissueslknowl4e.shtml] (January 24, 2004). 
460 Canada, Correctional Service of Canada, Demographic Overview of Aboriginal Peopbs in 
Canada and Aboriginal Offenders In Federal Corrections [http:llwww.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/prgrml 
correctional/abissueslknow/lO~e.shtml] (January 24, 2004). 
and extensive judicial renunciation of personal freedoms, it is undoubtedly an undue 
hardship on a specific group of peoples within the population. In fact, many of the 
commissions and studies discussed came to the conclusion that Aboriginal Peoples are 
subject to 'systemic discrimination' which, when practiced and maintained by state 
institutions, extends beyond the principle of undue hardship to a tradition of oppression. 
Whether these statistical and systemic factors apply equally to the 
Haudenosaunee as a group has yet to be established. Specific statistical data regarding 
Iroquois accused and convicted within the justice system are not available, but the 
simple fact that they are by far the largest First Nation in canadam' would suggest that 
they are indeed suffering the same types of criminal justice related hardships as other 
Aboriginal groups in Canada. There is no justifiable reason to conclude that they are 
somehow immune to the same difficulties experienced by other First Nations. 
Further, according to the most recent correctional statistics (December 30, 2001) 
Aboriginal offenders in Ontario comprise 10% of the federally incarcerated population462 
while only accounting for 1.3% of the total Ontario population.463 Precise data for Ontario 
provincial institutional populations is not available, however, the Canadian Centre for 
Justice Statistics concluded that, apart from the shockingly high percentages in the three 
prairie provinces, Aboriginal admissions ranged from two to ten times their proportion in 
the provincial/territorial population.464 Personal experience working with many 
Haudenosaunee offenders incarcerated in provincial institutions465 indicates the 
percentage would be in the upper range of this estimate. Again, considering that the Six 
461 Registered Indian Population by Sex and Residence, supra note 3. As of December 31, 2002 
the Six Nations of the Grand River had a Band membership list totaling 21,618 individuals. In 
comparison, the second largest were the Mohawks of Akwesasne with a membership of 9,771 
and the third largest the Blood of Alberta with a membership totaling 9,358. 
462 Canada, Correctional Service of Canada, Aboriginal Offender Statistics [http://www.csc- 
scc.gc.ca/ text/prgrm/correctional/abissues/know/4~eshtl] (January 24, 2004). 
463 Demographic Overview of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, supra note 460. 
464 Canada, Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Aboriginal Peoples in 
Canada [http :Ilwww.statcan.calenglishlfreepub/85F0033MIE/85F0033MIE01001 .pdfl (January 
26, 2004). 
465 My conclusion relates to personal volunteer work with Haudenosaunee inmates at the Burtch 
Correctional Centre, Brantford, Ontario; Cambridge Detention Centre, Cambridge, Ontario; 
Brantford Detention Centre, Brantford Ontario. 
Nations of the Grand River are by far the largest First Nations community in ~ a n a d a , ~ ~ ~  it 
is reasonable to infer that they come into contact with the criminal justice system to the 
same degree, if not more so, than other Aboriginal peoples, and are therefore subject to 
the same magnitude of systemic discrimination and the resultant undue hardship as 
other First Nations throughout Canada. 
Does The Legislation Deny To The Holders Of The Right Their Preferred 
Means Of Exercising That Right? 
Under this stage of inquiry the Crown is likely to stress the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the existing measures that have been implemented to redress the 
undue harm experienced by Aboriginal Peoples. Therefore, it is necessary to examine 
these initiatives to determine if any are consistent with Haudenosaunee understandings 
of the expression of justice, and consequently, their preferred means of exercising their 
inherent right. 
Federal and provincial governments have initiated two main policy/procedure 
dire~t ives~~' that are intended to: (1) address the justive system inequities Aboriginal 
Peoples experience with the development of a more impartial and culturally relevant 
legal system; and (2) return a measure of control over criminal justice to Aboriginal 
communities. These directives are being discharged through: (a) further lndigenisation of 
the criminal justice system and the creation of "Tribal courts"; and (b) the increased use 
of alternative measures and culturally relevant processes such as the Sentencing Circle, 
Community Sentencing Panels, and the more recent Community Justice 
The primary flaw with lndigenisation and "Tribal courts" is the failure to address 
the foundational issue of Aboriginal accused remaining subject to foreign values and 
procedures that have traditionally been utilized as an oppressive function of colonization. 
466 Registered Indian Population by Sex and Residence, supra note 3 .  
467 The federal government has also implemented section 718 (2) (e) of the Criminal Code, which 
directs judges to consider all non-custodial sentencing options specifically in the instance of 
Aboriginal offenders. However, this provision is only applicable to sentencing under the 
mainstream criminal justice system and is not directly relevant to the Haudenosaunee's preferred 
means of exercising their right. 
468 Canada, Department of Justice Canada, The Aboriginal Justice Strategy [http://canada.justice 
.gc.ca/en/ps/ajln/strat.html] (January 26, 2004). 
A Haudenosaunee accused would feel no more justice from a common law sentencing 
disposition imposed by an Aboriginal agent of the state, as opposed to a non-Aboriginal 
agent of the state. On the contrary, such an accused is likely to consider the system 
even more unjust because of its recruitment and utilization of Aboriginal agents to do its 
bidding. The Haudenosaunee have evidently recognized the inadequacies of 
Indigenisation, which is indicated by their rejection of a "Tribal court" in 1999. Thus, it is 
obvious that Indigenisation is not the Haudenosaunee's preferred method of exercising 
their inherent right. 
The increasing use of cultural accommodation measures and Community Justice 
Programs is an attempt to restore a degree of participation and control over criminal 
justice procedure and sentencing to Aboriginal communities, with the underlying belief 
that culturally relevant processes will instill a greater sense of respect, confidence and 
adherence to the system.469 However, this practice is inherently flawed through the 
continued jurisdictional authority of the same criminal justice system and agents that 
initiated the crisis. For instance, the judicially directed programs470 require Crown 
consent regarding those accused who can participate471 and judges often retain the 
ultimate authority as to a "fit and proper" sentence.472 In addition, many "sentences 
imposed" under these procedures are subsequently appealed and overturned under the 
rationale that they don't meet the standard of a "fit and proper" sentence.473 
Community Justice Programs are also subject to similar limitations. They require 
authorization by the Attorney ~ e n e r a l ~ ' ~  and tend to focus on less serious offences, 
excluding those individuals accused of more serious assaults, administration-of-justice 
offences, impaired driving, robbery, theft over $5000, and many other categories of 
469 See, R.G. Green, Justice in Aboriginal Communities: Sentencing Alternatives (Saskatoon: 
Purich Publishing, 1998). 
470 Judicially directed programs are specific types of Sentencing CircleslCommunity Sentencing 
Panels that include judgesllawyerslpolicel parole officers in the sentencing process. 
47 1 Criminal Code, supra note 279 s. 71 7 (1) (b). 
472 R. V. Morin (1 995). 4 C.N.L.R. 37 (Sask. C.A.). 
473 M.E. Turpel-Lafond J., supra note 427. 
474 Criminal Code, supra note 279 s. 717 (1) (a). 
crime.475 Therefore, these types of initiatives do not impart jurisdiction476 and essentially 
restrict the expression of "Aboriginal justice" to the utilization of culturally relevant 
processes with those individuals and offences the Crown considers suitable for 
diversion. Such limitations directly conflict with Haudenosaunee assertions of sovereign 
autonomy over all aspects of their internal affairs and with their cultural understandings 
of justice, which cannot be fragmented into the use of cultural processes with specific 
offenders and specific offences. For the Haudenosaunee, justice is represented by The 
Great Law mandates of Peace, Health, and Righteousness, which apply to all 
Haudenosaunee community members, no matter their behaviour. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Haudenosaunee have always maintained a 
position of sovereignty in their dealings with the Imperial, Dominion and Canadian 
governments. They have also consistently resisted, overtly and covertly, any attempts by 
the above mentioned governments to usurp their internal practices. This resistance has 
also included the area of criminal justice jurisdiction as evidenced by initial reactions to 
the Treaty of Niagara, 1764, harassment of the RCMP during their 30 year occupation of 
Haudenosaunee territory in the 1900s, and the establishment of their own police force in 
1989. This obviously indicates that foreign justice systems and practices are not 
welcome in Haudenosaunee society. 
Finally, the elected political leadership is currently conducting a study regarding 
the development of "an alternative justice system incorporating traditional 
~ n g w e h o n : w e ~ ~ ~  values".478 The structure that this system will take is yet to be 
determined, but the existing Akwesasne and Onondaga models are being investigated 
and may prove to be useful examples. Such a project is an obvious indication that the 
475 Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Restorative Justice in Canada: A Consultation Paper, 
Appropriate Offences for Restorative Processes (May, 2000) [http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/ 
voc/rjpap.html#Aboriginal] (February 2, 2004). 
476 Under the more recent Community Justice Programs, Aboriginal communities/organizations 
and federallprovincial governments enter into Protocol Agreements that provide for the diversion 
of specific offendersloffences from the mainstream criminal justice system. These agreements 
do not impart jurisdiction. 
477 
'Ongwehon:weB is terminology which the Haudenosaunee also use to refer to themselves. 
Translated to English it means 'the real people' or by some lroquoian dialects 'the real men'. 
478 Six Nations Council, Justice and Law Portfolio, supra note 8. 
Haudenosaunee 'prefer' to develop and administer a system of justice that is consistent 
with the concepts of decolonization and integrates full jurisdictional authority. 
Conclusion On lnfringement 
Essentially what is required to establish prima facie infringement of an inherent 
right is "whether the legislation in question has the effect of interfering with an existing 
Aboriginal right. If it does have such an effect, it represents a prima facie infringement of 
s. 35(1)".~" AS the above analysis undeniably reveals, a prima facie infringement has 
been demonstrated. Criminal justice legislation and practice unreasonably limits 
Haudenosaunee desires to increase individual and community well being, causes undue 
hardship with the imposition of foreign values and discriminatory practices, and denies 
them the prerogative to develop and administer a justice system based on 
Haudenosaunee values. In combination, these clearly establish an interference with the 
existing Haudenosaunee right to criminal justice jurisdiction. 
Having confirmed the existence of a prima facie infringement, the final stage 
queries whether this infringement can be justified. 
Can The lnfringement Be Justified? 
The infringement justification stage requires the court to employ a two-part test 
that was first articulated in  parr row.^'' First, the government must demonstrate that it 
was acting pursuant to a compelling and substantial legislative objective, and secondly, 
that the infringement is consistent with the Crown's fiduciary obligation to First Nations. 
Compelling And Substantial Legislative Objective 
The concept of a compelling and substantial objected was first discussed in 
Sparrow where the court stated: 
- - -  - 
479 Sparrow, supra, note 178 at para. 68. 
480 Ibid. 
Here the court would inquire into whether the objective of Parliament in 
authorizing the department to enact regulations regarding fisheries is 
valid. The objective of the department in setting out the particular 
regulations would also be scrutinized. An objective aimed at preserving 
s. 35(1) rights by conserving and managing a natural resource, for 
example, would be valid. Also valid would be objectives purporting to 
prevent the exercise of s. 35(1) rights that would cause harm to the 
general populace or to Aboriginal peoples themselves, or other objectives 
found to be compelling and s~bstantial.~~' 
This particular quote is on point to the issue at hand as the objective of Canadian 
criminal justice legislation is primarily to maintain and restore peace and good order to 
the community,482 or in other terms, prevent harm to society and Aboriginal peoples 
themselves. However, the simple statement that a piece of legislation has the objective 
of preventing harm is not sufficient to meet the standard required to demonstrate a 
substantial and compelling objective. The content and effect of legislation itself must be 
examined to determine if the government is acting pursuant to a compelling and 
substantial objective.483 However, as the evidence previously discussed has illustrated, 
the imposition of Canadian criminal justice on Aboriginal Peoples has not acted to 
increase public safety or prevent harm to the general public or First Nations. In fact, in 
this context, it has principally acted to amplify harm. For instance, Aboriginal offenders in 
federal institutions have an overall recidivism rate484 of 33% compared to 20% for non- 
Aboriginal offenders.485 When considered in conjunction with the escalating percentages 
of federally incarcerated Aboriginal offenders,486 one can only conclude that the amount 
of crime is increasing. Greater numbers of Native offenders incarcerated, and 
subsequently recidivating, plainly means more crimes being committed, and 
consequently, an increase in the number of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal victims. 
481 Ibid. at 1 1  13. 
482 Leonardy, supra note 100 at 183. 
483 Gladstone, supra note 240 at para. 77 
484 The recidivism rate used is based upon readmission to a federal institution within one year of 
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485 Canada, Correctional Service of Canada, Examining Reintegration Potential for Aboriginal 
Offenders [http:llwww.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/forumlvl4n31vl4n3al5e.pdfl (February 4, 2004). 
486 Canada, Correctional Service of Canada, Aboriginal Offender Statistics (http:llwww.csc- 
scc.gc.caltext/prgrmlcorrectionallabissues/knowl4e.shtml) (February 6, 2004). 
In addition, there is also significant evidence which emphasizes that the rates of 
violent and property crime in First Nation communities is exceedingly high, particularly in 
comparison with the rates for non-Aboriginal peoples.487 For instance, in Ontario violent 
offences accounted for 20% of all criminal activity, compared to 11% in conventional 
urban neighborhoods of comparable size. Rates for break and enter, theft under $5,000, 
motor vehicle theft and assault were also elevated, while youth in First Nations 
communities were involved in a larger proportion of property crimes than youths in non- 
First Nations communities. It is also evident that Aboriginal females were involved in a 
much higher proportion of violent crimes than females in Euro-Canadian communities.488 
The above analysis reveals an existing crisis within First Nations communities in 
respect to criminal activity and the continued victimization of community members, 
including those of the Six Nations. Historically, such a state of affairs was unheard of in 
Haudenosaunee and other Aboriginal societies. The causes of the current situation are 
varied, and may include the additional factors of residential schools, destruction of 
culture, and poverty, however the issue at hand is criminal justice legislation itself. 
For over thirty years various government studies and commissions have reported 
that there is a major problem; Canadian criminal justice is acting to the detriment of 
Aboriginal Peoples and significant change is required. Attempts to address the issue 
with the addition of sentencing provisions489 and the expansion of cultural 
accommodation measures has not alleviated the problem.490 Aboriginal peoples still 
continue to suffer the same, inequity, discrimination and higher rates of victimization as 
before parliament tinkered with the Criminal Code or the Department of Justice created 
the Aboriginal Justice Directorate. It is evident that overwhelmingly, Aboriginal Peoples 
are not benefiting from the purported objectives of the criminal justice system but are 
primarily victimized by it. Public safety and the prevention of harm may well be 
compelling and substantial objectives, however, the legislation and processes currently 
utilized pursuant to those objectives is plainly unable to accomplish those endeavors. 
487 Demographic Overview of Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, supra note 460. 
488 Canada, Ministry of Solicitor General Canada, Police Reported First Nations Statistics ( 1  998) 
[http:/1 www.csc-scc.gc.caltext~prgrm/correctional/abissues/know/1O~e.shtml] (February 6, 2004). 
489 Criminal Code, supra note 279 s. 718 (2) (e). 
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Is The Infringement Consistent With The Crown's Fiduciary Obligation To 
First Nations? 
In Sparrow the Supreme Court concluded that the Crown's fiduciary obligation to 
First Nations is taken to mean that: 
... the honour of the Crown is at stake in dealings with Aboriginal 
peoples. The special trust relationship and the responsibility of the 
government vis-a-vis Aboriginals must be the first consideration in 
determining whether the legislation or action in question can be 
j~stified.~" 
and, 
Within the analysis of justification, there are further questions to be 
addressed, depending on the circumstances of the inquiry. These include 
the questions of whether there has been as little infringement as possible 
in order to effect the desired result; whether, in a situation of 
expropriation, fair compensation is available; and, whether the Aboriginal 
group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation 
measures being imp~emented.~~' 
The analysis in Sparrow was in direct relation to the allocation of resources and 
therefore, may not appear to be relevant to the issue of a residual function of self- 
government such as criminal justice jurisdiction. Unfortunately, there is little judicial 
guidance regarding the fiduciary component in relation to residual self-government 
rights. However, subsequent cases have adopted additional criteria that help to clarify 
the issue at hand. For instance, the court in Delgamuukw developed further guidelines 
for the fiduciary analysis in its application to Aboriginal title: 
There is always a duty of consultation .... In occasional cases, when the 
breach is less serious or relatively minor, it will be no more than a duty to 
discuss important decisions that will be taken with respect to lands held 
pursuant to Aboriginal title. Of course, even in these rare cases when the 
minimum acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in 
good faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns 
of the Aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue. In most cases, it will 
be significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even 
require the full consent of an Aboriginal nation, particularly when 
491 Sparrow, supra note 178 at para. 75. 
492 Ibid. at para. 82. 
provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to Aboriginal 
lands.493 
Again, the subject matter of this case is not directly on point but it ardently 
reaffirms the Crowns duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples when their rights have been 
infringed. It also sets the minimum standard required for consultation, which clearly has 
not been met. The Crown has not consulted with the Haudenosaunee with the intention 
of substantially addressing their concerns or grievances with the mainstream criminal 
justice system. The Iroquois have no meaningful input into the definition of criminal acts, 
the procedures accused are subject to, or the sanctions prescribed for offences. Further, 
it is justifiable to contend that in this instance the Crown is under a standard higher than 
the minimum duty to consult. Under Canadian criminal justice, Six Nations individuals 
are subject to a discriminatory system, can be forcibly removed from their territorial 
boundaries, and can be incarcerated in a Canadian prison or penitentiary. If some 
situations require the full consent of First Nations in regard to the enactment of hunting 
and fishing regulations within their territorial boundaries, how could a lower standard be 
set for the enactment of criminal laws that extend into Haudenosaunee territory? To do 
so implies that deer and trout represent a greater inherent and judicial value than that of 
the Haudenosaunee people and Haudenosaunee culture. 
Further guidance regarding fiduciary analysis was also provided by the British 
Columbia Supreme Court in Campbell. After an extensive review of applicable case law 
in relation to Aboriginal self-government, the court articulated the following: 
... these authorities mandate that any consideration of the continued 
existence, after the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown, of some right 
to Aboriginal self-government must take into account that: (1) the 
indigenous nations of North America were recognized as political 
communities; (2) the assertion of sovereignty diminished but did not 
extinguish Aboriginal powers and rights; (3) among the powers retained 
by Aboriginal nations was the authority to make treaties binding upon 
their people; and (4) any interference with the diminished rights which 
remained with Aboriginal peoples was to be 
The relevant issue for this analysis is that any interference with the right must be 
minimal. In application however, the inherent right at issue has been subject to maximal 
493 Delgamuukw, supra note 298 at para. 168. 
494 Campbell, supra note 414 at para. 95. 
infringement, or in other terminology, complete prohibition. As previously discussed, the 
RCMP raided Haudenosaunee territory in 1922 and afterward occupied the area until the 
establishment of the Six Nations police force. From the time of that initial raid, the Six 
Nations have been subject to Canadian criminal law and forbidden to formally assert 
their traditional criminal justice practices. The Haudenosaunee certainly continued to 
utilize traditional methods of conflict resolution on matters not considered to be serious 
criminal acts, however, this was always done privately out of fear of criminal 
This considered, it is highly unlikely that the government could demonstrate a minimal 
infringement of Haudenosaunee criminal justice jurisdiction. 
Although consultation and minimal infringement are the most consistently utilized 
factors examined in a fiduciary analysis, they do not represent an exhaustive set of 
criteria. The judiciary has concluded that "the requirements of the fiduciary duty are a 
function of the "legal and factual context" of each and the degree of scrutiny 
undertaken by the court is directly related to the nature of the Aboriginal right at issue.497 
Essentially what this means is that the factors to be considered in a fiduciary analysis 
will be dependent on the specifics of each case and the standard required of the Crown 
to justify any infringement will also be correlated to the significance of the Aboriginal right 
itself. Considering that the Canadian criminal justice system has a considerable effect on 
Aboriginal offenders, victims and communities as a whole, it is reasonable to conclude 
that a court must set an onerous standard on Crown justification. 
There are undoubtedly further inquiries related to the fiduciary component that 
must be investigated and the courts will determine the precise focus of these inquiries. 
However, I think there is one vital and specific concern that requires discussion. That 
concern is 'whether the Crown has sufficiently accommodated the Haudenosaunee in 
respect to criminal justice within their territorial boundaries'. This inquiry will require the 
court to focus on any measures the Crown has undertaken to alleviate or negate the 
harm created by any infringement. 
495 Traditional oral teachings, supra note 54. 
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For the purposes of the Haudenosaunee, there are two specific instances in 
which the Crown has attempted to accommodate. The first is concluding a tripartite 
agreement with the Six Nations for the development of a Haudenosaunee police force in 
1989, and the second is the government-endorsed initiative to institute a 
Haudenosaunee court. 
Neither of these issues deals with the fundamental problems associated with the 
criminal justice system itself. Simply changing the actors within an inadequate 
framework is an ad hoc measure that only gives the appearance of change. The police 
themselves remain enforcement agents of the Canadian state, while the creation of a 
Haudenosaunee court is an intrusion of foreign values, procedures and jurisdiction that 
have traditionally been used as oppressive functions of colonization. The 
Haudenosaunee and other Aboriginal Nations are a distinct people with distinct values, 
needs and practices. It is my contention that true accommodation and reconciliation 
requires this reality to be taken into full consideration and be given due weight in any 
fiduciary scrutiny. 
Parliament has already recognized that specific portions of the population, 
namely youth and armed forces personnel, require justice systems tailored to their 
distinct needs and requirements. This practice has be longstanding and without any 
significant disruption to the mainstream criminal justice system.498 There is no legitimate 
reason to presume that a parallel Haudenosaunee justice system would have any 
disrupting affects on Canadian criminal justice,499 and therefore, no justifiable reason to 
deny them the same measure of recognition and accommodation that already exists, 
albeit on a different basis, for other groups in society. 
In Sparrow, the court commented on the Crown's fiduciary obligation to 
Aboriginal Peoples: 
The sui generis nature of Indian title, and the historic powers and 
responsibility assumed by the Crown constituted the source of such a 
fiduciary obligation. In our opinion, Guerin, together with R. v, Taylor and 
Williams (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360, ground a general guiding principle for 
498 A. H. Kaiser, "The Criminal Code of Canada: A Review based on the Minister's Reference" 
[I 9921 U.B.C.L. Rev. (spec. ed.) at 88. 
499 Leonardy, supra note 100 at 182. 
s. 35(1). That is, the Government has the responsibility to act in a 
fiduciary capacity with respect to Aboriginal peoples. The relationship 
between the Government and Aboriginals is trust-like, rather than 
adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal 
rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship.500 
In Hogkinson, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. remarked on the legal obligations 
placed on the party who owes a fiduciary duty: 
At the heart of the fiduciary relationship lie the dual concepts of trust and 
loyalty. This is first and best illustrated by the fact that the fiduciary duties 
find their origin in the classic trust where one person, the fiduciary, holds 
property on behalf of another, the beneficiary. In order to protect the 
interests of the beneficiary, the express trustee is held to a stringent 
standard; the trustee is under a duty to act in a completely selfless 
manner for the sole benefit of the trust and its beneficiaries (Keech v. 
Sandford (1726), 25 E.R. 223) to whom he owes the "the utmost duty of 
loyalty" (Waters, Law of Trusts in Canada (2"d ed 1984), at p. 31 ). And 
while the fiduciary relationship is no longer confined to the classic trustee- 
beneficiary relationship, the underlying requirements of complete trust 
and utmost loyalty have never varied.501 
Taken together, it is reasonable to conclude that there is an obligation on the 
Crown to act in the best interests of First Nations and First Nations can trust the Crown 
to do so. For the Crown to discharge the requirements of its fiduciary obligation it must 
act to alleviate or negate the harm caused by the imposition of the Canadian criminal 
justice system. As illustrated throughout this analysis, the most effective means of doing 
so is through the establishment of a parallel Haudenosaunee justice system. Not to do 
so only continues the inequity and discrimination experienced by the Haudenosaunee, 
which is clearly not in their best interests. 
Conclusion On Justification 
The justification stage in this matter is clearly the most difficult process that will 
be encountered in any future litigation. However, the onus is on the Crown to prove 
justification, not on the Haudenosaunee to disprove it. We can speculate the Crown's 
position will include basic rhetorical arguments of public safety, equality before the law, 
500 Sparrow, supra note 178 at para. 59. 
501 Hogkinson v. Simms [I9941 3 S.C.R. 377 (S.C.C.). 
and public confidence in the justice system itself.502 This standpoint seemingly presumes 
that the concept of legal pluralism is not compatible with the existing Canadian legal 
framework. One concern may be that the Haudenosaunee will develop and be subject to 
an entirely different set of laws and sanctions if permitted to implement their own forms 
of criminal justice, which will then result in a greater risk of harm or victimization to the 
general population.503 To a limited extent, part of this assertion is true. The 
Haudenosaunee do hold values that are somewhat different from mainstream society, 
however, they also embrace many of the same values as that society. Respecting 
personal integrity and individual well-being is integral to Haudenosaunee culture, and 
any suspicions that a parallel justice system will some how encourage higher rates of 
victimization is unfounded. As previously mentioned, in traditional Six Nations society 
crime was a very rare occurrence because internal regulation of criminal behaviour was 
an ingrained component of their culture.504 Thus, the implementation of a system of 
justice, which integrates those cultural practices that kept a society in a state of cohesion 
for hundreds of years, cannot reasonably be considered a threat to public safety or 
confidence. 
In fact, it is likely that a parallel Haudenosaunee system will place more stringent 
obligations on individuals than those found in the mainstream justice system. The 
current Criminal code505 integrates the common law principle that individuals are not 
accountable for a failure to act unless there is a legal duty to do so.506 In 
Haudenosaunee society, as well as many other Aboriginal societies, there is a broad 
502 W. Warry, Unfinished Dreams: Community Healing and the Reality of Aboriginal Self- 
Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Inc., 1998) at 179. 
503 Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra note 9 at 236-238. 
504 See, A.C. Parker, Parker on the lroquois vol. 3 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968); 
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W.B. Newell, Crime and Justice Amoung the lroquois Nations (Montreal: Caughnawaga Historical 
Society, 1965); L.H. Morgan, League of the lroquois (New York: Burt Franklin, 1901 ); H.C. 
Colden, The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada, 1727, vol. 1 (New York: Allerton Book 
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York: AMS Press, 1976); E. Kenton, The Indians of North America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
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Genesee, 22nd ed. (New York: American Scenic and Historic Preservation Society, 1925). 
505 Criminal Code, supra note 279. 
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concept of obligation based on social reciprocity. For the Iroquois, this essentially means 
that one's duties and responsibilities to others outweigh one's personal desires and 
 gratification^.^" Traditionally, this sense of obligation to others was a principal factor in 
the maintenance of peaceful relations, and it is reasonable to expect that the 
Haudenosaunee would reflect those customs in any system of criminal justice they might 
In addition, my experience as a Haudenosaunee individual leads me to believe 
that the definition of criminal acts will not be a matter of much debate or conflict. The Six 
Nations are not blind to the realities of contemporary society and would likely be willing 
to adopt similar offences as those currently defined within the Criminal Code, unless an 
existing inherent right has been identified as an offence. It is also possible to get a good 
indication of what such a code of offences might look like with an examination of an 
existing code developed by a sister Haudenosaunee community. 
In 1989 a Code of Offences and Procedures for Justice for the Mohawk Territory 
at Akwesasne was presented for consideration to the Mohawk Nation Council of 
The code is 40 pages long and includes a comprehensive list of criminal 
offences that are divided into three broad categories. Those categories include, 
Offences Against One Another; Offences Against the Community; and Offences Against 
Nature. Crimes are also ranked according to severity and include many of the same 
offences found in the Criminal Code. For example, Offences Against One Another 
prohibits murder, rape, sexual abuse, kidnapping, assault, theft, etc. Offences Against 
the Community includes disorderly conduct, public intoxication, and embezzlement of 
public funds, while Offences Against Nature forbids any person or group of persons from 
changing or altering any terrain or watercourse in a manner that would be detrimental to 
natural life cycles or to nature. Those found guilty of serious offences under the code 
can be sentenced to probation, community service, fines, a penalty of twice the revenue 
earned from illegal activities, or bani~hment.~" 
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Thus, it would seem apparent that apprehension regarding the definition of 
criminal acts is unwarranted. The Haudenosaunee value the integrity, safety, and 
security of individuals as profoundly as any other society, if not more so. 
The issue of sanctions is also likely to create concerns as they may be viewed as 
more lenient and not in uniformity with those prescribed by the Criminal Code. However, 
as previously discussed, parallel systems of criminal justice already exist in Canada 
without any disruption to the mainstream system. Both young offenders and military 
personnel fall under criminal justice legislation that is not uniform with the Criminal 
The question of incarceration, or a parallel system's reluctance to utilize 
incarceration as a standard sentence, is also relevant. Most Aboriginal systems of justice 
utilize the restorative principles of offender reintegration and victim/offender/community 
healing. Thus, reconciliation is the principal objective. Incarceration is not considered 
useful in achieving reconciliation, so it is rarely, if ever, utilized.512 From a 
Haudenosaunee perspective, the objective of justice is "to put things right" and this 
cannot be achieved with the use of in~arceration.~'~ 
In 1995 the Canadian Parliament amended the Criminal code514to provide a 
statement of the purposes and principles underlying sentencing. Included within those 
purposes and principles are the objectives of rehabilitation, reparation, and 
respon~ibi l i ty.~~~ In addition, s. 717 (1) authorizes the use of alternative measures when 
their use is consistent with the protection of society, and s. 71 8 (2) (e) directs the court to 
consider all available sanctions other than imprisonment when doing so is reasonable. It 
is also important to note that s. 71 8 (2) (e) should be considered for all offenders with 
particular attention paid to Aboriginal offenders.516 Hence, it is evident that the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act, R.S.C. 2002, c. 1; National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5. 
512 Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra note 9 at 239-240. 
513 Traditional oral teachings, supra note 54. 
514 Criminal Code, supra note 279. 
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516 Section 718 (2) (e) reads: A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration 
the following principles: (e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in 
the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the 
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. 
mainstream criminal justice system is discouraging the use of incarceration as a 
standard sentencing norm and is increasingly incorporating the principles of restorative 
justice as a fundamental tenet. 
Thus, the argument of uniformity is not very compelling in a country that supports 
parallel systems of criminal justice for youth and military personnel, incorporates the 
principles of restorative justice into its legal framework, and whose constitution is 
designed expressly to authorize diversity in the laws applying in different regions of the 
In conclusion, I do believe it will be possible to rebut the Crown's attempts at 
justification with thorough preparation of all necessary evidence and a logical, 
compelling line of reasoning similar to that already discussed. Of course, relevant 
statistics, evidence of the extent of harm suffered by the Haudenosaunee, and 
assurance that any parallel system will not conflict with or disrupt the mainstream system 
will also need to be obtained and presented. 
517 Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra note 9 at 244. 
As noted, this examination has not come to a definitive conclusion on the issue of 
Haudenosaunee criminal justice jurisdiction. Much more evidence, time, and resources 
are required to reach such a conclusion, and in the end, it is ultimately up to the courts to 
make the final judgment. However, I do believe the foregoing discussion has 
demonstrated a convincing and sound foundation on which to build, should the 
Haudenosaunee find litigation necessary. As mentioned, there should not be much 
difficulty in meeting the requirements needed to establish either the existence of their 
relevant inherent right or a prima facie infringement of that practice. The Crown, on the 
other hand, will very likely have a difficult task in their attempts to establish 
extinguishment, and I would dare say, justification as well. 
Justification is unquestionably the most ambiguous area of this particular legal 
analysis, and any result on this matter will be directly linked to the court's willingness to 
take judicial notice of the numerous studies and commissions that have recognized the 
necessity for, and implementation of, parallel Aboriginal systems of justice. Considering 
that precedent in this regard has already been established in Glad~e,~" where the 
Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged and referred to many of these same studies 
and commissions for guidance when interpreting s. 718 (2) (e) of the Criminal Code, it is 
reasonable to expect similar judicial notice in any litigation involving Haudenosaunee 
criminal justice jurisdiction. 
This said, it is also imperative to comment on the broader but essential question 
surrounding this issue. That question is, 'Why are the courts being left to adjudicate the 
matter of Aboriginal criminal justice jurisdiction, when there is longstanding 
governmental recognition of the existing Aboriginal right to self-government"? Indian and 
Northern Affairs' existing policy on self-government emphasizes, "The Government of 
Canada recognizes the inherent right of self-government as an existing Aboriginal right 
under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,"~'~ while the scope of negotiations toward 
the implementation of self-government includes the "administrationlenforcement of 
Aboriginal laws, including the establishment of Aboriginal courts or tribunals".520 
Additional acknowledgement can also be found in the preamble of the recent First 
Nations Governance Act, which states in part, "Whereas the Government of Canada has 
adopted a policy of recognizing the inherent right of self-government as an Aboriginal 
right."521 In addition, in 1992 the Charlottetown Accord proposed to amend the Canadian 
Constitution to include the recognition of Aboriginal governments as a third order of 
government in ~ a n a d a , ~ ~ '  and that those governments have the authority to "safeguard 
and develop their languages, cultures, economies, identities, institutions and 
traditions"523 and "control their developments as peoples according to their own values 
and priorities and ensure the integrity of their societies".524 
Thus, it is evident that Canadian governments have formally recognized the 
Aboriginal right to self-government for over one full decade. However, this in turn begs 
the question, "Is criminal justice jurisdiction included within the scope of Aboriginal self- 
government"? Guidance on this query can be found in the most recent governmental 
reports on the subject. For instance, the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba stated: 
Aboriginal self-government includes the right to create and maintain 
codes of civil and criminal law, and a system to enforce and apply those 
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laws as well as any non-Aboriginal law that Aboriginal people choose to 
adopt.525 
In addition, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concluded: 
Aboriginal peoples' inherent right of self-government is recognized and 
affirmed in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and forms the basis 
for Aboriginal government as one of three orders of government within 
Canada. In the specific context of this report, it is our conclusion that the 
Aboriginal right of self-government encompasses the right of Aboriginal 
nations to establish and administer their own systems of justice, including 
the power to make laws within the Aboriginal nation's territory.526 
These assessments, which come from some of the foremost legal experts in the 
country, plainly answer this question in the positive. Aboriginal peoples have an existing 
inherent right to self-government and the scope of self-government includes the right to 
develop and administer systems of criminal justice. This notwithstanding, federal and 
provincial governments continue to regard Aboriginal nations as dependant wards of the 
state, and continue to resist the official acknowledgement of Aboriginal Peoples as 
nations. It is this fundamental principle that is at the core of the continuing discord 
surrounding criminal justice jurisdiction. This is particularly so for the Haudenosaunee, 
who have consistently maintained a position of sovereign nationhood, and who were 
acknowledged as such by Europeans for over 300 years. Thus, the most practical and 
constructive manner with which to resolve this friction is with a recommencement of the 
nation-to-nation relationship that was maintained for over three centuries. In keeping 
with the Supreme Court's assertion in Delgamuukw, the best approach in this case is a 
process of recognition and reconciliation that properly considers the complex and 
competing interests at stake,527 that recognizes that we are all here to s tap8  and follows 
the Two Row Wampum and Silver Covenant Chain in acknowledging that each nation 
will be responsible for their respective internal affairs. 
525 Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manifoba, supra note 338. 
526 Bridging the Cultural Divide, supra note 9 at 31 0. 
527 Delgamuukw, supra note 298 at para. 207. 
528 Ibid. at para. 186. 
1. With the statesmen of the League of Five Nations, I plant the Tree of Great Peace. 
I plant it in your territory Atotarho, and the Onondaga Nation: in the territory of you who 
are the firekeepers. I name the tree Tsioneratasekowa, the Great White Pine. Under the 
Shade of this Tree of Great Peace, we spread the soft, white, feathery down of the 
Globe Thistle as seats for you, Atotarho, and your cousin statesmen. We place you upon 
those seats, spread soft, with the feathery down of the Globe Thistle, there beneath the 
shade of the spreading branches of the Tree of Great Peace. 
There shall you sit and watch the Fire of the League of Five Nations. All the affairs of the 
League shall be transacted at this place before you, Atotarho, and your cousin 
statesmen, by the statesmen of the League of Five Nations. 
2. Roots have spread out from the Tree of Great Peace, one to the north, one to the 
east, one to the south and one to the west. If any man or any Nation outside the Five 
Nations shall obey the laws of the Great Peace (Kaianarekowa), and shall make this 
known to the statesmen of the League, they may trace back the roots to the Tree. 
If their minds are clean, and if they are obedient and promise to obey the wishes of the 
Council of the League, they shall be welcomed to take shelter beneath the Tree of the 
Long Leaves. 
We place at the top of the Tree of Great Peace an eagle, who is able to see afar. If he 
sees in the distance any danger threatening, he will at once warn the people of the 
League. 
3. To you, Atotarho and the Onondaga statesmen, I and the other statesmen of the 
League have entrusted the caretaking and the watching of the Five Nations Council Fire. 
When there is any business to be transacted and the Council of the League is not in 
session, a messenger shall be sent to either Atotarho, Hononwirehton, or Skanawate, 
firekeepers, or to their War Chiefs, with a full statement of the business to be 
considered. 
Then Atotarho shall call his cousins Chiefs together and consider whether the business 
is of sufficient importance to call the attention of the Council of the League. If so, 
Atotarho shall send messengers to summon all the Chiefs of the League and to 
assemble beneath the Tree of the Great Peace. 
When the statesmen are assembled, the Council Fire shall be kindled, but not with 
chestnut wood, and Atotarho shall formally open the Council. Then shall Atotarho and 
his cousin statesmen, the Firekeepers, announce the subject for discussion. The smoke 
of the Council Fire of the League shall ever ascend and pierce the sky so that other 
Nations who may be allies may see the Council Fire of the Great Peace. 
4. You, Atotarho and your thirteen cousin statesmen shall faithfully keep the space about 
the Council Fire clean, and you shall allow neither dust nor dirt to accumulate. I lay a 
long seagull wing (Tsiowatstekawe Onerahontsha) before you as a broom. 
As a weapon against a crawling creature, I lay a stick with you so that you may thrust it 
away from the Council Fire. If you fail to cast it out, then call all the rest of the united 
statesmen to your aid. 
The Mohawks 
5. The Council of the Mohawks shall be divided into three parties: Tehanakarine, 
Ostawenserentha and Soskoharowane are the first. Tekarihoken, Ayonwatha and 
Satekariwate are the second. Sarenhowane, Teyonhekwen and Orenrekowa are the 
third. 
The first party is to listen only to the discussion of the second and third parties and if an 
error is made, or the proceeding irregular, they are to call attention to it and when the 
case is right and properly decided by the two parties, they shall confirm the decision of 
the two parties and refer the case to the Seneca statesmen for their decision. When the 
Seneca statesmen have decided, in accord with the Mohawk statesmen, the case or 
question shall be referred to the Cayuga and Oneida statesmen on the opposite side of 
the house. 
6. 1, The Peacemaker, appoint the Mohawk statesmen the head and Leaders of the Five 
Nations League. The Mohawk statesmen are the foundation of the Great Peace, and it 
shall therefore be against the Great Binding Law to pass measures in the Council of the 
League after the Mohawk statesmen have protested against them. No Council of the 
League shall be legal unless all of the statesmen of the Mohawks are present. 
Thanksgiving 
7. Whenever the statesmen of the League shall assemble for the purpose of holding 
a council, the Onondaga statesmen shall open it by expressing their gratitude to their 
cousin statesmen, and greeting them, and they shall make an address and offer thanks 
to the earth where men dwell, to the streams of water, the pools and the lakes, to the 
maise and the fruits, to the medicinal herbs and trees, to the forest trees for their 
usefulness, and to the animals that serve as food and give their pelts for clothing, to the 
great winds and the lesser winds, to the Thunderers; to the Sun, the mighty warrior; to 
the moon, to the messengers of the Creator who reveal his wishes, and to the Great 
Creator who dwells in the heavens above, who gives all things useful to men, and who is 
the source and ruler of health and life. Then shall the Onondaga statesmen declare the 
Council open. The Council shall not sit after darkness has set in. 
8. The Firekeepers shall formally open and close all councils of the statesmen of the 
League, they shall pass upon all matters deliberated upon by the two sides, and render 
their decision. Every Onondaga statesmen (or his deputy) must be present at every 
Council of the League, and must agree with the majority without unwarrantable dissent, 
so that a unanimous decision may be rendered. It Atotarho or any of his cousin 
statesmen are absent from a Council of the League, any other Firekeeper may open and 
close the Council, but the Firekeepers present may not give any decisions, unless the 
matter is of small importance. 
9. All the business of the Five Nations League Council shall be conducted by the two 
combined bodies of Confederate statesmen. First the guestion shall be passed upon by 
the Mohawk and Seneca statesmen, then it shall be discussed and passed by the 
Oneida and Cayuga statesmen. Their decision shall then be referred to the Onondaga 
statesmen, the Firekeepers, for final judgment. 
The same process shall be followed when a question is brought before the Council by an 
individual or a War Chief. 
10. In all cases, the procedure must be as follows: 
When the Mohawk and Seneca statesmen have unanimously agreed upon a question, 
they shall report their decision to the Cayuga and Oneida statesmen, who shall 
deliberate upon the question and report a unanimous decision to the Mohawk 
statesmen. The Mohawk statesmen will then report the standing of the case to the 
Firekeepers, who will render a decision as they see fit in case of a disagreement by the 
two bodies, or confirm the decisions of the two bodies if they are identical. The 
Firekeepers shall then report their decision to the Mohawk statesmen who shall 
announce it to the open Council. 
11. If through any misunderstanding or obstinacy on the part of the Firekeepers, they 
reach a decision at variance with that of the two sides, the two sides shall reconsider the 
matter and if their decisions are jointly the same as before, they shall report to the 
Firekeepers, who are then compelled to confirm their joint decision. 
12. When a case comes before the Onondaga statesmen, the Firekeepers, for 
discussion and decision, Atotarho shall introduce the matter to his comrade statesmen, 
who shall then discuss it in their two bodies. Every Onondaga statesmen except 
Hononwireton shall deliberate and he shall listen only. When a unanimous decision shall 
have been reached by the two bodies of the Firekeepers, Atotarho shall notify 
Honowireton of the fact, then he shall confirm it. He shall refuse to confirm a decision if it 
is not unanimously agreed upon by both sides of the Firekeepers. 
13. No Chief shall ask a question of the body of Chiefs of the League when they are 
discussing a case, question or proposition. He may only deliberate in a low tone with the 
separate body of which he is a member. 
14. When the Council of the Five Nations Chiefs shall convene, they shall appoint a 
speaker for the day. He shall be a Chief of either the Mohawk, Onondaga, or Seneca. 
The next day, the Council shall appoint another, but the first speaker may be 
reappointed if there is no objection, but a speaker's term shall not be regarded more 
than for a day. 
15. No individual or foreign Nation interested in a case, question, or proposition shall 
have any voice in the Council of the League except to answer a question put to him or 
them by the speaker for the Chief. 
16. If the conditions which shall arise at any future time call for an addition to or change 
of this law, the case shall be carefully considered and if a new beam seems necessary 
or beneficial, the proposed change shall be decided upon, and if adopted, shall be 
called, "Added to the Rafters". 
Rights, Duties, Qualifications Of The Statesmen 
17. A bunch of certain shell (wampum) strings each two spans in length shall be given to 
each of the female families in which the Chieftain titles are vested. The right of 
bestowing the titles shall be hereditary in the family of females legally possessing the 
bunch of shell strings, and the strings shall be token that the females of the family have 
ownership to the Chieftainship title for all time to come, subject to certain restrictions 
mentioned here. 
18. If any Chief of the League neglects or refuses to attend the Council of the League, 
the other Chiefs of the Nation of which he is a member shall require their War Chief to 
request the female sponsors of the Chief so guilty of neglecting his duties to demand his 
attendance at the Council. If he refuses, the women holding the title shall immediately 
select another candidate for the title. 
No Chief shall be asked more than once to attend the Council of the League. 
19. If at any time it shall be apparent that a Chief of the League has not in mind the 
welfare of the people, or disobeys the rules of the Great Law, the men or the women of 
the League, or both jointly, shall come to the Council and scold the erring Chief through 
his War Chief. 
If the complaint of the people through the War Chief is not heeded, on the first occasion, 
it shall be uttered again, and then if no attention is given, a third complaint and a warning 
shall be given. If the Chief is still disobedient, the matter shall go to the Council of War 
Chiefs. The War Chiefs shall then take away the title of the erring Chief by order of the 
women in whom the title is vested. 
When a Chief is deposed, his War Chief shall address him as follows: 
"So you, .......... disregard and set at naught the warnings of your women relatives. You 
fling the warnings over your shoulder to cast them behind. Behold the brightness of the 
Sun, and the brightness of the Sun's light, I depose you of your title and remove the 
sacred emblem of your Chieftainship title. I remove from your brow the deer's antlers 
which was the emblem of your position and token of your nobility. I now depose you, and 
return the antlers to the women whose heritage they are." 
The War Chief shall now address the women of the deposed Chief and say: 
"Mothers, as I have deposed your Chief, I return to you the emblem and title of the 
Chieftainship; therefore, repossess them." 
Again addressing the deposed Chief he shall say: 
"As I have deposed and discharged you so you are no longer Chief. You shall go your 
way alone. The rest of the people of the league shall not go with you, for we no not the 
kind of mind you possess. As the Creator has nothing to do with wrong, so he will not 
come to rescue you from the precipice of destruction in which you have cast yourself. 
You will never be restored to the position which you once occupied." 
Then shall the War Chief address himself to the Chiefs of the Nation to which the 
deposed Chief belongs and say: 
"Know you my Chiefs, that I have taken the deer's antlers from the brow of ........ the 
emblem of his position and the token of his greatness." 
The Chiefs of the League shall have no other alternative then except to sanction the 
discharge of the offending Chief. 
20. If a Chief of the League of Five Nations should commit murder the other Chiefs of 
the Nation shall assemble at the place where the corpse lies and prepare to depose the 
criminal Chief. If it impossible to meet at the seen of the crime the Chiefs shall discuss 
the matter at the next Council of their Nation and request their War Chief to depose the 
Chief guilty of the crime, to bury his women relatives and to transfer the Chieftainship 
title to a sister family. 
21. Certain physical defects in a statesman of the League makes him ineligible to sit in 
the League Council, such defects are infancy, idiocy, blindness, deafness, dumbness 
and impotency. When a statesman of the League is restricted by any of these 
conditions, a deputy shall be appointed by his sponsors to act for him, but in cases of 
extreme necessity, the restricted statesman may exercise his rights. 
22. If a statesman of the League desires to resign his title, he shall notify the statesmen 
of the Nation of which he is a member of his intentions. If his co-active statesmen refuse 
to accept his resignation, he may not resign his title. 
A statesman in proposing to resign may recommend any proper candidate which 
recommendation shall be received by the statesmen but unless confirmed and 
nominated by the women who hold the title, the candidate shall not be considered. 
23. Any Chief of the League of Five Nations may construct shell strings or wampum 
belts of any size or length as pledges or records of matters of national or international 
importance. 
When it is necessary to dispatch a shell string by a War Chief or other messenger as a 
token of a summons, the messenger shall recite the contents of the string to the party to 
whom it is sent. That party shall repeat the message and return the shell string, and if 
there has been a summons, he shall make ready for his journey. 
Any of the people of the Five Nations may use shells or wampum as the record of a 
pledge, contract, or an agreement entered into and the same shall be binding as soon as 
shell strings shall have been exchanged by both parties. 
24. The Chiefs of the League of Five Nations shall be mentors of the people for all time. 
The thickness of their skin shall be seven spans (tsiataniioronkarake), which is to say 
they shall be proof against anger, offensive action, and criticism. Their hearts shall be 
full of peace and good will, and their minds filled with a yearning for the welfare of the 
people of the League. With endless patience, they shall carry out their duty. Their 
firmness shall be tempered with a tenderness for their people. Neither anger nor fury 
shall find lodging in their minds and all their words and actions shall be marked by calm 
deliberation. 
25. If a Chief of the League should seek to establish any authority independent of the 
jurisdiction of the League of the Great Peace, which is the Five Nations, he shall be 
warned three times in open Council, first by women relatives, second by men relatives, 
and finally by the Chiefs of the Nation to which he belongs. 
If the offending Chief is still persistent, he shall be dismissed by the War Chief of his 
Nation for refusing to conform to the laws of the Great Peace. His Nation shall then 
install the candidate nominated by the female name holders of his family. 
26. It shall be the duty of all Chiefs of the League of Five Nations, from time to time as 
occasion demands, to act as teachers and spiritual guides of their people, and remind 
them of their Creator's will and words. They shall say: 
"Listen that peace may continue unto future days!" 
"Always listen to the words of the Great Creator for he has spoken." 
"United people, let no evil find lodging in your minds." 
"For the Great Creator has spoken and the cause of peace shall not become old." 
"The cause of peace shall not die if you remember the Great 
Creator." 
27. All Chiefs of the League of Five Nations must be honest in all things. They must not 
idle or gossip, but be men possessing those honourable qualities that make true leaders. 
It shall be a serious wrong for anyone to lead a Chief into trivial affairs, for the people 
must ever hold their Chiefs high in estimation out of respect to their honourable 
positions. 
28. When a candidate Chief is to be installed, he shall furnish four strings of shells or 
wampum one span in length bound together at one end. Such will constitute the 
evidence of his pledge to the Chiefs of the League that he will live according to the 
Constitution of the Great Peace and exercise justice in all affairs. 
When the pledge is furnished, the Speaker of the Council must hold the shell strings in 
his hand and address the opposite side of the Council Fire, and he shall begin his 
address saying: 
"Now behold him. He has now become a Chief of the League. See how splendid he 
looks." 
An address may then follow. At the end of it he shall send the bunch of shell strings to 
the opposite side, and they shall be received as evidence of the pledge. 
29. When a Chieftainship title is to be conferred, the candidate Chief shall furnish the 
cooked venison, the corn bread and the corn soup, together with other necessary things 
and the labour for the Conferring of Titles festival. 
30. The Chiefs of the League may confer the Chieftainship title upon a candidate 
whenever the Great Law is recited, if there is a candidate, for the Great Law speaks all 
the rules. 
31. If a Chief of the League should become seriously ill and be thought near death, the 
women who are heirs of his title shall go to his house and lift his crown of deer antlers, 
the emblem of his Chieftainship, and place them at one side. If the Creator spares him 
and he rises from his bed of sickness, he may rise with the antlers on his brow. 
32. If a Chief of the League should die while the Council of the Five Nations is in 
session, the Council shall adjourn for ten days. 
No Council of the League shall sit within ten days of the death of a Chief of the League. 
If the Three Brothers (ahsennihontatekenah) (the Mohawk, Onondaga and Seneca) 
should lose one of their Chiefs by death, the Younger Brothers (iatatekanah) (the 
Cayuga and Oneida) shall come to the surviving Chiefs of the Three Brothers on the 
tenth day and console them. 
If the Younger Brothers lose one of their Chiefs, then the Three Brothers shall come to 
them and console them. And the consolation shall be the reading of the contents of the 
thirteenth shell (wampum) strings of Ayonwatha. 
At the termination of this rite, a successor shall be appointed, to be appointed by the 
women heirs of the Chieftainship title. If the women are not ready to place their nominee 
before the Chiefs, the Speaker shall say: 
"Come let us go out." 
All shall then leave the Councilor place of gathering. The Speaker shall lead the way 
from the house by saying: 
"Let us depart to the edge of the woods and lie in wait on our bellies." 
(Tenshakonatioswentarhese). 
When the women title holders shall have chosen one of their sons, the Chiefs of the 
League will assemble in two places, the Younger Brothers in one place and the Three 
Older Brothers in another. The Chiefs where to console the mourning Chiefs shall 
choose one of their number to sing the Song of Peace as they journey to the sorrowing 
Chiefs. The singer shall lead the way, and the Chiefs and the people shall follow. When 
they reach the sorrowing chiefs, they shall hail the candidate Chief and perform the right 
of Conferring the Chieftainship title. (Ohke iontentshera) 
33. When a Chief of the League dies, the surviving relatives shall immediately dispatch a 
messenger, a member of another clan, to the Chiefs in another locality. When the runner 
comes within hailing distance of the locality, he shall utter a sad wail, thusly: 
The sound shall be repeated three times, and then again and again at intervals as many 
times as the distance may require. When the runner arrives at the settlement. the people 
shall assemble and one must ask him the nature of his sad message. He shall then say: 
"Let us consider." (rakwennikonriak) 
Then he shall tell them of the death of the Chief. He shall deliver to them a string of 
shells or wampum and say: 
"Here is the testimony, you have heard the message." 
He may return home. It now becomes the duty of the Chiefs of the locality to send 
runners to other localities and each locality shall send messengers until all Chiefs are 
notified. Runners shall travel day and night. 
34. If a Chief dies and there is no candidate qualified for the office in the family of the 
women title holders, the Chiefs of the Nation shall give the title into the hands of a sister 
family (Kentennonteron) in the clan until such time as the original family produces a 
candidate, when the title shall be restored to the rightful owners. No Chieftainship title 
may be carried into the grave. The Chiefs of the League may dispossess a dead Chief of 
his title even at the grave. 
Pine Tree Chief 
35. Should any man of the Nation assist with special ability or show great interest in the 
affairs of the Nation, if he proves himself wise and honest and worthy of confidence, the 
Chiefs of the League may elect him to seat amoung them, and he may sit in the Council 
of the League. He shall be proclaimed a Pine Tree, sprung up for the Nation, and be 
installed as such at the next assembly for the installation of Chiefs. Should he ever do 
anything contrary to the rules of the Great Peace, he may not be deposed from office- no 
one shall cut him down- but thereafter everyone shall be deaf to his voice and his 
advice. Should he resign from his seat and title, no one shall prevent him. A Pine Tree 
Chief has no authority to name a successor nor is his title hereditary. 
The War Chiefs 
36. The title names of the War Chiefs of the League shall be: 
Ayonwehs: War Chief under Chief Takarihoken (Mohawk) 
Kahonwaitiron: War Chief under Chief Otatsheteh (Oneida) 
Ayentes: War Chief under Chief Atotarho (Onondaga) 
Wenens: War Chief under Chief Dekaenyon (Cayuga) 
Shoneratowaneh: War Chief under Chief Skanyatariio (Seneca) 
The women heirs of each head Chiefs title shall be the heirs of the War Chiefs title of 
their respective Chief. 
The War Chiefs shall be selected from the eligible sons of the female families holding 
the head Chieftainship title. 
37. There shall be one War Chief from each Nation, and their duties shall be to carry 
messages for their Chiefs, and to take up arms in case of emergency. They shall not 
participate in the proceedings of the Council of the League, but shall watch it's progress, 
and in case of an erroneous action by a Chief, they shall receive the complaints of the 
people and convey the warnings of the women to him. The people who wish to convey 
messages to the Chiefs of the League shall do so through the War Chiefs of their Nation. 
It shall always be his duty to lay the cases, questions, and propositions of the people 
before the Council of the league. 
38. When a War Chief dies, another shall be installed by the same rite as that by which a 
Chief is installed. 
39. If a War Chief acts contrary to instructions, or against the provisions of the laws of 
the Great Peace, doing so in the capacity of his office, he shall be deposed by his 
women relatives and by his men relatives. Either the women or the men alone or jointly 
may act in such a case. The women title holders shall then choose another candidate. 
40. When the Chiefs of the League take occasion to dispatch a messenger in behalf of 
the Council of the League, they shall wrap up any matter they may send, and instruct the 
messenger to remember his errand, to turn not aside, but to proceed faithfully to his 
destination and deliver his message according to every instruction. 
41. If a message borne by a runner is the warning of an invasion, he shall whoop, "Kwa- 
ah, Kwa-ah!" twice and repeat at short intervals, then again at longer interval. If a human 
is found dead, the finder shall not touch the body, but return home immediately shouting 
at short intervals, "Koo-weh!" 
The Clans 
42. Amoung the Five Nations and their descendants there shall be the following Clans: 
Great Name Bearer, Ancient Name Bearer, Great Bear, Ancient Bear, Turtle, Painted 
Turtle, Standing Rock, Large Plover, Little Plover (or Snipe), Deer Pigeon, Hawk, Eel, 
Ball, "Opposite Side of the Hand" and Wild Potatoes. These Clans distributed through 
their respective Nations shall be the sole owners and holders of the soil of the country 
and in them is vested, as a birthright. 
43. People of the Five Nations who are members of a certain Clan shall recognize every 
member of the Clan, no matter what Nation, as relatives. Men and women therefore, 
who are members of the same Clan are forbidden to marry. 
44. The lineal descent of the people of the Five Nations shall run in the female line. 
Women shall be considered the progenitors of the Nation. They shall own the land, and 
the soil. Men and women shall follow the status of their mothers. 
45. The women heirs of the Chieftainship titles of the League shall be called Oianer or 
Otiianer (Noble) for all time to come. 
46. The women of the 48 (now 50) noble families shall be the heirs of the Authorized 
Names for all time to come. 
When an infant of the Five Nations is given an Authorized Name at the Midwinter 
Festival or at the Green Corn and Strawberry and Harvest Festival, one in the 
cousinhood of which the infant is a member shall be appointed a Speaker. He shall then 
announce to the opposite cousinhood the names of the father and mother of the child, 
together with the Clan of the mother. Then the Speaker shall announce the child's name 
twice, the uncle of the child shall then take the child in his arms and walking up and 
down the room shall sing "My head is firm; I am of the League." as he sings the opposite 
cousinhood shall respond by chanting, "Hyen, Hyen" until the song is ended. 
47. If the female heirs of a title of a Chief of the League become extinct, the title shall be 
given by the Chiefs of the League to a sister family whom they shall elect, and that 
family shall hold the name and transmit to their female heirs, but they shall not appoint 
any of their sons as a candidate for a title until all the eligible men of the former family 
shall have died, or othetwise have become ineligible. 
48. If all the heirs of a Chieftainship become extinct, and so all the families in the Clan, 
then the title shall be given by the Chiefs of the League to a family of a sister Clan whom 
they shall elect. 
49. If any of the Otiianer women, heirs of a titleship, shall willfully withhold a 
Chieftainship or other title and refuse to bestow it, or if such heirs abandon, forsake, or 
despise their heritage, then shall such women be deemed buried, and their family 
extinct. The titleship shall then revert to a sister family, or Clan, upon application and 
complaint. The Chiefs of the League shall elect the family or Clan which shall in future 
hold the title. 
50. The Otiianer women of the League, heirs of the Chieftainship titles shall elect two 
women of their family as cooks for the Chief when the people shall assemble at his 
house for business or other purposes. It is not good nor honourable for a Chief of the 
League to allow his people whom he has called to go hungry. 
51. When a Chief holds a conference in his home, his wife, if she wishes, may prepare 
the food for the union Chiefs who assemble with him. Theirs is an honourable right which 
she may exercise, and an expression of her esteem. 
52. The Otiianer women, heirs of the Chieftainship titles, shall, should it be necessary, 
correct and admonish the holders of the titles. Those only who attend the Council may 
do this, and those who do not shall not object to what has been said nor strive to undo 
the action. 
53. When the Otiianer women, holders of a Chieftainship title, select one of their sons as 
a candidate, they shall select one who is trustworthy, of good character, of honest 
disposition, one who manages his own affairs, and supports his own family, if any, and 
who has proven a faithful man to his Nation. 
54. When a Chieftainship title becomes vacant through death or other cause, the 
Otiianer women of the Clan in which the title is hereditary shall hold a council, and 
choose one of their sons to fill the office made vacant. Such a candidate shall not be the 
father of any Chief of the League. If the choice is unanimous the name is referred to the 
men relatives of the Clan. 
If they should disapprove, it shall be their duty to select a candidate from amoung their 
own number. If then the men and women are unable to decide which of the two 
candidates shall be named, then the matter shall be referred to the Chiefs of the League 
in the Clan. They shall decide which candidate shall be named. If the men and women 
agree to a candidate, then his name shall be referred to the sister Clans for confirmation. 
If the sister Clans confirm the choice and present it to their cousin Chiefs, and if the 
cousin Chiefs confirm the name, then the candidate shall be installed by the proper 
ceremony for the conferring of Chieftainship titles. 
The Symbols 
55. A large bunch of shell strings, in the making of which the Five Nations Chiefs have 
equally contributed, shall symbolize the completeness of the union, and certify the 
pledge of the Nations represented by the Chiefs of the league of the Mohawk, the 
Oneida, the Onondaga, the Cayuga, and the Seneca, that all are united and formed into 
one body, or union, called the Union of the Great Law which they have established. 
A bunch of shell strings is to be the symbol of the Council Fire of the League of Five 
Nations. And the Chief whom the Council of Firekeepers shall appoint to speak for them 
in opening the Council shall hold the strands of shells in his hands when speaking. 
When he finishes speaking, he shall place the strings on an elevated place or pole so 
that all the assembled Chiefs and the people may see it and know that the Council is 
open and in progress. 
56. Five strings of shell tied together as one shall represent the Five Nations, each string 
shall represent one territory, and the whole a completely united territory known as the 
Five Nations Territory. 
57. Five arrows shall be bound together very strong and shall represent one nation each. 
As the five arrows are strongly bound, this shall symbolize the complete union of the 
Nations. Thus are the Five Nations completely united and enfolded together, united into 
one head, one body, and one mind. They shall therefore labour, legislate, and council 
together for the interest of future generations. 
The Chiefs of the League shall eat together from one bowl the feast of cooked beaver's 
tail. While they are eating, they are to use no sharp utensils, for if they should, they 
might accidentally cut one another, and bloodshed would follow. All measures must be 
taken to prevent the spilling of blood in any way. 
58. There are now the Five Nations League Chiefs standing with joined hands in a circle. 
This signifies and provides that should any one of the Chiefs of the League leave the 
Council and the League, his crown of deer antlers, the emblems of his Chieftainship title, 
together with his birthright, shall lodge on the arms of the Union Chiefs whose hands are 
so joined. He forfeits his title, and the crown falls from his brow, but it shall remain in the 
League. 
A further meaning of this is that if at any time any one of the Chiefs of the League 
choose to submit to the law of a foreign people, he is no longer in but out of the League, 
and persons of this class shall be called "They have alienated themselves." 
(Tehonatonkoton). Likewise, such persons who submit to laws of foreign nations shall 
forfeit all birthrights and claims on the League of Five Nations and territory. 
You, the League of Five Nations Chiefs, be firm so that if a tree should fall upon your 
joined hands, it shall not separate you or weaken your hold. So shall the strength of 
union be preserved. 
59. A bunch of wampum strings, three spans of the hand in length, the upper half of the 
bunch being white and the lower half black, and formed from equal contributions of the 
men of Five Nations, shall be the token that the men have combined themselves into 
one head, one body, and one thought, and it shall symbolize their ratification of the 
peace pact of the league. Whereby the Chiefs of the Five Nations have established the 
Great Peace. The white portion of the shell strings represent the women, and the black 
portion the men. The black portion, furthermore, is a token of power and authority vested 
in the men of the Five Nations. 
This string of wampum vests the people with the right to correct their erring Chiefs. In 
case a part of the Chiefs or all of them pursue a course not vouched for by the people 
and heed not the third warning of their women relatives (Wasenensawenrate), then the 
matter shall be taken to the General Council of the Women of the Five Nations. If the 
Chiefs notified and warned three times fail to heed, then the case falls into the hands of 
the men of the Five Nations. The war Chiefs shall then, by right of such power and 
authority, enter the open Council to warn the Chief or Chiefs to return from their wrong 
course. If the Chiefs heed the warning, they shall say, "We shall reply tomorrow." If then 
an answer is returned in favor of justice and in accord with this Great Law, then the 
Chiefs shall individually pledge themselves again, by again furnishing the necessary 
shells for the pledge. Then shall the War Chief or Chiefs, exhort the Chiefs, urging them 
to be just and true. 
Should it happen that the Chiefs refuse to heed the third warning, then two courses are 
open: either the men in the Council may decide to depose the Chief or Chiefs, or to club 
them to death with war clubs. Should they in their Council decide to take the first course, 
the War Chief shall address the Chief or Chiefs, saying: 
" Since you the Chiefs of the Five Nations have refused to return to the procedure of the 
Constitution, we now declare your seats vacant, and we take off your horns, the token of 
your Chieftainship, and others shall be chosen and installed in your seats. Therefore, 
vacate your seats." 
Should the men in their Council adopt the second course, the War Chief shall order his 
men to enter the Council, to take positions beside the errant Chiefs, sitting between 
them where ever possible. When this is accomplished, the War Chief holding in his 
outstretched hand a bunch of black wampum strings shall say to the erring Chiefs: 
"So now. Chiefs of the Five Nations, harken to these last words from your men. You 
have not heeded the warnings of the General Council of Women, and you have not 
heeded the warning of the men of the Nations, all urging you to the right course of 
action. Since you are determined to resist and hold justice from your people, there is 
only one course for us to adopt." 
At this point, the War Chief shall drop the bunch of black wampum, and the men shall 
spring to their feet, and club the erring Chiefs to death. Any erring Chief may become 
submissive before the War Chief lets fall the black wampum. Then his execution is 
withheld. 
The black wampum used here symbolizes that the power to execute is buried, but it may 
be raised up again by the men. It is buried, but when the occasion arises, they may pull 
it up and derive their power and authority to act as here described. 
60. A broad belt of wampum of thirty eight rows, having a white heart in the centre, on 
either side of which are two white squares all connected with the heart by white rows of 
beads shall be the emblem of unity of the Five Nations. 
The first of the squares on the left represents the Mohawk Nation and it's territory, the 
second square on the left and near the heart represents the Oneida Nation and it's 
territory, and the white heart in the middle represents the Onondaga Nation and it's 
territory. It also means that the heart of the Five Nations is single in it's loyalty to the 
Great Peace, and that the Great Peace is lodged in the heart (meaning with Onondaga 
League Chiefs) and that the Council Fire is to burn there for the Five Nations. Further it 
means that the authority is given to advance the cause of peace whereby hostile Nations 
out of the League shall cease warfare. The white square to the right of the heart 
represents the Cayuga Nation and it's territory and the fourth and last square represents 
the Seneca Nation and it's territory. 
White here symbolizes that no evil nor jealous thought shall creep into the minds of the 
Chiefs while in Council under the Great Peace. White, the emblem of peace, love, 
charity, and equity surrounds and guards the Five Nations. 
61. Should a great calamity threaten the generations rising and living of the Five United 
Nations, then he who is able to climb to the top of the Tree of the Great Long Leaves 
may do so. When he reaches the top of the Tree, he shall look about it in all directions 
and should he see evil things indeed approaching, then he shall call to the people of the 
Five United Nations assembled beneath of the Tree of the Great Peace and say, "A 
calamity threatens your happiness." 
Then shall the Chiefs convene in Council and discuss the impending evil. When all the 
truths relating to the trouble shall be fully known and found to be truths, then shall the 
people seek a Tree of Kahonkaahkona, the great swamp elm tree, and when they shall 
find it they shall assemble their heads together and lodge for a time between it's roots. 
Then, their labours being finished, they may hope for happiness many days after. 
62. When the League of the Five Nations Council declares for a reading of the belts of 
shell calling to mind these laws, they shall provide for the reader a specially made mat 
woven of the fibres of wild hemp. The mat shall not be used again for such formality is 
called "honouring the importance of the law." 
63. Should two sons of opposite sides of the Council Fire (iatawa) agree in a desire to 
hear a reciting of the Laws of the Great Peace and so refresh their memories in a way 
specified by the Founder of the League, they shall notify Atotarho. He shall consult with 
five of his cousin Chiefs and they in turn shall consult their eight brethren. Then should 
they decide to accede to the request of the two sons from the opposite sides of the 
Council Fire, Atotarho shall send messengers to notify the Chiefs of each of the Five 
Nations. Then they shall dispatch their War chief to notify their brother and cousin Chiefs 
of the meeting and it's time and place. 
When all have come and have assembled, Atotarho, in conjunction with his cousin 
Chiefs, shall appoint one Chief who shall repeat the laws of the Great Peace to the two 
sons. Then the chosen one shall repeat the laws of the Great Peace. 
64. At the ceremony of the installation of Chiefs, if there is only one expert speaker and 
singer of the Law and Song of Peace to stand at the Council Fire, then when this 
speaker and singer has finished addressing one side of the Fire, he shall go to the 
opposite side and reply to his own speech and song. He shall thus act for both sides of 
the Fire until the entire ceremony has been completed. Such a speaker and singer shall 
be termed "Two-faced" because he speaks and sings for both sides of the Fire. 
65. 1, The Peacemaker, and the United Chiefs, now uproot the tallest tree 
(skarenhesekowa) and into the hole thereby made we cast all weapons of war. Into the 
depths of the earth, down into the deep underneath currents of water (Tionawatetsien) 
flowing to unknown regions we cast all the weapons of strife. We bury them from sight 
and we plant again the tree. Thus shall the Great Peace be established and hostilities 
shall no longer be known between the Five Nations, but peace to the United people. 
Adoptions 
66. The father of a child of great comeliness, learning, ability or specially loved because 
of some circumstances may, at the will of the child's Clan, select a name from his own 
(the father's) Clan and bestow it by ceremony, such as is provided, this naming shall be 
only temporary, and shall be called, "A name hung about the neck." 
67. Should any person, a member of the League of Five Nations, especially esteem a 
man or a woman of another Clan or of a foreign nation, he may choose a name, bestow 
it upon that person so esteemed. The naming shall be in accord with the ceremony of 
bestowing names. Such a name is only temporary and shall be called "A name hung 
about the neck." A short string of shells shall be delivered with the name as a record and 
a pledge. 
68. Should any member of the Five Nations, a family, or a person belonging to a foreign 
nation submit a proposal for adoption into a Clan of one of the Five Nations, he or they 
shall furnish a string of shells, a span in length, as a pledge to the Clan into which he or 
they wish to be adopted. The Chiefs of the Nation shall then consider the proposal and 
submit a decision. 
69. Any member of the Five Nations, who through esteem or other feelings, wishes to 
adopt an individual, a family, or a number of families, may offer adoption to him or them, 
and if accepted, the matter shall be brought to the attention of the Chiefs for confirmation 
and the Chiefs must confirm the adoption. 
70. When the adoption of anyone shall have been confirmed by the Chiefs of the Nation, 
the Chiefs shall address the people of the Nation and say: 
"Now you of our Nation, be informed that ...... (such a person, such family or such 
families) have ceased forever to bear their birth Nation's name and have buried it in the 
depth of the earth. Henceforth let no one of our Nation ever mention the original name or 
Nation of their birth. To do so will hasten the end of our peace." 
Emigration 
71. When a person or family belonging to the Five Nations desires to abandon their 
Nation and the territory of the Five Nations, they shall inform the Chiefs of their Nation 
and the Council of the league of Five Nations shall take notice of it. 
When any person or any people of the Five nations emigrate and reside in a distant 
region away from the territory of the League of Five Nations, the Chiefs of the Five 
Nations at will may send a messenger carrying a broad belt of black shells and when the 
messenger arrives he shall call the people together or address them personally, 
displaying the belt of black shell and they shall know that this is an order for them to 
return to their original homes and to their Council Fires. 
Foreign Nations 
72. The soil of the earth from one end to the other is the property of the people who 
inhabit it. By birthright, the Onkwehonwe, the original beings, are the owners of the soil 
which they own and occupy and none other may hold it. The same law has been held 
from the oldest times. 
73. The great Creator has made us of one blood, and of the same soil he made us, and 
as only different tongues constitute different Nations, he established different hunting 
grounds and territories and made boundary lines between them. 
74. When any alien Nation or individual is admitted into the League the admission shall 
be understood to be a temporary one. Should the person or Nation create loss, do 
wrong, or cause suffering of any kind to endanger the peace of the League, the League 
Statesmen shall order one of their War Chiefs to reprimand him or them. If a similar 
offence is committed, the offending party or parties shall be expelled from the territory of 
the League. 
75. When a member of an alien Nation comes to the territory of the League and seeks 
refuge and permanent residence, the Statesmen of the Nation to which he comes shall 
extend hospitality and make him a member of the Nation. Then shall he be accorded 
equal rights and privileges in all matters except as mentioned here. 
76. No body of alien people who have been adopted temporarily shall have a vote in the 
Council of the Chiefs of the League, for only they who have been invested with 
Chieftainship titles may vote in the Council. Aliens have nothing by blood to make claim 
to a vote and should they have it, not knowing all the traditions of the League, might go 
against the Great Peace. In this manner, the Great Peace would be endangered and 
perhaps destroyed. 
77. When the Chiefs of the League decide to admit a foreign Nation and an adoption is 
made, the Chiefs shall inform the adopted Nation that it's admission is only temporary. 
They shall also say to the Nation that it must never try to control, to interfere with, or to 
injure the Five Nations, nor disregard the Great Peace or any of it's rules or customs. In 
no way should they cause disturbance or injury. Then shall the adopted Nation disregard 
these injunctions, their adoption will be annulled and they will be expelled. 
78. Whenever a foreign Nation enters the League or accepts the Great Peace, the Five 
Nations and the foreign Nation shall enter into an agreement and compact by which the 
foreign Nation shall endeavor to persuade the other Nations to accept the Great Peace. 
79. Skanawati shall be vested with a double office, duty, and with double authority. One 
half of his being shall hold the Statesman title, and the other half shall hold the title of 
War Chief. In the event of war he shall notify the five War Chiefs of the League and 
command them to prepare for war and have the men ready at the appointed time and 
place for engagement with the enemy of the Great Peace. 
80. When the Council of the League has for it's object the establishment of the Great 
Peace among the people of an outside nation and that Nation refuses to accept the 
Great Peace, then by such refusal they bring a declaration of war upon themselves from 
the Five Nations. Then shall the Five Nations seek to establish the Great Peace by a 
conquest of the rebellious Nation. 
81. When the men of the League, now called forth to become warriors, are ready for 
battle with an obstinate opposing Nation that has refused to accept the Great Peace, 
then one of the five War Chiefs shall be chosen by the warriors of the League to lead the 
army into battle. It shall be the duty of the War Chief so chosen to come before his 
warriors and address them. His aim shall be to impress upon them the necessity of good 
behaviour and strict obedience to the commands of the War Chiefs. 
He shall deliver an oration exhorting them with great zeal to be brave and courageous 
and never to be guilty of cowardice. At the conclusion of his oration he shall march 
forward and commence a War Song. 
82. When the warriors of the Five Nations are on an expedition against the enemy, the 
War Chief shall sing the War Song as he approaches the country of the enemy and not 
cease until his scouts have reported that the army is near the enemy's lines when the 
War Chief shall approach with great caution and prepare for the attack. 
83. When peace shall have been established by the termination of the war against a 
foreign Nation, then the War Chief shall cause all the weapons of war to be taken from 
the Nation. Then shall the great Peace be established and that Nation shall observe all 
the rules of the Great Peace for all time to come. 
84. Whenever a foreign Nation is conquered or has by their own will accepted the Great 
Peace, their own system of internal government may continue, but they must cease all 
warfare against other Nations. 
85. Whenever a war against a foreign nation is pushed until that nation is about 
exterminated because of it's refusal to accept the Great Peace, and if that nation shall by 
it's obstinacy become exterminated, all their rights, property, and territory shall become 
the property of the Five Nations. 
86. Whenever a foreign nation is conquered and the survivors are brought into the 
territory of the League of Five Nations and placed under the Great Peace, the two shall 
be known as the Conqueror and the Conquered. A symbolic relationship shall be 
devised, and be placed in some symbolic position. The conquered nation shall have no 
voice in the Councils of the League in the body of Chiefs. 
87. When the War of the Five Nations on a foreign rebellious nation is ended, peace 
shall be restored to that nation by a withdrawal of all their weapons of war by the War 
Chief of the Five Nations. When all the terms of peace shall have been agreed upon, a 
state of friendship shall be established. 
88. When the proposition to establish the Great Peace is made to a foreign nation, it 
shall be done in mutual council. The foreign nation is to be persuaded by reason, and 
urged to come into the Great Peace. If the Five Nations fail to obtain the consent of the 
nation at the first council, a second council shall be held and upon a second failure, a 
third council shall be held and this third council shall end the peaceful methods of 
persuasion. At the third council, the War Chief of the Five Nations shall address the 
Chief of the foreign nation and request him three times to accept the Great Peace, if 
refusal steadfastly follows, the War Chief shall let the bunch of white lake shells drop 
from his outstretched hand to the ground, and shall bound quickly forward and club the 
offending Chief to death. War shall thereby be declared, and the War Chief shall have 
his warriors to back any emergency. War must continue until the contest is won by the 
Five Nations. 
89. When the Chiefs of the Five Nations propose to meet in conference with a foreign 
nation with proposals for an acceptance of the Great Peace, a large band of warriors 
shall conceal themselves in a secure place, safe from the espionage of the foreign 
nation, but as near at hand as possible. Two warriors shall accompany the Union Chief 
who carries the proposals, and these warriors shall be especially cunning. Should the 
Chief be attacked, these warriors shall hasten back to the army of warriors with the news 
of the calamity which fell through the treachery of the foreign nation. 
90. When the Five Nations Council declares war, any Chief of the league may enlist with 
the warriors by temporarily renouncing his sacred Chieftainship title which he holds 
through the nomination of his women relatives, the title then reverts to them and they 
may bestow upon another temporarily until the war is over, when the Chief, if living, may 
resume his title and seat in the council. 
91. A certain wampum belt of black beads shall be the emblem of authority of the five 
War Chiefs to take up the weapons of war and with their men to resist invasion, this shall 
be called a War in Defense of the Territory. 
92. If a nation, part of a nation, or more than one nation within the Five Nations should in 
any way endeavor to destroy the Great Peace by neglect or violating its laws, and 
resolve to dissolve the League, such a nation or such nations shall be deemed guilty of 
treason and called enemies of the League and the Great Peace. 
It shall then be the duty of the Chiefs of the League who remain faithful to resolve to 
warn the offending people, they shall be warned once, and if a second warning is 
necessary, they shall be driven from the territory of the League by the War Chief and his 
men. 
Rights Of The People 
93. Whenever an especially important matter or a great emergency is presented before 
the League Council, and the nature of the matter effects the entire body of the Five 
Nations, threatening their utter ruin, then the Chiefs of the League must submit the 
matter to the decision of their people and the decision of the people shall affect the 
decision of the League Council. This decision shall be a confirmation of the voice of the 
people. 
94. The men of every Clan of the Five Nations shall have a Council Fire ever burning in 
readiness for a Council of the Clan. When it seems necessary for the interest of the 
people, for a council to be held to discuss the welfare of the Clan, then the men may 
gather about the fire. This Council shall have the same rights as the Council of Women. 
95. The women of every Clan of the Five Nations shall have a Council Fire ever burning 
in readiness for a Council of the Clan. When in their opinion it seems necessary for the 
interest of the people, they shall hold a Council, and their decision and recommendation 
shall be introduced before the Council of Chiefs by the War Chief for it's consideration. 
96. All the Clan Council Fires of a Nation or of the Five Nations may unite into one 
general Council Fire, or delegates from all the Council Fires may be appointed to unite in 
a general Council for discussing the interest of the people. The people shall have the 
right to make appointments, and to delegate their power to others of their number. 
When their Council shall have come to a conclusion on any matter, their decision shall 
be reported to the Council of the Nation or the League Council (as the case may require) 
by the War Chief or the War Chiefs. 
97. Before the real people united their nations, each Nation had it's own Council Fires. 
Before the Great Peace their Councils were held. The Five Council Fires shall continue 
to burn as before and they are not quenched. The Chiefs of each Nation in the future 
shall settle their Nation's affairs at this council Fire, governed always by the laws and 
rules of the Council of the League and the Great Peace. 
98. If either a nephew or a niece see an irregularity in the performance of the functions 
of the Great Peace and it's laws, in the League Council or in the conferring of Chiefs 
titles in an improper way, through their War Chief they may demand that such actions 
become subject to correction, and that the matter conform to the ways prescribed by the 
law of the Great Peace. 
Ceremonies 
99. The rites and festivals of each Nation shall remain undisturbed and shall continue as 
before, because they were given by the people of old times as useful and necessary for 
the good of men. 
100. It shall be the duty of the Chiefs of each brotherhood to confer at the approach of 
the time of the Midwinter Thanksgiving and to notify the people of the approaching 
festival. They shall hold a Council over the matter, and arrange it's details and begin the 
Thanksgiving five days after the moon of Tiskonah is new. the people shall assemble at 
the appointed place and the nephews shall notify the people of the time and place, from 
the beginning to the end, the Chiefs shall preside over the Thanksgiving and address the 
people from time to time. 
101. It shall be the duty of the appointed managers of the Thanksgiving Festivals to do 
all that is needful for carrying out the duties for the occasions. the recognized festivals of 
Thanksgiving shall be the Midwinter Thanksgiving, the Maple or Sugar Making 
Thanksgiving, the Raspberry Thanksgiving, the Strawberry Thanksgiving, the 
Cornplanting Thanksgiving, the Corn Hoeing Thanksgiving, the Little Festival of Green 
Corn, the Great Festival of Ripe Corn, and the Complete Thanksgiving for the Harvest. 
Each Nation's festivals shall be held in their Longhouses. 
102. When the Thanksgiving for the Green Corn comes, the special managers, both the 
men and the women, shall give it careful attention and do their duties properly. 
103. When the Ripe Corn Thanksgiving is celebrated, the Chiefs of the Nation must give 
it the same attention as they give to the Midwinter Thanksgiving. 
104. Whenever any man proves himself by his good life and his knowledge of good 
things, he shall be recognized by the Chiefs as a Teacher of Peace and Kariwiio, and 
the people shall hear him. 
Installation Song  
105. The song used in installing the new Chief of the League shall be sung by Atotarho 
and it shall be: 
"Haii, haii Akaw wiio 
Haii, haii Akonhewawatha 
Haii, haii Skaweiesekowa 
Haii, haii Yonkwawi 
Haii, haii lakonhewatha" 
106. Whenever a person properly entitled desires to learn the Song of Peace, he 
privileged to do so, but he must prepare a feast at which his teachers may sit with him 
and sing. The feast is provided that no misfortune may befall them for singing the song 
when no Chief is installed. 
Protection Of The House 
107. A certain sign shall be known to all the people of the Five Nations which shall 
denote that the owner or occupant of a house is absent. A stick or a pole in a slanting or 
leaning position shall indicate this and be the sign. Every person not entitled to enter the 
house by right of living within upon seeing such a sign shall not enter the house by day 
or by night, but shall keep as far away as his business will permit. 
Funerals 
108. At the funeral of a Chief of the League these words are said: 
"Now we become reconciled as you start away. You were once a Chief of the League of 
Five Nations, and the united people trusted you. Now we release you, for it is true that it 
is no longer possible for us to walk about together on the earth. Now, therefore, we lay it 
(the body) here. Here we lay it away. Now then we say to you, persevere onward to the 
place where the Creator dwells in peace, let not the things of the earth hinder you. Let 
nothing that transpired while you lived hinder you. In hunting you once delighted; in the 
game of lacrosse, you once delighted, and in the feast and pleasant occasions your 
mind was amused, but now do not allow thoughts of these things to give you trouble." 
"Let not your relatives hinder you and also let not your friends and associates trouble 
your mind. Regard none of these things." 
"Now then, in turn, you here present who are related to the man, and you who were his 
friends and associates, behold the path that is yours also. Soon we ourselves will be left 
in that place. For this reason, hold yourselves in restraint as you go from place to place. 
In your actions and in your conversation do no idle thing. Speak not idle talk, neither 
gossip. Be careful of this, and speak not and do not give away to evil behaviour. One 
year is the time that you must abstain from unseeming levity, but if you cannot do this for 
ceremony, ten days is the time to regard these things for respect". 
109. At the funeral of a War Chief say: 
"Now we become reconciled as you start away. Once you were a War Chief of the Five 
Nations League, and the united people trusted as their guard from the enemy." (The 
remainder is the same as the address at the funeral of a Chief) 
11 0. At the funeral of a warrior say: 
"Now we become reconciled as you start away. Once you were a devoted provider and 
protector of your family, and you were ready to take part in battles for the Five Nations. 
The united people trusted ..." (The remainder is the same as the address at the funeral 
of a Chief) 
11 1. At the funeral of a young man say: 
"Now we become reconciled as you start away. In the beginning of your career you were 
taken away, and the flower of your life is withered away." (The remainder is the same as 
the address at the funeral of a Chief) 
11 2. At the funeral of a Chief woman say: 
"Now we become reconciled as you start away. You were once a Chief woman of the 
League of Five Nations. You were once a Mother of the Nations. Now we release you, 
for it is true that it is no longer possible for us to walk about together on the earth. Now, 
therefore, we lay it (the body) here. Here we lay it away. Now then we say to you, 
persevere onward to the place where the Creator dwells in peace. Let not the things of 
the earth hinder you. Let nothing that transpired while you lived hinder you. Looking after 
your family was a sacred duty, and you were faithful. You were one of the many joint 
heirs of the Chieftainship titles. Feastings were yours and you had pleasant 
occasions ...." (The remainder is the same as the address at the funeral of a Chief). 
11 3. At the funeral of a woman of the people say: 
"Now we become reconciled as you start away. you were once a woman in the flower of 
life and the bloom is now withered away. You once held a sacred position as a mother of 
the Nation. Looking after your family was a sacred duty and you were faithful. Feastings 
...." (The remainder is the same as the address at the funeral of a Chief). 
114. At the funeral of an infant or young woman say: 
"Now we become reconciled as you start away. You were a tender bud and gladdened 
our hearts for only a few days. Now the bloom has withered away. Let none of these 
things that have transpired on earth hinder. Let nothing that happened while you lived 
hinder you" (The remainder is the same as the address at the funeral of a Chief). 
115. When an infant dies within three days, mourning shall continue only five days. Then 
shall you gather the little boys and girls at the house of the mourning, and at the funeral 
feast, a speaker shall address the children and bid them to be happy once more, though 
by death, gloom has been cast over them. Then shall the children be again in the 
sunshine. 
116. When a dead person is brought to the burial place, the Speaker on the opposite 
side of the Council Fire shall bid the bereaved family cheer in their minds once more and 
rekindle their hearth fires in peace, to put their house in order and once again be in 
brightness, for darkness has covered them. He shall say that the black clouds shall roll 
away and that the bright blue sky is visible once more. Therefore they shall be at peace 
in the sunshine again. 
117. Three strings of shell, one span in length, shall be employed in addressing the 
assemblage at the burial of the dead. The Speaker shall say: 
"Hearken, you who are here, this body is to be covered. assemble in this place again in 
ten days hence, for it is the decree of the Creator that mourning shall cease when ten 
days have expired. Then a feast shall be made." 
Then at the expiration of ten days, the Speaker shall say: 
"Continue to listen you who are here. The ten days of mourning have expired and your 
mind must now be freed of sorrow as before the loss of your relative. The relatives have 
decided to make a little compensation to those who have assisted at the funeral, it is a 
mere expression of thanks. This is to the one who did the cooking while the body was 
lying in the house. Let her come forward and receive this gift and be dismissed from the 
task." (In substance, this will be repeated for everyone who assisted in any way until all 
have been remembered.)" 
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